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History

FLOWERS FROM THE DEVIL: AN AMERICAN OPIATE CRISIS, THE
CRIMINALIZATION OF MARIJUANA, AND THE TRIUMPH OF THE PROHIBITION
STATE, 1840-1940
Chairperson: Jeff Wiltse
This dissertation focuses on historic changes in public perception of narcotic use and abuse from
the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth. From the 1840s to the outbreak of Civil War,
politicians, physicians, the general public, and state and federal government remained largely
ambivalent on the topic of drug use. Opium, morphine, and cannabis were legal, widely available
in American pharmacies, and touted as essential medicines. Within the Bohemian community,
artists and writers experimented with the recreational use of cannabis and their accounts of that
style of consumption filled the pages of Harper’s, The New Yorker, and a host of other literaryminded publications. By the 1880s, that seemingly permissive environment seemed to suddenly
give way to a government increasingly focused on the regulation and prohibition of drugs.
This work argues that a late-nineteenth century opiate epidemic radically transformed the
country’s relationship with drugs and placed cannabis on a historical trajectory that led to its
criminalization in the late-1930s. As newspapers blamed the perceived narcotic crisis that
emerged in post-bellum America on the medical community, public opinion turned, to a large
extent, against doctors and pharmacists. This erosion in public trust in the practice of medicine—
a direct byproduct of an American opiate crisis—instigated a transfer of control over the nation’s
approach to drug management. Once entirely the occupation of a relatively decentralized medical
community, crucial choices over the dispensation of narcotics and their general management
shifted to the arena of popular politics. This dissertation argues that transference of power aided
the formation of a prohibition-minded state that rapidly banned smokable opium, non-medicinal
opiates, cocaine, alcohol, heroin, and—eventually—marijuana.
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Introduction
In 1866, newspapers across the United States published advertisements for “Hasheesh
Candy.” It labeled the confection a “Great Oriental Panacea!” and the “only, reliable, safe and
agreeable preparation of this much esteemed Eastern Stimulant and Tonic.” The cannabis used to
make the candy had been prepared “under the supervision of one of the most celebrated chemists
in the country.” The papers billed the treat as a medicine and argued that, to those who could not
get a good night’s sleep, it was “invaluable.” It also eased the symptoms of “nervousness,
headache, low spirits, coughs, neuralgia, loss of appetite, chronic and camp diarrhea, dyspepsia,
asthma, and dysentery.” In the treatment of those diseases, the promotional bulletin continued,
cannabis was simply unparalleled. Indeed, Dr. Mott, who practiced in New York City, offered a
testimonial that read, “the true medicinal virtues of the Hasheesh Candy are very great; much
better than yet appears. I could wish that a remedy, so potent for good as it is, were more
generally in use.”1
Sixty years later, the United States government went to war against that same substance.
On November 27, 1937, it was widely reported that U.S. customs agents had assembled along
the Mexican border to stop the flow of cannabis into the United States. The agents were
“veterans in wars against international smuggling rings” and were “waging a battle to halt the
flow of marihuana from its native Mexico” into the United States. In many cases, federal
authorities crossed into Mexico. “The federal battle lines are moving southward,” a syndicated
article proclaimed, “into the tiny villages of the vast, barren Northern Mexico country, where the
dread ‘giggle weed’ is cultivated and grows wild.”2
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How did Americans’ relationship with drugs go from permissive and experimental in the
mid-to-late nineteenth century to fearful and prohibitory during the twentieth century? At its
heart, this dissertation seeks to answer that question. The broad conclusion drawn here is that a
late-nineteenth century opioid epidemic restructured the way Americans thought about narcotics
and ultimately how they perceived the practices that defined the medical and pharmaceutical
professions. In the process, the general public also broadly reconsidered the role government
should play in averting public health crises. Indeed, their responses pointed to complicated and
multilayered set of social and political developments greatly spurred by a morphine crisis
following the Civil War—one that led to a wholesale reconsideration of all narcotics, including
opium, cocaine, hashish, heroin, and marijuana.
The story of how that crisis unfolded and changed American opinions on narcotic use
starts in the 1840s in the field of medicine. A variety of social and scientific trends shaped that
initial permissive and experimental environment that dominated the practice of medicine
throughout the nineteenth century. During that period, the field of medicine was largely
responsible for vetting new narcotics for the pharmaceutical marketplace and, for the most part,
state and federal government did not interfere with that process. In an era before centralized
agencies tested new and potentially powerful drugs for public consumption, the relatively
unregulated medical and pharmaceutical professions assumed that role. In the process, doctors
continued to vet medicines through trial-and-error experiments on patients they encountered in
daily practice.
The methods deployed to test the safety of new medicines for the marketplace in the
nineteenth century represented the antithesis to the isolated and controlled laboratory
experiments that would replace them in the twentieth. Nineteenth century physicians conducted
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experiments in London, New York, Philadelphia, Boston, New Orleans, St. Louis, San
Francisco, and nearly all the small cities and towns in between. Their subjects were not carefully
selected, but rather included any American seeking medical treatment. The experiments were
also not controlled or necessarily even guided by established data. The latter was especially true
in the initial stages of experimentation when little information on the impact of a certain narcotic
existed. In that environment of uncertainty, doctors tended to push forward with prescriptions
that would later be deemed controversial. Throughout the period, physicians continually
prescribed new medicines—whether it was raw opium, cannabis, laudanum, morphine,
chloroform, cocaine, or heroin—and then noted the patient’s reactions (whether it was positive
or negative). That information, then printed in medical journals, circulated throughout Europe
and the United States.
This style of testing the medical viability of new drugs nurtured a culture of prescriptive
latitude. It also helped that the drugs physicians experimented with did not tend to nurture
widespread social disease—or at least that was the dominant reality before the outbreak of the
American Civil War. The resultant overdoses, accidental poisonings, and rates of addiction
during that period, while not unheard of, did ultimately seem relatively contained. That kind of
containment strategy proved successful largely because the profession worked with unrefined
plant-based substances throughout much of the nineteenth century. While raw opium introduced
its fair share of consequences, unfortunate outcomes were ultimately deemed manageable.
Cannabis, a substance the medical community vigorously tested throughout the mid-nineteenth
century, led to no known deaths or addictions. Consequently, the medical community’s
reputation for managing the dispensation and vetting of new drugs remained relatively intact
through the American Civil War.
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The introduction of the hypodermic needle created an entirely different environment. The
intravenous application of a meticulously distilled opioid began to spike rates of addiction in the
United States and undermined the long-term viability of the medical profession’s approach to
vetting new medicines. Physicians, just as they had done with opium, cannabis, laudanum,
chloroform, and morphine powders, tested the power of intravenous morphine on patients with
that familiar sense of liberality embraced by ante-bellum practitioners. According to their
training, those individuals used it widely and treated subjects with muscular issues, depression,
nausea, diarrhea, and etcetera. This seemingly unfettered use created a population of addicted
Americans and many of them, at first, tended to be middle-class women. In response, the media
fixated on the imagery of the unfortunate drug addicted American mother and pursued a style of
reporting on the morphine problem that began to reshape popular opinion and stoke a sense of
panic.
While many in the medical community arrived at the understanding that their aging
practices seemed to have encountered a new reality that required modern thinking, the damage
had mostly been done. In fact, as the health epidemic created by morphine addiction grew
exponentially in the 1880s, the medical community continued experimenting with new narcotics
like cocaine, a highly addictive drug used for toothaches, fatigue, depression, and nausea. The
perceived inability of the profession to rapidly readjust their practices began to significantly
damage the average physician’s public reputation. At the same time, the press increasingly
portrayed physicians and pharmacists as out-of-touch and unprofessional while also
sensationalizing drug related issues and encouraging a political intervention in order to solve a
crisis it then actively promoted.
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The criticism of the medical profession was not confined to the media alone. Dr. T.D.
Crothers, a tireless reformer of his community’s practices, argued in 1899 that even American
doctors were becoming addicted to the morphine needle. He used the new popular name for
morphine dependency—morphinism—and argued that any continued ambivalence on the subject
might threaten the core foundations of society. “I cannot stop without calling attention to the fact
that morphinism is increasing among physicians.” He continued by pointing out that “the reports
from private asylums and public hospitals” suggested that if the problem remained unchecked,
“medical men” would soon form “a considerable part” of the asylum’s inmate population.3
Crothers’ prediction was bleak and suggested the drug crisis had not only entered the
middle-class home, but also had infiltrated the pharmaceutical and medical community itself.
These types of stories, widely reported by the press, created a legitimate sense of alarm. Worse,
the medical profession, which had operated largely outside the purview of state or federal
oversight, failed to keep statistics on the rates of addiction. Consequently, the best evidence of
rising drug dependency came from the accumulation of anecdotal news stories. In that era of
uncertainty, then, the relative number of drug addicts in the United States was truly anyone’s
guess.
In an environment characterized by a lack of hard data, morphine abuse emerged as a
favored topic of the press and a reliable source of late-nineteenth century public anxiety.
Responding to changing public perceptions of the crisis, politicians, often pressured by
grassroots sentiment, began to intervene into the problem and call for local, state, and federal
laws curtailing access to “dangerous” drugs. This development led to a battle over who would
emerge as the managers of the nation’s drug crisis. Would the medical community lead the way
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with a clinic-based approach that continued to exist outside the realm of politics? Would the
political class seize control of the crisis and govern it through drug reform legislation? Or would
a hybrid policy develop in which state and federal governments collaborated with the medical
profession to limit the impact of drug addiction in America? They were complicated questions to
answer.
A scenario in which the American public and the political class continued to allow the
medical community to manage issues related to drug addiction without governmental oversight
became increasingly unlikely. Although many younger physicians attempted to adjust practices
and reform the profession, their efforts were too little, too late. It was also clear that the issue of
drug abuse and the control of narcotics was destined to become far more of a political issue in
the twentieth century than it had been in the nineteenth. A situation then emerged in which the
medical community continued its internal reforms and managed the ongoing drug crisis while
Congress developed policies that placed them under federal oversight. Simultaneously,
politicians at all levels of government worked to curtail the public’s access to drugs through
prohibitory legislation. From 1900 to 1937, Congress passed the Biologic Controls Act, the Pure
Food and Drug Act, the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act, the Harrison Narcotic Act, the AntiHeroin Act, the Volstead Act, and the Marihuana Tax Act. Their efforts represented a stunning
change in direction for the federal government and a new style of public health management. It
was both regulatory and punitive, institutional and populist, and legislative, legal, and medical.
Its cumulative impact created a modern state anchored by a politics of restriction and discipline.
The broader story told here is about the rise, peak, near collapse, and ultimate triumph of
the resulting Prohibition State, a term used to describe the confluence of professional reforms,
grassroots activism, and state and federal politicking that helped shape a broad anti-drug agenda
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in the United States. Advocates of the Prohibition State introduced a diverse set of political
goals, many of them proposed in a bipartisan fashion. The aims of this new form of regulatory
government could be quite specific, involving the implementation of simple pharmaceutical
reforms, or they could be broadened to include a wholesale reconsideration of how the
international opium supply might be monopolized. The issues surrounding drug reform might
also be professional and rational while, at the same time, capable of veering into racism and
xenophobia. One coherent strategy rarely dominated the nation’s emerging drug war politics.
Rather, a multitude of responses worked in synchronicity to create robust socio-political change.
The numerous competing theories about what caused the perceived drug crisis also influenced
the contours of that diffuse approach. In a decentralized and democratized society, all theories
had influence.
The popular notion that the drug problem resulted from physicians overprescribing
powerful drugs that were then supplied by an unregulated pharmacy continued to dominate the
discussion. That conclusion fueled the transfer of the crisis from the medical profession to the
political class. Less convincing theories, however, still lured followers. Other possible answers
included citification (meaning the adoption of a harried, frenetic pace associated with a modern
lifestyle). In that scenario, individuals unaccustomed to the breakneck change of modern
industrial and urban living had turned to escapism in the form of drug abuse. The crisis might
also be associated with Chinese immigrants, feminine emotions, boredom, or Godlessness.
These theories highlighted the organic and grassroots origins of the Prohibition State. The
process of its construction did not rely on a top-down process initiated in Washington, D.C. It
rather depended on a bottom-up democratic process in which the states truly served as the
laboratories of anti-drug policy making. Many of those states acted quickly to address what
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appeared to be a rapidly progressing drug crisis. California and Oregon, for example, passed
laws restricting morphine and cocaine in the 1880s. Congress, on the other hand, did not act until
1914 as it prepared for World War.
In answering the question of how the United States transformed so rapidly from a society
tolerant of drug use to one intent on prohibition, it is important to highlight a key point. When
considering the involvement of city councils and state legislatures in the crisis—a process that
began in the 1870s—governmental action does not appear to emerge so suddenly. Instead, it
represented the slow nationalization of localized laws in an environment where Congress took its
cues from the states. When the beginning of the government’s involvement in the drug crisis is
traced to the 1870s at the state level, it seems historically logical to place the origins of the
Prohibition State in the immediate post-bellum years. In that context, perceptions of American
drug history begin to change. Not only does the unfolding of a state intent on prohibiting drugs
begin nearly forty years earlier than is typically argued, but its early construction involves city
councils and state legislatures more than it does Presidents or Congresses.
The primary argument of this work, then, is that the federal response to a perceived drug
crisis came as the result of a decidedly liberal and democratic process built on local grassroots
politics, lobbying, and state-level legislation; and that a late-nineteenth century morphine
crisis—a national opiate crisis—inspired these developments. By the time Congress passed
nationals laws, many states had already established legal and legislative precedents for those
statutes. Ultimately, federal involvement in the early erection of the Prohibition State largely
involved the slow nationalization of existing local laws.
That explanation is still too simplistic. The bigger crisis—the one that truly nurtured the
opioid epidemic that inspired local action—involved systemic breakdowns in the practice of
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medicine. Indeed, the crisis illustrated the extent to which liberal nineteenth century theories
about how new medicine was to be vetted for public consumption were no longer workable in a
modern environment that included intravenous morphine. Further complicating the story, those
issues were global. The United States followed British, French, and German medical practices
and each country suffered from the opioid crisis—even if less severely than the United States.
Consequently, the transfer of the drug problem from the medical community to the federal
government occurred in those countries as well, which made the construction of the Prohibition
State—and the seemingly endless war on narcotics it encouraged—a transatlantic collaboration;
one that was, in the case of the United States, implemented first at the municipal and state level.
The literature in the field of drug and alcohol history tends to view the political
intervention into the medical management of drugs as a kind of hostile takeover. The state’s
subsequent management of the drug problem is then approached with seemingly relentless
skepticism. The most prominent historian of the American opioid crisis, David Courtwright,
argues that by the time the federal government intervened to control the nation’s problem with
opiates, it had been largely solved by the medical community. In his illuminating work Dark
Paradise: A History of Opiate Addiction in America, Courtwright argues that “opiate addiction
increased throughout the nineteenth century, peaked in the 1890s, and thereafter began a
sustained decline.” He further suggests that “the major reason for the rise, as well as the fall, in
the rate of opiate addiction was the prevailing medical practice of the day.” His argument,
however, somewhat understates the role of government in spurring the medical community
towards corrective action. Consequently, subsequent analysis minimizes problems the medical
community faced in reforming its mid-nineteenth century practices and casts political solutions
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as measures that came after the problem had been solved. This brand of analysis ultimately
portrays governmental responses as largely unnecessary.4
This skepticism of the government’s formulation and enactment of drug policy defined
the field for decades. Courtwright’s claim that “another fundamental feature of American
narcotic laws is that they were passed, interpreted, and defended on the basis of misleading, even
fraudulent information” established a deep sense of unease in the field. That assertion, which cast
the government as a hapless—if not malicious—actor in the American drug crisis, has had
profound influence. The modern literature on the topic mirrors this approach. Historian Kathleen
Frydl, whose work focuses on the period from 1940 to 1973, argues that “more than anything
else, the drug war extended or enabled certain state agendas, like policing inner cities embroiled
in conflict, or wielding influence and power abroad, especially throughout the developing
world.” She continues by asserting that “the drug war compensated for deficiencies in other
institutions and instruments of government. Bereft of other tools, the state punished its way to
power.”5
The problem with Frdyl’s indictment of state motives is largely one of periodization and
focus. If, for example, a history of the nation’s narcotic problem begins in 1940 after decades of
foundational lawmaking—and then focuses entirely on the national government’s work in
preserving institutions created as early as 1901—the state appears as a highly irrational actor.
While her arguments present a very fair and thoughtful analysis of the ways in which the postwar state benefited from and preserved its prohibitionist agenda, broader contextualization would
likely lead to less certain conclusions. A similar strategy is deployed by Courtwright in
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suggesting that the federal government did not react to the morphine crisis until 1914, an
assertion that effectively removes the role of state laws in shaping national agendas.
In Lisa McGirr’s The War on Alcohol: Prohibition and the Rise of the American State,
which can be viewed as a corrective to many of the issues in the scholarship, she writes that “the
war on alcohol was a prime example of a recurring theme of United States mass politics.” She
continues by suggesting “the nation’s powerful traditions of evangelical Protestantism and its
freewheeling brand of expansive capitalism emerged in tandem—and in tension with one
another.” This phenomenon, she argues, led to a situation in which the combination of those
forces “fueled moral crusades among men and women unsettled by social conflict and change.”
This more nuanced interpretation of the social movements that led to the rise of the Prohibition
State adds much needed depth to the narrative. Most importantly, she portrays the prohibition of
alcohol as a grassroots effort, which is a crucial point. Indeed, some of this work’s key
arguments borrow from McGirr’s work. Her assertion that the “nation’s nascent domestic and
international drug-prohibition regime emerged symbiotically with national alcohol prohibition”
serves as the building blocks for the final chapter of this dissertation, which highlights the
intensive overlapping of alcohol and drug prohibition politics.6
On the other hand, deep suspicions regarding the wielding of state power similarly
characterize McGirr’s work. She argues that alcohol reformers “turned to the state to stabilize
social order, and secure their place within it, with strong doses of coercive moral absolutes”
while averring that their “monumental anxieties over industrial capitalism, mass immigration,
and the increasingly large and potentially volatile proletarian populations congealed around the
campaign against the saloon and liquor traffic.” McGirr’s work ultimately helps steady the shaky

6
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argument that the entirety of America’s approach to drug and alcohol reform may be found in
largely discredited anxieties that were cynically used by bureaucratic entrepreneurs to
unnecessarily expand the state.7
This work can be distinguished from the existing scholarship by its relative lack of
suspicion or sense of conspiracy. While it does not refute the overwhelming evidence that racist,
xenophobic, classist, and other generalized anxieties fueled the growth of the Prohibition State, it
nonetheless concludes that the story was far more complicated. The rise of the Prohibition State
was a liberal and democratic process, backed by the voting public, heralded by activists, exalted
by the press, embraced in bipartisan fashion, promoted in churches and schools, funded by
philanthropists and expanding budgets, corroborated by judges, policed at all levels of law
enforcement, and widely celebrated as common-sense governing. Indeed, the push for drug
reform started in the presidency of Ulysses S. Grant and reached its peak during Franklin
Roosevelt’s administration. It transcended political partisanship and gained the support of one of
the most diverse political coalitions in American history—one that lasted for 150 years.
Moreover, much of the scholarship on the prohibition of drugs and alcohol rests on a
reading of social anxiety that casts the phenomenon as an irrational force that inspires equally
irrational policy making. This work operates from the standpoint that social anxiety is a
constant—and not ahistorical—factor that influences the history of the United States. It also
contends that moral panic is a common everyday force that actively shapes national responses to
crises (for better or worse). The business of deciding what is and what is not a legitimate
response to a perceived threat is largely outside the purview of historical analysis. As Robert S.
Billings, Thomas W. Milburn, and Mary Lou Shaalman argue in their work “A Model of Crisis
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Perception:” “although crisis is common, little is known about how a situation becomes defined
as a crisis.” They further note that there is an “incomplete development of the concept of crises
or of the process of perceiving crises.” While their work is dated (1980), there has been relatively
little scholarship on the subject since.
In this work, the state is viewed as an everchanging, elastic, highly imperfect, and
oftentimes unfortunate reflection of various national anxieties. The state, according to this
reading of history, is not necessarily an idea to be broadly condemned. The rise of the
Prohibition State in this story, which seems to occur suddenly, also accorded with longstanding
American political traditions. It was a global project that began at the local level and then
became a municipal and state level enactment of international trends. The war on drugs the
Prohibition State engendered and supported mirrored America’s most rational and irrational
tendencies, simultaneously embodying the nation’s ingenuity as well as its racist underbelly.
Within that context, the Prohibition State emerged as the bureaucratic manifestation of one of
America’s most deep-seated fears—the spread of addictive and deadly drugs within their
communities.8
The first chapter of this work takes inspiration from James H. Mill’s histories of cannabis
in England, especially Cannabis Britannica: Empire, Trade, and Prohibition, 1800-1928. By
anchoring his story in the nineteenth century and connecting it to the politics of the present, a
complicated story of medicine, empire, and politics emerges. It also offers a rare narrative that
covers the topic of drug use in western society in a century long context. In emulation, this work,
which seeks to chart the rise of a prohibition-minded twentieth century state, begins in 1840.
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This first chapter focuses exclusively on the medicalization of cannabis in the midnineteenth century. It was during that period, one significantly defined by the Britain’s Opium
Wars with China, that the western world discovered medicinal cannabis. From the laboratory of
William O’Shaughnessy, an Irish physician employed by Britain’s East India Company, the
substance then spread to London, Paris, and eventually Boston, New York, Philadelphia, New
Orleans, St. Louis, and Chicago. This chapter interprets the arrival of cannabis in the United
States through a transatlantic medical information exchange developed in the early-nineteenth
century.
Cannabis arrived in the United States during a period of pharmaceutical experimentation.
The European and American medical professions were rapidly developing new and more
powerful medicines and a kind of therapeutic revolution lay just around the bend. The profession
had experimented widely with the implementation of cannabis in the practice of medicine, but
eventually determined it to be too erratic for serious use. Ultimately, however, it was the
emergence of the opioid epidemic that swept cannabis to the margins of legitimate medical use.
The consistent pain relief physicians hoped cannabis might ultimately provide had been
remedied, in large part, by the effective results delivered by intravenous morphine. So, the
medical community, which once hoped cannabis might replace opium as a pain reliever, then
abandoned it and returned to a more distilled form of opium—intravenous morphine. This
chapter also highlights the halcyon days of the profession’s control of the nation’s narcotic
supply and offers a scenario in which their strategies worked reasonably well.
In chapter two, which focuses on the rise of the popular “hasheesh confessional,” a
literary genre focused on detailing one’s recreational use of cannabis, this project continues to
outline the dimensions of the nineteenth century’s tolerance of broad experimentation with
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drugs. It argues that this artistic rendering of cannabis use also had medical value and ultimately
walked a tightrope between science and literature. More, this work suggests that in an
environment lacking centralized agencies charged with vetting new drugs, a broad and liberal
approach to testing medicines characterized the process. Because of that, hallucinatory literary
prose had influence and was reluctantly embraced by a medical profession intent on gathering
information from all experiences with the substance in question.
In chapter three, close attention is paid to transitions within the medical community. The
period covered marks the moment when the medical vetting process used to test cannabis and
other new drugs began to fail in a modern world that included intravenous morphine. It presents
a profession devoted to liberal experimentation using a hypodermic syringe in the same way it
did tinctures of opium and cannabis. The results led to spiking levels of addiction and morphinerelated death, a new media uniquely focused on drug dependency, an erosion in public trust in
the medical profession, and the increased politicization of the crisis.
Chapter four highlights the active transfer of the nation’s drug problem from the medical
and clinical setting to the political arena. By 1900, debates about drugs had dramatically
changed. The American public, no longer ambivalent on the topic, begins to embrace
governmental regulation of the medical and pharmaceutical industries as well as the prohibition
of drugs. This chapter charts the legislative foundations of a Prohibition State and focuses on the
Biologic Controls Act, the Pure Food and Drug Act, the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act, and the
Harrison Narcotic Act. In the backdrop, it also focuses on the rise of a new American-led foreign
policy centered, to a large degree, on controlling the global opium supply. By 1914, the medical
profession is largely absent in debates around how to best control the nation’s ongoing opioid
epidemic and the issue is entirely political.
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The final two chapters of this work interpret the peak, decline, and triumph of the
Prohibition State from 1919-1937. After passing the Harrison Narcotic Act in 1914, which
prohibited cocaine and placed historic limitations on non-medicinal opioids, Congress followed
with the Volstead Act and the Eighteenth Amendment prohibiting alcohol in 1919. Then, in
1924, Congress implemented the uncontroversial Anti-Heroin Act, banning that substance as
well. These maneuvers represented the apex of prohibition-minded government and pointed to a
stunning transformation in public perception and policy since the outbreak of America’s first
opioid epidemic. Much of the public, the press, and government at all levels had become united
in their stance against drug and alcohol use.
Just as the Prohibition State reached its pinnacle with a ban on alcohol, it seemingly
collapsed with the repeal of the Volstead Act, passed just twelve years later. That profound
rebuke of the fundamental philosophies of the state did not, however, blunt the progress and
evolution of the state’s prohibitionist agenda. Despite popular historical narratives, the
prohibitionist movement continued in different forms. Budgets and agents were merely
transferred to new agencies like the Alcohol Tax Unit. Instead of stifling prohibitionist zeal, the
repeal of alcohol prohibition led to the empowerment of its sister agency—the Bureau of
Narcotics—which almost immediately began to pursue the criminalization of marijuana in the
mid-1930s. The subsequent shift in focus to the so-called Reefer Madness that allegedly plagued
the United States, along with the fact that alcohol prohibition agents and the budgets that enabled
continued on in different forms, ultimately led—this work suggests—to the long-term triumph of
the Prohibition State.
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Chapter One
“Giving the Resin of Hemp an Extensive Trial:” The Rise of a Global Medical
Marijuana Economy
When William O’Shaughnessy, a young Irish physician, first arrived in 1830s Calcutta to
take a post at the city’s medical college, cannabis could easily be found. On the streets and in the
city’s bazaars, merchants sold its dried leaves—called gunjah—which were then smoked, most
often in a hookah. They kept its “larger leaves and capsules” for use in a popular milk-based
drink that possessed mildly intoxicating effects. Those larger leaves, referred to as bhang, could
also be smoked or baked into edibles widely sold as majoons. The market for cannabis in India,
essentially a legal and recreational one, showed the extent to which eastern society had adopted
the substance as heartily as the west did alcohol and it caught the attention of this young
physician recently employed as a corporate doctor by the East India Company.1
While Dr. William O’Shaughnessy became known for a variety of achievements not
related to cannabis, he nonetheless occupies a coveted spot in American drug history as the man
who introduced medical marijuana to the west. After he arrived in India in the 1830s,
O’Shaughnessy held a number of professional positions, experimented with the possibility of
underwater telegraphy, and published prolifically in his field. He was best known for his work in
establishing the telegraph (above ground) in India, an achievement for which he was ultimately
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knighted by the British government. For a short time though—from roughly 1838 to 1843—his
name was synonymous with cannabis experimentation.2
O’Shaughnessy’s efforts eventually led to the establishment of a medical marijuana
economy in the United States that lasted into the 1930s when Congress banned its possession.
While the doctor had a clear impact on the practice of medicine, his socio-cultural impact was,
perhaps, even greater. His unyielding advocation of the use of cannabis accelerated a culture of
narcotic experimentation that defined the practice of medicine throughout the nineteenth century.
After O’Shaughnessy introduced cannabis to the west, physicians began experimenting with its
medical potential while. Almost simultaneously, hashish use became popular in Bohemian
literary circles and a culture of cannabis consumption emerged in the United States.
The story of western cannabis experimentation did not end as O’Shaughnessy imagined it
would, however. Physicians struggled with the substance in ways their eastern counterparts had
not. The drug was irascible, generated frustrating results, and was difficult to prescribe with any
sense of clarity. Doctors often noted unwelcome effects that exacerbated the underlying
conditions they initially sought to treat. By the late-nineteenth century, after decades of repeated
struggles, the mainstream medical community began to slowly marginalize its use of the
substance. It was ultimately not a story of triumph for medical marijuana in the west. Once
celebrated by the scientific community, cannabis ultimately became a problematic substance
deemed too resistant to standardization.3
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While fundamentally a rise and fall history, the story of marijuana in America also points
to larger social trends. It highlights a story about global connections and the transatlantic
exchange of medical knowledge from England to the United States. It advances this perspective
while also offering a glimpse at the international dimensions of the practices that shaped an early
medical marijuana economy. During the period highlighted here, England, France, and Germany
did not collaborate to suppress the spread of cannabis as they would just a few decades later, but
rather worked to increase its use as a modern medicine with untold potential. The mainstream
medical community in England, in fact, embraced Dr. O’Shaughnessy’s work with the substance
and reports of his findings traveled from Calcutta to London, Paris, Berlin, New York, Boston,
Louisville, and throughout urban and rural United States.4
Within that narrative of global exchange, there is another story about the way in which
the British government appropriated and exported Indian medical knowledge. The classical
historical literature on colonial/settler relationships typically presents information exchanges as a
one-way transmission from London to Calcutta. Even in the revisions countering the
“Orientalism” inherent in that perspective, there are few examples of Indian culture directly
impacting and reshaping thought in the west. William O’Shaughnessy’s embrace of medical
cannabis and the exportation of that knowledge to the United States illustrates such an example.
While histories highlighting the Indian influence on the medical culture of London are rare, those
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dealing with its impact on the same community in Boston, New York, Philadelphia, New
Orleans, and St. Louis through a transatlantic crossing are exceedingly so.5
Within that larger context, this work highlights the American medical profession’s
dependency on European practices—especially upon London. It was that reliance on European
medicine that led American physicians towards the use of medical cannabis in the first place.
Physicians in the United States mirrored the practices of their British colleagues and began to
test the substance in order to reveal its therapeutic viability. The medical marijuana trials that
spilled from O’Shaughnessy’s Calcutta laboratory then depended on this transatlantic
collaboration in which scientific conclusions and hypotheses traveled quickly across the ocean.
More, this consistent interchange ultimately led to the realization that cannabis, while a
potentially powerful healing agent, was also an incredibly complex substance not easily tamed
by the scientific method. Its effects were deemed unpredictable, which made it difficult to
prescribe with confidence. After two decades of attempting to transform cannabis into a trusted
mainstream medicine, the American medical community—frustrated by its mysterious
composition—began to turn away from its use.
The medical community’s loss of confidence in cannabis also occurred in London,
Berlin, and France, illustrating ongoing global interconnectedness and intellectual cohesion in
the two decades leading up to the Civil War. While the medical community considered cannabis
to be possibly more powerful than opium in the 1840s, it gradually adjusted its expectations and
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used the drug with a narrowed focus while continually working to uncover the source of its
psychoactive power. Charged by O’Shaughnessy’s advice to give “the resin of hemp an
extensive trial,” the medical community responded enthusiastically and provided a diverse set of
case studies that guided the use of the substance into the twentieth century.
The Calcutta Experiments
Dr. William O’Shaughnessy embodied the spirit of global exchange in the early-to-midnineteenth century. He was born in Limerick, Ireland, in 1809, a major commercial center in the
southern region of the country. He left Limerick for Edinburgh, where he studied medicine and
obtained his degree before briefly settling in London where he felt persecuted because of his
Irish heritage. In response, he joined the Bengal Medical Service of the East Indian Company, a
multi-national corporation that maintained its own army and functioned as a for-profit agent of
the British government. The company then sent him to Fort William in Calcutta in 1833—a
fortress it built in 1696. In a matter of a decade after leaving Ireland, O’Shaughnessy found
himself in Calcutta via Edinburgh and London.6
When he first arrived in Calcutta, O’Shaughnessy worked as an Assistant Surgeon in the
general employ of the East Indian Company until 1834 when he was sent to the “Civil Stations
of Gyah and Cuttack successively.” Towards the end of that year he “was doing duty with the
artillery at Dum-Dum.” Thereafter, he managed the medical care of the 72nd Bengal Native
Infantry, the 10th Regiment Bengal Light Cavalry, and served as the First Assistant to the Opium
Agent in Bihar. He travelled extensively, from Indian metropolises to the outlying countryside,
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and gained a wide breadth of experience as a clinical physician turned army doctor—for both
British and Indian troops—and then as an opium agent.7
It was at the British Opium Agency in Bihar that O’Shaughnessy first learned the power
of Indian psychoactive botanicals. In an article published in 1840 titled “On Opium in India,” the
doctor wrote, “to this important subject I propose to devote more space than it generally claims
in elementary treatises on chemistry.” He undertook the task of detailing the plant’s power
because it was a “source of enormous revenue, and an article of the highest commercial interest.”
O’Shaughnessy felt he was the logical candidate for the task considering he had “held the
appointment of Assistant to the Opium Agency of Behar for a considerable period.” His astute
analysis of how poppy plants were harvested, the manner in which they arrived to the agency,
and the processing that occurred before being shipped for global sale mirrored the style of his
later writings on cannabis—a substance with a profit potential he would have recognized from
his dealings with opium in Bihar.8
O’Shaughnessy was then appointed Professor of Medicine in the Medical College at
Calcutta in April of 1835. The school was in the process of a reformation in which the more
objective scientific methods of western medicine supplanted the alleged folk remedies of
traditional eastern practices. O’Shaughnessy arrived to help retrain a new generation of Indian
doctors in those methods considered more modern and scientific. He wrote little about his
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experiences in Calcutta or at the Medical College. It is ironic, however, that after being hired to
educate native students in western medicine he spent much of his time learning about the ancient
eastern practice of using cannabis as a therapeutic. Instead of undermining native physicians, he
instead utilized their knowledge, documented it, and published his findings. While his actions
constituted what could easily be considered an appropriation of eastern custom for western gain,
it was—on some level—a medical collaboration.9
On the other hand, O’Shaughnessy’s arrival in the city coincided with the First Opium
War between England and China over the latter’s reluctance to embrace the importation of the
drug by British commercial interests. It was also a period of intense botanical imperialism, in
which the control of plants like cannabis and poppies were transferred from Indian society to the
British Empire for western profit. In that sense, it is ultimately more accurate to say that the
doctor’s cooption of medicinal cannabis use was a continuation of the British tradition of mining
India’s resources for imperial benefit.10
The appropriation of medicinal marijuana from India, however, was subtler than it had
been with opium. In the case of the latter, India had been transformed into a factory farm in
which opium was cultivated, harvested, processed, and shipped abroad—especially to China—
solely for profits that were then deposited in London banks. Cannabis never reached that level of
commercialism, ultimately failed to generate profits significant enough to incite wars, and thus
remained in the realm of medical experimentation. For the British, it existed almost solely as a
subject of scientific inquiry.
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After a season of preparatory research, Dr. O’Shaughnessy began a series of cannabis
experiments in the late-1830s on animals and then quickly evolved to testing it on patients at the
Calcutta Hospital suffering from severe symptoms of disease. His work culminated in the
publication of a highly influential article, “On the Preparations of the Indian Hemp, or Gunjah,
(Cannabis Indica) their Effects on the Animal System in Health, and their Utility in the
Treatment of Tetanus and other Compulsive Diseases.”11
In his work, first published in 1841, the doctor readily admitted he was not the discoverer
of the medical use of cannabis. He wrote that the “narcotic effects of hemp are popularly known
in the South of Africa, South America, Turkey, Egypt, Asia Minor, India, and the adjacent
territories of the Malays, Burmese, and Siamese.” He contended, however, that the substance
was most often used in those countries by the “dissipated and the depraved, as the ready agent of
a pleasing intoxication.” He further noted that physicians in those countries employed it to treat a
wide variety of ailments, and O’Shaughnessy turned to those cases to inform how he might use it
in his own practice. While he did not condone the recreational use of cannabis, he nonetheless
concluded that the substance possessed unique healing power, and therefore had medical uses.
After laying out these general points, the doctor then pursued a detailed account of the
plant itself. He started with its physical characteristics and noted it was “diaceous, annual, about
three feet high, covered over with a fine pubescence.” Its stem was “erect, branched, bright
green, angular” with leaves “alternate or opposite, on weak petioles.” The plant was “digitate,
scabrous, with linear, lanceolate, sharply serrated leaflets, tapering into a long smooth entire
point.” It had “clusters of flowers axillary with subulate bractes” and males that were “lax and
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drooping, branched and leafless at base.” It was “calyx downy, five parted, “imbricated” with
“five stemens,” possessed “anthers large and pendulous, and “calyx covered with brown glands.”
The cannabis plant had roundish ovaries, with “pendulous ovule, and two long filiform glandular
stigmas; achenium ovate, one seeded.” O’Shaughnessy culled that information from Lindley’s
Flora Medica, a popular 1830s reference manual written for medical students to help in
developing a more thorough understanding of the botanical characteristics of commonly used
medicines.12
His thorough introduction of the plant began the process of western medical subjugation.
As for its chemical properties, the doctor noted that “in certain seasons and in warm countries a
resinous juice…concreted on the leaves and slender stems and flowers” of the plant. That resin
when “separated and in masses” constituted the churrus—as they called it in “Nipal and
Hindostan.” Those secretions, he believed, gave the plant its psychoactive powers. That resin
was also soluble in alcohol and ether, partially so in alkaline, and, when pure, gave off a blackish
grey color. Its odor was “fragrant and narcotic” with a taste “slightly warm, bitterish, and
acrid.”13
O’Shaughnessy continued by pointing out that when cannabis was used for the purposes
of recreational intoxication only, “four or five persons” usually joined together “in this debauch”
where they exchanged a hookah. Each person took “a single draught” and intoxication occurred
almost instantaneously thereafter. The subsequent cannabis high usually led to “heaviness,
laziness, and agreeable reveries.” This section of O’Shaughnessy’s article revealed that
medicinal cannabis use in the east had also been accompanied by a pronounced recreational
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culture. That had been true of opium as well. Similarly, in the United States, as physicians
attempted to implement cannabis into the practice of medicine, a recreational culture of
bohemian hashish use developed at the same time solidifying the interconnectedness of the two
styles of use.14
A man named Ameer, one of the physicians O’Shaughnessy consulted, reported the
existence of seven or eight majoon makers—or purveyors of cannabis edibles—in Calcutta.
These entrepreneurs often created special orders for customers and “all classes of persons,
including the lower Portugese, or ‘Kala Feringhees,’ and especially their females” consumed the
drug. He claimed that this form of edible cannabis was “most fascinating in its effects” and
produced “extatic [sic] happiness, a persuasion of high rank, a sensation of flying, voracious
appetite, and intense aphrodisiac desire.” Ameer also claimed that cannabis did not lead to
madness, impotence, or to the “numerous evil consequences described by the Arabic and Persian
physicians.” O’Shaughnessy entered the narrative at that point to acknowledge he did not agree
with Ameer on those specific points.15
Still, O’Shaughnessy clearly respected his colleagues in India and the Middle East. “I
owe my cordial thanks,” he wrote, “to the distinguished traveler Syed Keramut Ali, Mootawulee
of the Hooghly Imambarrah.” He thanked Hakim Mirza Abdul Razes of Teheran, who had
furnished him “with interesting details regarding the consumption of hemp in Candahar, Cabul,
and the countries between the Indus and Herat.” O’Shaughnessy concluded by acknowledging
the Pandit Moodoosudun Gooptu, who gave him notices “of the statements regarding hemp in
the early Sanscrit authors on materia medica.”16
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For additional information on the substance, O’Shaughnessy turned to Persian writers,
who claimed that the first use of cannabis long predated “Haider’s era.” Hippocrates referred to
cannabis in his writings and so, too, did Dioscorides. Egypt passed “very severe ordinances”
against the substance in 780, which resulted in the uprooting of cannabis gardens. Perpetual
violators of the new ban on cannabis were then subject to having their teeth extracted.
O’Shaughnessy cited the 35th chapter of the 5th volume of “Rumphius’ Herbarium Amboinense”
as “containing a long and excellent account of hemp.” In that work, Rumphius identified upper
India as its habitat. He then “notices very briefly the exciting effects ascribed to the leaf, and to
mixtures thereof with spices, camphor, and opium.” The author doubted cannabis had actual
aphrodisiac powers and attributed the rise of that reaction to the general temperament of the
consumer. “This was the amount of preliminary information possessed by our author,”
O’Shaughnessy admits, “when he entered upon his experiments to determine its application to
man as a remedial agent.”17
While O’Shaughnessy acknowledged those non-British individuals, who informed his
initial understanding of medicinal cannabis, it was not simply a medical or scientific
collaboration. On November 6th, 1839, as O’Shaughnessy collected information on the use of
medical cannabis, for example, George Thompson took the podium at the Friend’s Meeting
House on Mount Street in London to deliver an address on British interests in India. He told the
audience “how capable India” was in “supplying to you, in any quantity, the crude material, and
of taking from you in return the varied manufactures of this country.” That, of course,
represented O’Shaughnessy’s approach to the exportation of medical cannabis. The bottom line
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was that cannabis was a potentially lucrative commodity supplied by India that would be
exported for western gain. O’Shaughnessy’s research was partly directed to that end.18
In the same speech, Thompson called for a “hearty and energetic movement towards
India” and heralded the “application of British capital and skill,” “the encouragement of native
industry,” “the improvement of the means of internal communication,” and “the importation into
British ports the products of the east.” To men like Thompson, British involvement in India was
good for the economy, led to the modernization of the country, and created new markets in an
ever-expanding capitalist economy. It was an era of global connections in which Britain worked
to make permanent the social, intellectual, and economic ties to its broad network of colonial
holdings.19
Indeed, in October of 1840, as O’Shaughnessy penned his article on the medicinal
benefits of cannabis, the East India Company, in collaboration with the British government,
chartered a Bank for British India to better facilitate the exchange of products. “On the
establishment of this institution,” the Leicester Chronicle reported, “every dependency of the
British empire will be linked in monetary connection with the mother country.” Asia,
“Australiasia,” the West Indies, “the Canadas,” and the Ionian Islands would all have “their
respective banks in England.” The paper reported that these banks were not just important from a
financial point of view, but from a social and political perspective as well.20
This kind of financial network prevented the need “for the transfer of bullion from one
country to another,” lowered the interest rates by supplying capital wherever it could “be
advantageously employed,” and steadied and equalized the exchanges. Such a system also gave
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“confidence to all engaged in distant trading operations” and would “induce merchants to direct
all [their] skill, energy, and means to the production and transfer of profitable commodities.”
This style of bank created a “powerful and enduring tie of mutual self-interest” that bound “in an
indissoluble way” a “peculiarly pleasing” union between the “distant dependency and the parent
state.”21
At the same time, in Calcutta, the British, on the verge of completing the construction of
two major cotton factories and the East India Company, had commenced fighting China to
maintain a recreational drug market, captured Aden in Yemen, and engaged in the First AngloAfghan War. The Times of India had just been recently established and Britain completed the
first iron bridge on the continent. All the while, O’Shaughnessy—who also worked to establish
the telegraph in India—experimented with the medicalization of cannabis for the western market.
The Irish doctor was, in every sense of the word, a reliable agent in creating a peculiarly pleasing
union between India, the distant dependency, and England, the parent state.22
While there may have been strong profit-motive behind the cooption of medical cannabis,
O’Shaughnessy also had an objective and scientific mind and conducted his cannabis trials with
a sense of professionalism. Having gathered as much information as he could by consulting local
experts, he finally embarked on his own trials. He used it first on canines and gave “a middling
sized dog” ten grains (approximately 65 milligrams) of cannabis. One half hour later, the animal
became “stupid and sleepy, dozing at intervals, starting up, and wagging his tail as if extremely
contended.” O’Shaughnessy closely observed the animal and documented that it “ate some food
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greedily” and then collapsed into “helpless drunkenness.” Despite its dramatic reaction to
cannabis, the animal had fully and happily returned to his pre-cannabis temperament within six
hours. The doctor proceeded by administering a much higher dose to a smaller dog and, this
time, the animal became “ridiculously drunk” within twenty minutes. The symptoms ultimately
faded and the dog, like the others, returned to its natural state.23
Dr. O’Shaughnessy, encouraged by these early experiments, then gave cannabis to three
baby goats on which it had no noticeable effect. In response, he returned to canines and
administered to a “very small” dog a high dose of the substance. It immediately “lost all power
over the hinder extremities” and, while acknowledging its name being called, tried hard to rise,
but ultimately could not and collapsed back to the ground. These rather severe symptoms passed
in a matter of hours, however. To be certain the plant had no unforeseen consequences,
O’Shaughnessy continued serving it to fish, dogs, cats, swine, vultures, crows, horse, deer,
monkeys, sheep, and cows. The total impact on the system, he concluded, was ultimately
negligible. “No hesitation could be felt as to the perfect safety of giving the resin of hemp an
extensive trial,” O’Shaughnessy informed his readers, adding that the substance was most
appropriate in cases where its “apparent powers promised the greatest degree of utility.”24
As cannabis had not caused lasting harm in those extensive trials on animals,
O’Shaughnessy comfortably turned to prescribing it to human patients at the hospital who were
not responding to more traditional methods of treatment. His first two cases involved patients
suffering from acute rheumatism and he reported they had responded relatively well to the
substance. O’Shaughnessy, like present-day physicians, sought to treat the inflammation of the
muscles that made the disease so painful and cannabis seemed ideally suited for the task. The
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first patient given cannabis fell into catalepsy (or was temporarily paralyzed) and the doctor and
his aides helped the man to a sitting posture by “raising his arms and limbs in every imaginable
attitude.” Had he been “a waxen figure,” O’Shaughnessy theorized, the man, according to his
notes, could not have been more “pliant or stationary.” The patient also became “insensible” and
made no sign of understanding the questions asked of him.25
The second patient, aroused by the noises made while moving the first, “seemed vastly
amused” by the “statue-like attitudes in which the first patient had been placed.”26 The image of
the first case then caused the second to emit a “peel of laughter” and compelled him to admit to
those near him that he believed “four spirits were springing with his bed into the air.”27 The
man’s disruptive behavior led to O’Shaughnessy escorting him from the room. After sleeping for
two hours, the patient emerged lethargic and hungry, but ultimately healthy. O’Shaughnessy was
thrilled that, after the passage of twenty-four hours, the patients were “not only uninjured by the
narcotic, but much relieved of their rheumatism.” They were then discharged. The complex side
effects, however, offered a preview of what the western medical community would struggle with
for the next two decades. Sudden paralysis, hallucinations, and uncontrollable laughter were not
ideal medical outcomes when seeking to treat common disease.28
The Calcutta experiments continued when cholera “attacked an athletic Rajpoot” and the
victim was sent to O’Shaughnessy “pulseless, cold, and in a state of imminent danger.” The
doctor tried to stabilize him with the resin of hemp and, within twenty minutes, the man’s pulse
returned, his skin became warm, his purging ceased, and he fell asleep. Within an hour, the
patients was cataleptic and remained in that condition for several hours. By morning, however,
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“he was perfectly well and at his duty as usual.” While it is unlikely that cannabis resin
resuscitated patients who had momentarily passed and then cured them of cholera, it certainly
seemed to provide a means, as O’Shaughnessy put it, “to strew the path to the tomb with
flowers.”29
The doctor, for one, was quite excited and suggested that the substance might be a cure
for cholera, tetanus, and arthritis. In 1843, he wrote that he knew no “remedy [comparable] to
[cannabis] as a general and steady stimulant when given to Europeans in half drachm doses
during the tractable stage of the disease.” The doctor also thought it was unparalleled in dealing
with nausea and claimed it controlled vomiting “much more certainly than the opium
preparations.” While O’Shaughnessy exaggerated the medical power of cannabis on many
occasions, he was right that it could be very useful in lessening the pain accompanying disease.
His assertion that the drug worked differently on Europeans than it did on Indian patients added a
degree of bizarre insight, but his trials—the first of their kind reported in the west—began an
intense process of vetting the potential power of cannabis as medicine.30
Buoyed by his successful treatment of the symptoms related to cholera and arthritis,
O’Shaughnessy employed it in cases of tetanus. Ramjan Khan, a thirty-year-old patient, was
admitted to the Calcutta Medical College and Hospital on December 13, 1838. The patient had
an ulcer on the back of his hand that had been treated five days earlier by “a native empiric” who
applied “a red hot gool (the mixture of charcoal and tobacco used in a hookah).” This treatment
caused Khan and his brother, who had received the same remedy, to develop tetanus. Khan’s
brother, however, refused to visit the hospital and died three days later. Khan, on the other hand,
was admitted after enduring a series of spasms that led to lock-jaw. He was promptly given
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liberal doses of opium mixed with calomel and, after physicians considered his case to be
hopeless, O’Shaughnessy gained permission to administer to him cannabis resin dissolved in
alcohol.31
Soon after taking the doctor’s cannabis cocktail, Khan allegedly “felt giddy” and slept
soundly. His spasms returned, however, and O’Shaughnessy responded by administering an
additional two grains every three hours after performing a purgative enema. He then increased
doses to three grains every two hours and the patient seemed to stabilize although he often
seemed “much intoxicated.” Khan continued to improve until he developed a fever and exhibited
bloody stools, which the doctor treated by applying leeches to his abdomen and by giving the
patient a starch and opium enema containing acetate of lead every two hours. While his tetanus
seemed to subside, the ulcer on his hand only grew worse and his dysenteric symptoms persisted.
O’Shaughnessy’s staff suggested they amputate his arm, but Khan refused. He died of
exhaustion on January 23, 1838.32
Cannabis could not ultimately save lives, but O’Shaughnessy argued that “an
unprejudiced view” of the case involving Ramjan Khan showed that, if nothing else, it had
powerful sedative effects. He wrote that “although the patient died, it must be remembered that it
was of a different disease, over which it is not presumed the hemp possesses the least power.”
Other cases, however, bolstered his confidence. One of his patients, Chunoo Syce, who
developed tetanus after being kicked by horse, and Huroo, a twenty-five-year-old female victim
with the same ailment, were both given cannabis and discharged from care soon after.
O’Shaughnessy concluded that “when given boldly and in high doses, resin of hemp is capable
of arresting effectually the progress of this formidable disease, and in a large proportion of cases,
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of effecting a perfect cure.” He added that cannabis acted like opium and wine, but was far more
certain in impact. “I have no hesitation in saying, that in cases in which the opium treatment is
applicable, hemp will be found far more effectual,” he concluded.33
The Attempted Medicalization of Cannabis
The results of Dr. O’Shaughnessy’s almost immediately capture the attention of the
British medical community and gained early advocates. William Ley, a British physician,
emerged as an early and fervent supporter. He had heard about the Calcutta experiments through
the telegraph and compiled as much information as he could on O’Shaughnessy’s work. In the
summer of 1840, Ley informed a gathering of the newly created Provincial Medical and Surgical
Association in London that William O’Shaughnessy “strongly recommends the use of the resin
of the garden hemp as a narcotic and anti-spasmodic.”34 Although Ley did not have access to the
full scope of O’Shaughnessy’s work in Calcutta, he nonetheless poured over the available
second-hand accounts and said he was “very much desirous in using the remedy.”35
In late-February 1843, Ley reported the results of O’Shaughnessy’s trials to the Royal
Medico-Botanical Society of London, claiming that cannabis caused an “inebriation of the most
cheerful kind” and often incited a person “to sing and dance, to eat food with great relish, and to
seek aphrodisiac desire.” Ley had, by then, conducted his own cannabis experiments and
reported the story of a lady who had been confined to a hydrostatic bed for five years due to a
spinal disease. Her situation had become so dire that whenever he moved her in order to change
the Indian-rubber bed sheet, that simple action caused a series of violent spasms that often lasted
through the night. The spasms came suddenly and drew her “body back into an arch” before
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ceasing abruptly and causing her to collapse onto the bed. Even worse, one spasm rapidly
followed another and continued for hours throughout the night making the patient faint, sick, and
incoherent. After Ley tried a variety of traditional remedies to ease the intensity of her seizures,
he ultimately turned to cannabis and found that it helped her sleep through the night and worked
to control her spasms. The lady, “who from long illness” knew most of the medicine on the
market, argued that cannabis affected “the muscles principally,” relieved “ordinary pains less
surely than opium,” did not upset the stomach, and produced “an unpleasant sensation in the
head.”36
Ley’s work was significant on several levels. First, he successfully replicated
O’Shaughnessy’s findings and became the first physician to confirm that cannabis did, in fact,
seem to have clear medicinal capabilities. Secondly, he delivered his speech at the esteemed
Royal Medico-Botanical Society, illustrating the rapidity with which news of Indian cannabis
penetrated the mainstream medical community. On the other hand, a closer reading of Ley’s
experiments could suggest that the substance had failed in treating the woman’s condition. He
even conceded that the patient, who had an expansive knowledge of available remedies,
suggested it was less effective than opium with bothersome side effects. Physicians, of course,
would continually confirm those findings in subsequent experiments. Ley’s enthusiasm,
however, overwhelmed her opinion and he upheld the case as a triumph. Did he, then, replicate
O’Shaughnessy’s findings or did he simply want the doctor’s work to be more valid than it might
have otherwise been?
When viewed in the context of later conclusions drawn by the medical profession about
the viability of cannabis as medicine, many of O’Shaughnessy’s cases appeared problematic as
36
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well. In scenarios involving severe illnesses like tetanus, cholera, and hydrophobia, the doctor
administered heavy doses of cannabis that seemed to have the effect of simply overwhelming the
symptoms of disease by generating a psychoactive distraction. In some cases, it appears as
though O’Shaughnessy quickly discharged the patient after administering the cannabis. Did he
cure the patient? Or did he momentarily relieve the symptoms of the underlying disease without
significantly contributed the source of the illness? The doctor also failed to provide useful
information from any follow-up visits.
The prestigious Royal Medio-Botanical Society, founded by John Frost in 1822,
embraced Ley’s work, which was perhaps even more problematic than O’Shaughnessy’s. It was
also true that the institution served as another administrative arm of Britain’s larger imperial
aims and its stated goal was to study the medicinal benefits of plants from around the globe. In
the process, the institution hosted lectures and procured awards for outstanding research. The
fact that that venerable of an institution validated O’Shaughnessy’s Calcutta experiments
propelled the work to heights it perhaps did not deserve. Again, however, it is hard to remove
these early developments from the context of empire. While it is difficult to prove that British
medical society might have confirmed O’Shaughnessy’s work because it fit neatly within the
nation’s larger imperialist agenda, it is worth considering the blurred lines separating western
science from capitalist motive.
In her fascinating work, Flora’s Empire: British Gardens in India, historian Eugenia W.
Herbert writes that “India was part of global network of botanical exploration and collecting that
gathered up the world’s plants for transport to great imperial centers like Kew.” Historian Lucille
Brockway similarly argues that the “British botanic garden network”—which thrived from 18411941—“played a critical role in generating and disseminating useful scientific knowledge, which
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facilitated transfers of energy, manpower, and capital on a worldwide basis and on an
unprecedented scale.” She further suggests that the British accelerated “plant transfers and
scientific plant development that resulted in new plantation crops for tropical colonies.” That had
been the case with opium. In the 1830s, it seemed cannabis was poised to follow those
precedents.37
It may not have mattered whether those initial cannabis trials were as convincing as they
should have been. It was about science, yes, but also about how science advanced imperial aims.
It is also difficult to remove O’Shaughnessy and Ley’s cannabis experimentation from the
context of Britain’s battle to maintain an open opium market in China. Uncertain of the outcome
in that war, cannabis would have been a perfect substance to hedge imperial bets with. Whether
it was tea, sugar cane, coffee, cocoa, cinchona (to be processed into quinine), opium or, in this
case, the resin of Cannabis indica, colonial botanicals provided indispensable profits for
O’Shaughnessy’s employer—the East India Company. The cultivation, processing, distribution,
and retailing of these plant-based commodities transformed many Eastern and Caribbean
colonies into gardens that produced essential revenue for the empire.38
The medical profession nonetheless took O’Shaughnessy’s work seriously, engaged his
findings with intellectual vigor, and debated conclusions in academic journals. Indeed, the
doctor’s article created enough excitement that he felt it necessary to publish a caveat shortly
after publication. O’Shaughnessy wrote, “too much importance has been attached by
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commentators on my paper on the occurrence of catalepsy as an effect of this drug.” He argued
that in cases of tetanus, “no trial of the drug [was] at all conclusive” unless dosages were pushed
“to the extent of inducing stupor and insensibility.” In that case, the doctor admitted, the goal
was to overwhelm the symptoms of tetanus with what could only be described as an overdose of
the substance. His faith in the cannabis’s potential nonetheless appeared to be genuine. He wrote
to the profession, “many failures must be expected at first,” and then concluded that caution and
time would prove cannabis to be an essential medicine.39
In his continued advance of O’Shaughnessy’s cause, Ley echoed his mentor and noted
that cannabis would become “most practical and beneficial,” arguing that the drug had potential
that could only be “confirmed by experience.” Others in the profession, thereafter, began
experimenting as well. In an early trial, Martin Lynch, a British general practitioner, gave the
substance to a sixty-four-year-old man who heard about it in the press and wanted to try it
(mostly just to observe the effects). For a doctor excited to experiment, the aging man
represented an ideal candidate. Lynch administered a significant dose and the patient noted an
“itchiness at the roots of the eyelashes and in a few points of the lower extremities and scrotum.”
His other symptoms were mild and he did not demonstrate any “sexual excitement.” That was
the extent of that particular trial.40
In that same edition of the Provincial Medical Journal, released in 1843, the publication
introduced the case of James M’Lellan, a forty-year-old carpenter with “temperate habits,” who,
while crossing one of the canal bridges late at night, heard splashes in the water and went to the
bank to investigate. He found a dog struggling in the water and when he tried to help the animal,
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it “snapped at and bit two of his fingers, which bled freely, and gave him considerable pain.” M’
Lellan responded to the unexpected dog bite by dipping his fingers in rum. After a couple of
weeks, the rum healed his wounds—or so it seemed to M’Lellan at the time.41
More serious problems developed when M’Lellan began to experience the onset of a
series of “bizarre” symptoms later diagnosed as hydrophobia. His case, considered severe, was
forwarded to E. Parker, House Surgeon of the Liverpool Northern Hospital, who decided it
warranted the use of cannabis extract. Parker administered a low dose of cannabis and the patient
had no reaction. He did not proceed with his experimentation and simply wrote an asterisk that
read “the dose of hemp administered to inhabitants of this country should be much greater than
those given to natives of India.”42 Dr. Parker, either through caution or lack of enthusiasm,
administered one small dose, made a peculiar point similar to earlier ones by O’Shaughnessy
about the nationality of patients and how it impacted the physiological effect of the substance,
and discontinued his experimentation. Still, M’Lellan’s case was added to the record.
On April 8, 1843, Dr. James Inglis wrote the Provincial Medical Journal “gentlemen, it
was with much pleasure that I read in your journal the paper of Dr. O’Shaughnessy.” The article,
he claimed, convinced him of “the beneficial effects of the Indian hemp in those cases which so
often resist the influence of other remedies.” He had received a tincture of cannabis from
O’Shaughnessy himself and was excited to test it. After receiving the substance, Inglis
“happened to have a slight attack of rheumatism” and so he “commenced a trial of the gunjah”
upon himself. He self-administered various doses for three nights in a row, but did not
experience any effects and he submitted that news to the medical community. It may have been
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less than compelling, but it too became part of the public record on the medicinal use of
cannabis.43
These trials marked an inauspicious beginning and somewhat undercut the notion that
cannabis would become a wonder-drug. In the meantime, however, Ley’s enthusiastic promotion
of medicinal cannabis crossed the Atlantic to the United States. In May of 1843, Philadelphia’s
Medical Examiner and Retrospect of the Medical Sciences reprinted Ley’s article in that month’s
London Lancet. In it, Ley wrote that he “found the resinous extract of hemp of service in the
treatment of acute rheumatism, cholera, chorea, effusion into the knee-joint, housemaid’s knee,”
(or the inflammation of the fluid filled cavity above the knee), and “enlarged ganglia.” That
article then appeared in Louisville’s The Western Journal of Medicine and Surgery.44
In a matter of three years, in a landscape defined by limited communication,
O’Shaughnessy’s article travelled from Calcutta to London to Philadelphia and finally to
Louisville, Kentucky. American physicians, emulating O’Shaughnessy and Ley, also began
experimenting and attempting to adopt the new global trends in medicine. The trend, however,
was that both British and American physicians struggled to find that optimism so distinctly
expressed by O’Shaughnessy. In London, Edward Crosse observed that cannabis, when taken
himself, produced nothing more than “an inclination to rub the eyelids and some indisposition to
exertion.” Somewhat disappointed, he then took a double dose and mixed it with alcohol. This
time, his spirits “in an hour were much elevated” and his “eyelids felt as if they had become
oedematous.” Crosse also believed “that some object was near to me which was not in the
room.” At the same time, his pulse, usually ninety, dropped to seventy. He argued that “the most
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marked effect of this substance was, that my recollection (not my memory) intermitted regularly
every two minutes, so that while in conversation, I was obliged to stop speaking, from a
momentary total loss of the subject.”45
Crosse also encountered that unpredictability that so many of his colleagues had also
found. He experienced dislocation, hallucinations, memory loss, and accelerated heartrate—
side-effects difficult to justify especially when those effects were not followed by marked relief
in actual pain. In Crosse’s case, the “phenomenon” experienced gradually disappeared in four or
five hours and was succeeded “by a languor and great inclination to find the lowest possible
horizontal position, accompanied by the sensation of being bitten in many parts of the body by
some insect.” Crosse concluded that, “there is no doubt that this is a powerful remedy” and
argued that it was “desirable that the profession should early be made acquainted with it, as
much positive and negative injury may occur from skepticism on the point.”46
Still, the news of cannabis’ medical potential continued to reach the United States.
Washington D.C.’s The Daily Madisonian reported the details of Ley’s presentation to the Royal
Medico-Botanical Society in the spring of 1843 and recounted his argument that it “may be
safely employed wherever opium is indicated.” The paper also instructed its readers that
O’Shaughnessy had gained important knowledge “from a series of experiments on dogs,
instituted in the native hospital of Calcutta” and predicted it would “prove a direct antidote—the
first of its class.” The New Mirror, a weekly literary-minded New York City paper gleefully
announced that “a drug has been discovered by the British in India” and that it had “wonderful
properties.”47
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In England, Ley, an indefatigable proponent of medical cannabis, wrote the Provincial
Journal in 1843: “Gentlemen: I send you the following case of tetanus, treated with cannabis
indica, for the sake of the record. If it is not satisfactory, it affords hope of future utility in the
remedy.” Ley’s case involved Thomas Stephens, a fifteen-year-old boy, who complained of
shivering and intense sweating. After observing his patient for three days, Ley wrote that
Stephens had gone back to work but returned two hours later complaining of back pain and went
to bed. At eleven at night, the boy left to get pie for dinner, but he could not open his mouth to
eat it. He then had a cup of milk and a jalap (a purgative obtained from the roots of a Mexican
climbing plant) and laid face down, complaining of extreme back pain, and chills. Stephens’s
condition worsened as he began to have back spasms that made it difficult for him to breathe. His
condition was severe enough that both his parents and the attending physician thought he was
dying.48
Ley intervened and “requested to be allowed to give an extract prepared in Calcutta,
which [was] certainly five times the strength of [those sold in London], and is otherwise
better.”49 Ley gave two grains of his Calcutta extract rubbed into powder with sugar every two
hours. Within a few hours, Stephens improved and not only understood what was being said to
him, but also could show his tongue. He no longer “wished to be turned in bed; the muscles were
soft” and his knee was capable “of being flexed a little.” While the cannabis relaxed his muscles
and lessened the intensity of the spasms, it did little to relieve the chest congestion and was
incapable of lessening his problems breathing. Two days later the “contraction of the muscles of
the chest” entirely overpowered his breathing and he died “in the same rigid state that the most
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violent spasm could reduce him to—every muscle had the hardness of a board, and the skin had
become a copper color.”50
It was another case of cannabis use, submitted to the medical profession so that it might
analyze and weigh the results. It was also one that tended to confirm the conclusion that
cannabis, while potentially powerful, was a remarkably unpredictable drug with questionable
efficacy in treating cases of advanced tetanus. Doctors like Ley, however, continued to suggest
that it could ultimately treat tetanus—even though it rarely, if ever, cured it. Early consensus on
the topic of cannabis’s power pointed to the idea that the distillations available at the local
pharmacy had not been properly distilled. That reality, many theorized, was to blame for its
inconsistency.
The Provincial Medical Journal responded by printing the commonly used recipe,
inspired by O’Shaughnessy, in order to encourage others to improve it. It instructed readers to
“take of gunjah (finely bruised), four pounds, avoirdupoise; rectified spirit (0.838), five gallons,
old. M.” Then, they were to macerate the gunjah in “two gallons of the spirit for seven days, and
strain; mix the two tinctures, and filter.” After boiling the hemp in the remaining two gallons of
liquor for fifteen minutes, they were to filter again while hot. Lastly, the tinctures were to be
mixed and distilled. The recipe produced twelve ounces.51
In the United States, a young pharmacist named Alexander Duhamel emerged as an early
supporter of implementing cannabis into everyday medicine. He introduced the substance to an
annual American pharmaceutical meeting in Philadelphia in November of 1843 and pointed out
that “for the knowledge we possess of this active remedy,” William O’Shaughnessy was “due the
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credit of introducing it to the medical public as a valuable therapeutic agent.” He informed the
gathering that the consensus among physicians, at that moment, was that cannabis served best as
an anti-convulsive and as a therapy that was sure to ease the symptoms of tetanus, cholera, and
hydrophobia. Duhamel downplayed the unpredictable side effects and paraphrased
O’Shaughnessy in noting that cannabis intoxication was “of the most cheerful character,
producing extatic [sic] happiness, a persuasion of high rank, a sensation of flying, voracious
appetite, and intense aphrodisiac desire.”52
As the medical community called for, American physicians increased their
experimentation with cannabis. Dr. H.T. Child used cannabis in hydrocephalus—or water on the
brain—after his initial prognosis of became “very unfavorable.” He used cannabis because it was
“our duty to do something.” “A most excellent and experienced physician” of New York
introduced the doctor to cannabis and recommended its use. While it “unquestionably, in several
cases, proved useful,” it ultimately a failed to effectively treat the disease’s symptoms. His
conclusion represented an adjustment in expectations. While O’Shaughnessy had perhaps
overstated cannabis’s power, he rightly argued that it was, in certain circumstances, a valuable
agent. That was the case especially in lost cause situations where, no rational person could
expect it to save the patient. It could, however, “strew the path to the tomb with flowers.”53
For medical professionals tragically over-reliant on the Materia Medica, the western
world’s collection of plant-based remedies and their best applications, the community could not
afford to abandon any substance with the potential to relieve pain. That was why the profession
continued to call for further experimentation. In a pre-Food and Drug Administration world,
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where a drug’s value and safety were largely determined through practical trial-and-error,
cannabis was neither stunningly effective nor particularly dangerous. While it seemed to wildly
underperform at times, that was largely because Dr. O’Shaughnessy shackled it with unrealistic
expectations and sold it as a potential cure-all. Even though it did not exceed—or even meet—
the expectations of the American and British medical profession, there was little incentive to stop
using it. So, physicians continued experimenting with it.
Indicative of the profession’s devotion to “further experimentation,” Dr. Wigglesworth—
of Boston—wrote a letter to the Boston Medical Journal in 1845 accompanied by a pound of
cannabis that had recently been sent to him by William O’Shaughnessy. The doctor found
cannabis a “very powerful agent in relieving pain,” but did not feel justified “in applying to it all
the encomiums bestowed by Dr. O’S.” He had no further use for it because he had fallen ill and
had to close his office. Still, Wigglesworth felt professionally obligated to send a pound of
cannabis to a medical journal with instructions that if it proved “worthy of notice, to make them
public.”54
In England, Dr. John Conolly, physician at the Hanwell Lunatic Asylum in London,
wrote in 1846 that “the Indian hemp,” which had been “lately introduced into English practice,
seems to be a valuable addition to our means of controlling vehement disorders.” Conolly noted
that, while there was very little Indian hemp in Europe, it had to become “an important article of
commerce.” English physician Benjamin Barrow wanted more research and better information.
He suggested in 1847 that “the Cannabis Indica, being one of those drugs, the use of which has
been, I believe, very limited, and of which little is known” would benefit from greater
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illumination. He concluded that “it may be interesting to some and useful to others of our
profession to have a few particulars of the plant and preparations laid before them.”55
Dr. Barrow offered his own study for the record. He used cannabis in a case of
dysmenorrhea, or excessive abdominal cramping during menstruation. He used it on a patient, a
twenty-six-year old married woman, “of a thin, spare habit, of a naturally feeble condition, and
who had suffered for some years” from the issue. Barrow had treated her in the past by
administering “very large doses” of opium and morphine, which ultimately “became so
obnoxious to [his] patient” that it often caused her to become sick for several days. Considering
this, Barrow turned to cannabis, his “attention having been directed to this remedy and its use
recommended, by a valued and professional friend.”56
His patient’s experience with cannabis turned out to be an unpleasant one. After receiving
a heavy dose of the substance, the woman found some relief and had a restless sleep. She awoke
and had dinner with her family along with a glass of wine. “A degree of incoherence was noted
by her family during the meal,” the report continued, “and almost immediately afterwards she
became violently sick and vomited, being at the same time altogether unconscious.” Her
extremities turned cold and Barrow could not detect a pulse and found her “eyes wide open and
staring.” The woman’s condition lasted for a quarter of an hour until warm brandy and opium
brought her back to a relatively stable condition.57
Instead of rejecting further use of cannabis, Barrow wrote, “upon all these points of
interest, and upon the effect with which others have observed to follow the exhibition of
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cannabis,” he felt it to be a useful test case. He was anxious to learn more and submitted his
experience to the Provincial Journal. Barrow believed it was “the duty of every man to give to
his professional brethren the advantage of his experience.” The mounting evidence, proven in
Barrow’s case and many others, was that cannabis produced bizarre reactions that tended to
complicate treatments rather than produce cures. In the case of his twenty-six-year-old patient,
who had previously been treated for painful menstruation (with opium and morphine), cannabis
caused vomiting and catalepsy—as it had been known to do from previous cases. In Barrow’s
case, he did not, in fact, note it having any beneficial effect.58
The Adjustment of Expectations and the Search for the Drug’s Active Agent
Further experimentation continued in the United States with mixed results. The Boston
Medical Surgical Journal reported in 1849, “through the earnest endeavors of Prof.
O’Shaughnessy, of Calcutta, the extract, a few years since, was extensively prescribed for
neuralgic diseases, with high expectations.” The uncertainty of the drug, however, continued to
impede researcher’s efforts and the journal added, “In New England, at least, it was found to be
nearly if not quite powerless.”59 That cannabis was nearly—if not quite powerless—seemed to be
the direction early experiments pointed. Yet, the flurry of new experimentations confirmed a
crucial point O’Shaughnessy had been correct on from the beginning: it caused little, if any,
harm. In a world filled with disease, there was no reason to eliminate it from practice.
In New York City, in 1848, for example, there were 15,919 deaths. 1,161 came as the
result of premature births and 327 were from suicide and murder. Of the nearly 16,000 deaths,
7,020 were adults and 8,899 were children; 8,343 were male while 7,576 were female. 11,302
were native born, 3,949 were Irish, 694 German, 454 English, 141 Scottish, and 68 French.
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Officials cited typhus fever as one of the major illnesses that plagued the city as it had taken
1,396 lives. On the other hand, “diseases of the bowels” caused 2,227 deaths and 444 succumbed
to small pox. There were also 12 cases of poisoning, 7 deaths from hydrophobia, 20 from
tetanus, and 34 from suicide.60
Even when considering the fact that the average physician of the nineteenth century could
not afford to eliminate tools from his or her kit, there also appeared to be moments of triumph.
Dr. Isaac Hiester of Reading, Pennsylvania, argued in the summer of 1846 that he had
successfully used cannabis to treat tetanus. His assertion received widespread attention in
American newspapers and in English medical journals. The case involved sixteen-year-old Cyrus
Hassaman, who, while “quarrying stones,” deeply cut his index finger. It seemed to have healed
after ten days, but then four or five days after that Cyrus felt his jaw stiffening, which was
accompanied by sharp pains in his chest and neck. Hiester treated him with lye poultice and
returned the next night to find his symptoms had worsened. Cyrus’s muscles were rigid and
inflexible, lock jaw had set in, and he suffered from unpredictable spasms.61
Hiester considered the case “a fair one for the trial of cannabis Indica” and gave Cyrus
two grains of resin in liquid form. After the doses the patient became tranquil and was able to
finally sleep. While he still suffered from the spasms, their intensity noticeably decreased.
Hiester found that cannabis—along with a dose of morphine—completely arrested his seizures.
It seemed to be a crucial case confirming cannabis’s potential as an anti-convulsive and
redeeming O’Shaughnessy’s earlier predictions. It was also true that Hiester coupled cannabis
with the far more powerful morphine. It was unclear, then, if Hiester simply attributed the
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powers of morphine to cannabis. Also, few of the cases cited—whether a success of failure—
received any news of follow-up visits or information from prolonged care.62
Even though its efficacy in treating tetanus remained unclear, the use of cannabis
expanded during the 1850s to treat other maladies. Dr. Simpson, of Edinburgh, gave doses of
cannabis to women experiencing “tedious labor” in the interest of “ascertaining if it possessed
oxytoxic effect (like Ergot or Rye) in increasing and exciting the parturient action of the uterus.”
Inspired by Dr. Churchill in London, Dr. Simpson found cannabis to induce labor “very
remarkably” after “exhibition of the hemp.” He also acknowledged, “far more extensive and
careful experiments would be required” before a definite opinion could be formed. Louisville’s
Western Journal of Medicine reprinted Simpson’s trials.63
Eight months later, the same publication introduced the work of Dr. Christison, also of
Edinburgh. Christison found that cannabis “seemed to possess a remarkable power of increasing
the force of uterine contraction during labor.”64 The author continued, “[Christison] reports, in
the August number of the Edinburgh Journal of Medical Science, some cases in which it was
given, with this view, at the Maternity Hospital of Edinburgh.” Christison was otherwise reliant
on Ergot, a medicinal fungus that decreased bleeding during childbirth. So, he considered
cannabis to be far superior as it acted faster and more noticeably. The benefit of cannabis in
issues relating to childbirth and infant care seemed to be confirmed by Charleston, South
Carolina’s Dr. Gaillard, who reported that he had cured two cases of “the trimus of new-born
infants” with Indian hemp.65
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That cannabis could be useful in child birth was a new angle in the 1850s and, as had
characterized knowledge of its uses previously, the news quickly traveled abroad. In this case, it
emerged from Edinburgh, was quickly picked up in London and sent to the United States, where
it led to experiments in South Carolina. It was a rare moment of unambiguously positive
cannabis news in the field of medicine.66
Those who continued to use it in general practice, however, continued to struggle with
effectively harnessing its mysterious impact. Dr. George S.D. Anderson of Rapides, Louisiana
wrote in 1855 that “since the publication of Dr. O’Shaughnessy’s account of the virtues of the
Indian hemp” it had been used by many respected physicians.” He suggested that it was far too
powerful a narcotic agent to ignore and urged the profession to continue to test its use in
practical medicine. Somewhat overestimating the power of cannabis, Anderson argued that just
because “it was capable of destroying life in not a very large dose” was no reason to discontinue
its use. For his part, Anderson administered cannabis to a total of six patients, including an infant
and an eighty-seven-year old woman, who seemed to have overdosed on it and momentarily lost
her pulse. As a man devoted to the objectivity of his field, Anderson submitted his results
“without comment.” Still, from what he witnessed, he was convinced “of the extraordinary
powers of the medicine” and he believed that “in time” cannabis would “become one of our most
valued and esteemed medicinal agents.”67
In the mid-1850s, frustrated with its inability to tame medical cannabis, the profession
looked to altering the recipes guiding the distillations. The search for the substance’s hidden
powers had started with the Calcutta experiments when William O’Shaughnessy claimed they
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could be found in the flower’s resins, but that theory was proven to too simplistic. In one of the
earliest attempts to revise it, M. De Courtive, a French pharmacy student, presented a thesis on
cannabis to the School of Pharmacy in Paris in 1848. His “inquiry was directed by the effects he
noticed it to produce upon the lunatics at the Bicêtre.” During his lecture, Courtive argued that “a
resin which he extracted through a complicated process of maceration, and the action of alcohol”
was undoubtedly the source of cannabis’s strange power. He called the resin “cannabina” and
claimed that doctors could do more with much less of his extract.68
This news excited the medical community, which argued that “if a resin of unvarying
strength can be fully procured, it will provide us with a most eligible form of administering the
drug.”69 As time went on, however, Courtive’s experiments, while interesting, could not be
widely replicated. While Courtive introduced his new theory on the active agent, Andrew
Robertson, a colleague of William O’Shaughnessy in the Chemistry Department at the
University of Calcutta, began building on his coworkers’ original recipe. He began by buying
thirty pounds of cannabis for “the purpose of having its medical qualities fully tested by
European medical men.”70
Dr. Robertson then sent quantities of his improved substance to London, Paris, Berlin,
Scotland, and to friends in the profession hoping they would experiment with it. He found that
O’Shaughnessy had heated the alcohol above boiling point, which turned it brown and limited its
overall impact. Robertson’s mixture, on the other hand, was “deep green” and “gave a grass
green tincture.” He claimed that the “inactivity” of cannabis in British medicine could be
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attributed to this unfortunate over-boiling. The experience had been much for Robertson,
however, and he announced he “did not care about making more” because the process was
“tedious and troublesome” and he was “tormented by the Excise regulations.”71
William Hodgson, an American physician, commented in 1858 that the problem with
medicinal cannabis was that United States pharmacies “in making the preparation generally
adopt the proportions of the Dublin Pharmacopeia.” After analyzing a London made tincture,
Hodgson found that forty percent of the extract consisted of materials that were not soluble in
alcohol. His comments gave credence to the idea that the unpredictability associated with the
effects of medicinal cannabis might not be the fault of the plant at all, but rather the result of
poorly created tinctures. Ultimately, Hodgson’s tincture contained less than thirteen grains per
fluid ounce instead of the twenty-two outlined in the Dublin Pharmacopeia. He acknowledged
that the cost of ensuring the purity of the tincture was almost double what it would otherwise be,
but argued “this ought to be of no moment, compared with the importance of supplying a reliable
article.” Ultimately, Hodgson’s theories failed to gain traction in the pharmaceutical industry, but
they highlight the ongoing efforts to make cannabis into “a reliable article” with consistently
predictable effects.72
The history of the many attempts to tame cannabis proved that making the drug a
standard pharmaceutical was difficult, if not impossible, to achieve. In 1860, Tilden and
Company, of New Lebanon, New York, also claimed they had mastered the art of the cannabis
tincture. Their product, they averred, would soon be proven the best in the world. The company
complained that cannabis was “not used as it should be, partly probably from the fact that it has
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so often proved unreliable.” They, like O’Shaughnessy, Courtive, Robertson, and Hodgson,
thought they had, once and for all, solved the problem. They had not.73
In 1861, William H.H. Githens, an American pharmacist, wrote that “having observed a
great want of stability in the mixtures of cannabis indica…it occurred to [him] that much more
elegant preparations might be introduced.” After a series of trials, however, Githens got no closer
to perfecting the remedy than his predecessors and admitted defeat. William Proctor, Professor at
the Philadelphia College of Pharmacy, asked in 1860, “is there a reliable test for the active resin
of Cannabis sativa of the East Indies” so that it could “be satisfactorily and easily ascertained by
the pharmacist?” Frustrated, he listed the many efforts at perfecting a reliable medicine from the
resinds, including several of his own tests. He concluded by arguing that the issue had to be
“made more manifest by further experimentation.”74
The state of the western medical profession’s attempt at turning cannabis into a reliable
drug stood, in 1860, where it had in 1840—with calls for further experimentation. William
O’Shaughnessy had argued that there should be no hesitation in offering the resin of hemp an
extensive trial. It is clear from the optimism in his writing that he was fairly certain the
profession would find that it had extensive curative powers. It seemed apparent in 1860 that it
did not. On the other hand, it continued to survive as a medicine and physicians prescribed it
readily and continued to experiment with it. Those days in which it was considered a revelatory
medicine, however, seemed to have passed. It worked well in arresting seizures and seemed to
function as a moderately effective pain reliever. These more modest uses of cannabis would
continue for a long time. It was not until the 1930s that the medical profession entirely gave up
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on it, and that was only due to the fact that it was criminalized. Had that not happened, it is likely
that doctors would have, in limited cases, continued to prescribe it as a pain reliever.
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Chapter Two
“Adventurous Tasters”: Non-Medicinal Drug Use in Nineteenth Century America
At the Hôtel Lauzun on the Ȋle Saint-Louis in Paris, a group of men, mostly writers and
artists, gathered in the 1840s to ingest hashish and extensively note their reactions to it. They
wore Arabic robes, laced Turkish coffee with significant doses of cannabis, and followed the
mental distortions the substance brought. Dr. Jacques-Joseph Moreau, a French experimental
psychiatrist, hosted these narcotic fueled soirees and one of his comrades, author Theophile
Gautier christened the group “Le Club Des Hachichins” in an article he wrote for the Revue des
Duex Mondes in 1846. Gautier embodied the boundary pushing spirit of the Hashish Club. After
publishing Mademoiselle de Maupin in 1835, the story of a transgender opera singer and sword
aficionado, he settled into the life of a literary, art, and dance critic.
As a regular member of the Hashish Club, Gautier joined other luminaries like Honorè
Balzac, Victor Hugo, Alexandre Dumas, Charles Baudelaire, Eugène Delacroix, and Gèrard de
Nerval. Under the guidance of Dr. Moreau, these literary figures consumed cannabis and
published the ways in which the substance altered their minds. In doing so, the group operated in
similar ways to the medical community that simultaneously worked to establish cannabis as a
mainstream medicine. The Hashish Club, however, existed in a liminal space where hashish,
experimental psychology, and Romantic literary tropes intersected to define a style of use that
was neither recreational nor for the sake of the medical record.
Both styles of use originated in India and the Middle East. Dr. William O’Shaughnessy
conducted his experiments with cannabis in Calcutta where he used the substance according to
the instruction he received from Indian physicians who had experience using it. He then exported
his findings to London where they were subsequently transmitted to the United States through a
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transatlantic information exchange. Similarly, Dr. Moreau, once a physician to wealthy French
travelers, first consumed hashish in Egypt and, upon returning to Paris, he hosted cannabis fueled
soirees that mirrored the Middle Eastern style of recreational use. In addition to Arabic robes and
Turkish coffee, the stories subsequently written often included surrealist imagery set in the
Middle East. Just as O’Shaughnessy appropriated the Eastern style of medicinal cannabis use,
the Hashish Club coopted a more recreational style that emerged from the same region.
A strong transatlantic connection also characterized the dissemination of Moreau’s
experiments from Paris—just as they had O’Shaughnessy’s from London (via Calcutta).
The London medical community collected reports of O’Shaughnessy’s Calcutta trials and then
forwarded them to the United States. The Hashish Club, repeating styles of use learned by
Moreau in Egypt, published their experiences in the French press; stories that were then
translated and exported to literary journals in the United States. That more recreational style of
cannabis experimentation, like the controlled medicinal trials it complemented, similarly became
a global phenomenon.
Soon thereafter, American artists and intellectuals—including Bayard Taylor and
Fitzhugh Ludlow—experimented recreationally with cannabis and documented the results of
their experiences in widely read drug confessionals. While these confessionals appealed to the
reading public, they also functioned as a kind of supplementary text that aided in the vetting of
new drugs for the medical marketplace. In the process, the confessionals existed on the margins
of both medicine and literature, which not only offered that style of writing an air of legitimacy,
but spurred the formation of America’s first recreational cannabis subculture.
Historians often view the Hashish Club and the authors it influenced as colorful asides in
the history of cannabis use in Europe and the United States. A closer look, however, reveals their
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works to be important accompaniments to the practice of medicine. The authors, who viewed
their endeavors as fundamentally scientific, explored the psychological effects of cannabis in
seemingly more thorough ways than mainstream medicine allowed. Indeed, Dr. Moreau
eventually published a work exploring the possibility of using cannabis to better understand
mental illness. Believing hashish induced the common symptoms associated with “madness,”
Moreau utilized the confessionals to gain a more psychologically acute knowledge of the origins
of mental disease. In an era before centralized agencies governed the vetting of new drugs for the
medical marketplace, the testing of new narcotics remained highly decentralized and the
boundaries separating controlled laboratory experiments from those conducted by laymen were
incredibly elastic.
Indicating the extent of the interconnectedness between the literary and medical texts
regarding cannabis in America, the popularity of the hashish confessionals rose and fell with
medical cannabis. From the 1840s-1860s, as the profession suggested cannabis had broad healing
powers, the public embraced tales of hashish hallucinations and they continued to gain popularity
within the literary community. After the Civil War, as the profession concluded that cannabis
was too unpredictable to become a reliable and widely applied treatment, the popularity of the
hashish confessional similarly waned. Indeed, the two movements were inextricably linked and,
for a period, provided a holistic view of cannabis’s powers—one from the medical community
and the other from a Bohemian subculture that continually crossed the boundaries of what
constituted scientific experimentation.
The Origins of Recreational Drug Use in Europe and the United States
Dr. Jacques-Joseph Moreau did not invent the modern drug confessional nor could he be
credited with creating the conditions that inspired it. That honor went to Thomas De Quincey,
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who published the essays that led to his epic novella Confessions of an English Opium Eater in
1821, over two decades before the first meeting of the Hashish Club in Paris. De Quincey’s work
followed a simple style—it recounted the horrors of addiction, oftentimes in a wild romantic
narrative, and then concluded with a tale of recovery, stability, and a restoration of sanity. That
style, in many ways, resembled the confessions of Christian literature, especially those of St.
Augustine.1
The writings that emerged from the Hashish Club in Paris, which inspired emulators in
the United States, had deep historical roots. The impulse to sin, confess, and pursue a path of
repentance was not a groundbreaking concept in western society. De Quincey cast sin in his story
as opium addiction and meticulously detailed his dependency for the benefit of others. Although
it was a simple concept, De Quincey knew his work had the potential for causing controversy
and so and he proceeded cautiously. “I present you, courteous reader, with the record of a
remarkable period of my life,” he wrote. Like the stories of addiction that would follow it, and
continue into present day, De Quincey wanted his work to be more than just an entertaining read.
Indeed, he imagined it becoming a helpful source for others suffering from similar maladies. It
was “in that hope” that he wrote his Confessions. De Quincey continued “and that must be my
apology for breaking through the delicate and honourable reserve, which, for the most part,
restrains us from the public exposure of our own errors and infirmaries.”2
His novella elevated the Romantic Era focus on the self to even greater heights than it
had already been lifted. It was a memoir, but not one of a hero or a public servant. Rather, it
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painted a detailed and unique portrait of a social menace, one of the west’s first anti-heroes. De
Quincey mastered the tightrope walk between remorse and a heedless offering of the lurid details
of addiction. Indeed, the author acknowledged he fully understood that nothing was “more
revolting to English feelings” than an individual who willingly spoke about his “moral ulcers or
soars.” He noted that a large number of those sorts of stories were often told by “demireps,
adventurers, or swindlers.” That, De Quincey assured his readers, was not his intention. He
wanted to offer a realist glimpse of addiction. His story, however, would be one of triumph—just
like St. Augustine’s—in which a broken man found renewal and grace.3
De Quincey’s novella influenced the Hashish Club, whose members read his work
extensively and used it as a resource in writing their mid-nineteenth century hashish
confessionals. In Charles Baudelaire’s Artificial Paradises, first published in 1860, the author
paid homage to De Quincey’s groundbreaking work. He, Gautier, and a small group of other
French writers had, by then, become known as “The Second Romantics” and they seemed to
have widely discussed Confessions of an English Opium Eater. Baudelaire not only sent his
friend Gustave Flaubert a copy of his own work on hashish, but also recommended De Quincey.
Flaubert responded, “I must especially thank you for introducing me to Mr. De Quincey, a
charming man! How likable he is!”4
Baudelaire informed his mother that he planned to introduce a French translation of De
Quincey’s work, writing that “The Opium Eater is a new translation of a magnificent author who
is not yet know in Paris.” Baudelaire had a publishing contract with the Moniteur, but the editors
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balked after receiving the first translations. Baudelaire told his mother that “the bizarre nature of
the work frightens them.” After many rejections, which led the author into a lengthy depression,
and battles with publishers over space and content, his translation was finally published in 1858.5
Although De Quincey’s work had been controversial in the 1820s—and also in 1850s
Paris—the public ultimately accepted it as a significant contribution to literature. Like the works
of the Hashish Club, the medical community viewed De Quincey’s work as a potential resource;
one that, through artful healing, offered medical and psychological insights that might prove
useful to average physicians. The American Medical Recorder wrote in July of 1822 that “when
we first glanced at this production, we considered the title as a mere vehicle, through which some
romantic or satirical tale was to be conveyed.” After reading it, however, the journal decided its
initial perception had been “erroneous, and that these confessions bore intrinsic marks of
authenticity.”6
The literary community similarly praised De Quincey’s work. The North American
Review argued in 1824 that “we believe that very few persons, if any, in this country, abandon
themselves to the use of opium as a luxury; nor does there appear to be any great danger of the
introduction of this species of intemperance.” It described the author’s work to American
audiences for the first time, noting “it abounds in fantastical and splendid images, and is
interspersed with descriptions of great beauty and magnificence, and with detached thoughts and
expressions of singular force and felicity.” Confessions of an English Opium Eater became one
of the first literary works to have crossover appeal within the medical profession.7
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It fit neatly within the literary styles that dominated the period and Confessions would
eventually be considered a classic text of the Romantic period. On the other hand, it had genredefying characteristics. The work veered into Gothic horror in the same manner that Mary
Shelley did with Frankenstein, published just two years earlier in England. De Quincey’s work
could also be considered a staple of the Dark Romantic style, a genre it contributed to—
interestingly—as a memoir. Indeed, the author often presented himself as a Frankenstein-like
character; part gentlemanly scholar, traveler, artist, junkie, degenerate. His work mixed romantic
and transcendental imagery with filthy dankness, lust, night sweats, and amorality, ultimately
propelling it into a stark originality unusual for the time.8
Consequently, British and American readers accepted it as a near instant classic. It also
continued to cross the boundaries that traditionally separated science from the art world. In 1829,
The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal printed an article entitled “Opium Eaters—From Mr.
Madden’s Travels in Turkey.” The writer, Mr. Madden, claimed he had “heard so many
contradictory reports of the sensations produced by [opium]” that he “resolved to know the truth,
and accordingly took [his] seat in the coffee-house, with half a dozen Theriakis.” He then
recounted his experience in the style of Thomas De Quincey. Those around him, who had
already ingested the substance, “were frightful: and spoke incoherently.” Their “features were
flushed, their eyes had an unnatural brilliancy, and the general expression of their countenance
was horribly wild.”9
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Mr. Madden’s narrative was an unusual contribution to a prestigious medical journal and
it highlighted the extent to which Confessions had captured the imagination of the profession.
Madden continued describing his experience and noted that his “faculties appeared enlarged” and
everything he “looked at seemed increased in volume.” He no longer had “the same pleasure”
when he closed his eyes as he did when they were open. It seemed to him that his mind turned
“external objects” into “images of pleasure.” “In short,” he wrote, “it was the faint exquisite
music of a dream” but in a “waking moment.” He left the Turkish opium parlor and made his
way home as quickly as he could, “dreading, at every step” that he might be capable of
committing “some extravagance.” As he walked, Mr. Madden barely noticed his feet touching
the ground and he immediately went to bed where “the most extraordinary visions of delight
filled [his] brain all night.” In the morning he arose “pale and dispirited,” his head ached, and he
remained on the sofa for the entire day, “dearly paying for [his] first essay at opium eating.”10
The medical community heavily relied on the use of opium and, as a result, became
specialists in managing the addictions it created. In an article titled “Autopsy of an Opium
Eater,” also published by the Boston Medical and Surgical Journal, Dr. M.S. Perry, in 1835,
examined a seventy-seven-year-old woman. She was, according to a medical history obtained
from her friends, “of nervous temperament, but enjoyed good health.” Her medical treatment
began after an attack of pleurisy, an inflammation of the tissues that line the lung and chest
cavity, which caused a serious and persistent cough. She was eventually prescribed opium. For
nine years prior to her death, she increased her opium use to fifteen, twenty, and sometimes even
thirty grains per day. Before her death, the woman locked herself in her bedroom for weeks at a
time and often replaced food and water with thirty grains of opium each night. Her attending
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physician noted she could not live without that level of opium and screamed until she received
it.11
To professionals perplexed by opiate addiction, De Quincey’s work offered a guidebook.
In some cases, journals directly cited Confessions. The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal
argued that, for those who had “accustomed themselves” to the use of opium, it was possible for
them to increase the amount of the drug until they could ultimately “swallow enough to destroy
three lives under ordinary circumstances.” An American, Dr. Smith, reported that on a visit to
Turkey he saw individuals ingesting between three and six drachms of opium regularly. “It was
about this portion,” he contended, “that an individual took who has acquired considerable
celebrity in this country, from his publication of a little volume which was entitled ‘Confessions
of an English Opium Eater.’”12
The journal reported that, in Confessions, De Quincey took 320 grains of opium once a
week and that he typically ingested the bulk of those doses on Saturday nights before the opera.
The opium, according to De Quincey’s telling, enhanced the music in profound ways. The
author’s gradual elevation of doses, however, led to a more formidable addiction. “One sensation
which he describes,” the author of the article continued, “I myself have felt when obliged to have
recourse to opium for the alleviation of pain, and which likewise I have heard others allude to,
namely, the singular lengthening out of time, so that a single night appears to have been of years’
duration.” The Boston Medical and Surgical Journal concluded by arguing that De Quincey’s
portrait of addiction could be confirmed by science. The journal confidently informed its readers
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that “these are not the imaginary sufferings of a romance writer,” but rather the “inconceivable
sensations” that many other patients had attributed to opium use.13
The medical community found De Quincey’s prose convincing. De Quincey did, indeed,
provide glimpses into the agony of long-term dependency. The author claimed that “during the
last two months” of his addiction, he slept “much in the daytime and was apt to fall into transient
dozings at all hours.” The sleep, however, was not restorative, but rather more disturbing than
the time he spent awake.
Besides the tumultuousness of my dreams (which were not only so awful as those which I
shall have to describe hereafter as produced by opium), my sleep was never more than
what is called dog-sleep; so that I could hear myself moaning, and was often, as it seemed
to me, awakened suddenly by my own voice; and, about this time, a hideous sensation
began to haunt me as soon as I fell into a slumber.
Later, De Quincey argued, “this is the doctrine of the true church on the subject of opium: of
which church I acknowledge myself to be the only member—the alpha and omega; but then it is
to be recollected, that I speak from the ground of a large and profound personal experience.”
This made him, according to the author himself, far more knowledgeable on the issue of the
subject than medical practitioners. “Even those who have written expressly on the materia
medica, make it evident, from the horror they express of it, that their experimental knowledge of
its action is none at all.” De Quincey understood his work to be a medical trial of sorts, one in
which the educated user of substances rose above the classically trained practitioner. That
instinct mirrored the spirit of the times, which exhibited an almost total faith in experimentation
over detached theory. That instinct, of course, guided O’Shaughnessy’s trials and inspired the
Hashish Club in Paris decades later.14
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Not only did De Quincey’s work provide important context for the medical community, it
also inspired other writers to follow in his footsteps. In 1839, The New Yorker published excerpts
of his novella.15 Soon after, William Blair, an unknown writer, penned an article titled “An
Opium Eater in America.” He emulated De Quincey’s signature style: “before I state the results
of my experience as an opium-eater, it will perhaps not be uninteresting, and it certainly will
conduce to the clearer understanding of such statement, if I give a slight and brief sketch of my
habits and history previous to my first indulgence in the infernal drug which imbittered [sic] my
existence for seven most weary years.” According to the story, the young man sailed to New
York from England in hopes of becoming a writer, but he failed to find work. Depressed, he
began to drink and take opium. He was then offered $2,000—or roughly $62,000 adjusted for
inflation—to write “Passages from the Life of an Opium Eater,” an indication of how well De
Quincey’s work had sold in the market. While attempting to begin the project, however, he
discovered he could not write and so he remained in Brooklyn until November of 1841, at which
point he moved into the city where he lived in “great poverty” and was “frequently unable to
procure dinner” as the few dollars he did receive all went to supplying himself with opium.
“Whether I now shall be able to leave off opium,” he wrote, “God only knows!”16
An unnamed man, writing for Colton’s admitted that his “imagination was once so
kindled by the perusal of a little book called the ‘Opium Eater,’” that he purchased from the
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apothecary “two enormous doses of the precious drug.” The author of the piece then engaged the
subject of drug addiction in that wild prose poetry innovated by De Quincey:
Thence again I emerged, with the placidity and power of Neptune over his troubled
realm, and driving my watery team over the excited bosom of the ocean, harmonized its
elements into the deep bass it sustained in the bursting anthem of the infant world. And
then with the fleetness of a disembodied spirit, I seemed to float around just between the
incumbent circle of the blue heaven and the sea, discerning within upon the surging plain
the motion of innumerable ships skimming the wave with the lightness of the swallow,
while without the circle I beheld, far down in the twilight and lurid gloom of an
immeasurable gulf, the wrecks of worn out worlds.”
The idea that deep personal experience with opiate addiction had medical value began to
prevail. In 1844, J. Root wrote a book entitled “The Horrors of Delirium Tremens.” The
Columbian Lady’s and Gentleman’s Magazine argued that “if the author had contented himself
with an exposition, derived from his personal experience, of the remarkable phenomenon
attendant upon that temporary insanity which is caused by excess of cerebral stimulants, he
might have produced a work which would be read with as much of pleased curiosity as the
celebrated ‘Confessions of an English Opium Eater,’ by De Quincey.” Instead, the author chose
to “overlay his narrative with a mass of psychological and theological speculation.” In other
words, Root had simply studied delirium tremens. He had not lived the horror of withdrawals
from alcohol like De Quincey had opium. As such, the periodical considered him something of a
charlatan. In that particular case, actual expertise in the field, gained through experience, was
cast as the promotion of unscientific analysis. In many cases, firsthand experience seemed to
matter more than an actual education in the matter being discussed.17
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In the spring and summer of 1845, De Quincey published a sequel to his famous work
entitled Suspiria de Profundis—or “Sighs from the Depths”—and it began circulating through
literary journals just as his original masterwork had. These new essays would be considered as
equally powerful as their 1822 precedents. At the same time, the drug confessional engrained
itself in European and American society more fully. A Manchester, England paper argued that
“the practice of eating opium was surrounded with so poetical a halo by the two great opium
eaters Coleridge and De Quincey that some years ago it threatened to become rooted in our
universities among all those inspiring youths who affected the character of men of genius.” As
medical journals printed quasi-confessionals in the interest of gaining a more thorough
education, British and American youth experimented with it to experience that Romantic
intoxication the author had so powerfully described.18
De Quincey’s appeal, then, was not without consequences. While his work provided
needed context, at times, for the medical community, it also seemed to inspire a recreational use
of opium that had the potential of exacting grave consequences. Opium could cause premature
death and there were numerous tragedies to point to even in the early-1800s. That reality
somewhat challenged the romance of De Quincey’s experimentation. Charles Wheedon, for
example, was a London papermaker who died suddenly at the age of forty-two years old from an
opium overdose. T. Fardon, a chemist on Stone Street, admitted he had known the man and that
he usually bought a pennyworth of opium every three or four days. Wheedon had been in the day
before his death, however, and asked for a pennyworth of “the old sort.” Fardon “remarked
jocosely that he was extravagant” as he filled the order. The coroner’s verdict was “death from
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an overdose of opium, taken without any criminal intent.” These kinds of incidences were
commonplace in the early-to-mid nineteenth century.19
Similarly, Thomas Bowyer, a forty-two-year-pensioner who had served the East India
Company for twenty-seven years, died at Mason’s Arms, “a small beerhouse” in London.
Bowyer, who had served honorably in the war in Afghanistan, “drank some hard cider with an
old soldier, and while there, he took some opium from a paper, put it in his mouth, chewed it,
and then called for water to wash it down.” He then laid his head on the table of the bar as if he
had fallen asleep and “suddenly fell to the ground a corpse.” These men represented the reality of
drug addiction in England and the United States far more than Thomas De Quincey did.20
Opium had become a complicated phenomenon by the 1820s and 1830s. It eased pain
more reliably than any other available drug on the market and was, in that context, a saving grace
to those employed in the art of the suffering public. On the other hand, that power came with
consequences—ones felt by Charles Wheedon, Thomas Bowyer, and their loved ones. Unlike
Thomas De Quincey, they did not survive their addictions and could not use them as examples of
an unfortunate past ultimately redeemed (which, in De Quincey’s case, had become a very
lucrative story). There were far more tragedies than there were tales of redemption, which was a
fact that may have, in part, led to the popularity of Confessions. It offered hope that addiction
could be overcome and that a normal life could once again be restored. De Quincey had been
able to return from a wrecked state when many others seemed incapable of such a triumphant
return.21
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The members of the Hashish Club worked in the shadows of De Quincey’s monumental
writings and they knew it. His work, a masterpiece of the romantic period, became one of the
first novellas to directly influence the practice of medicine and its immediate dissemination of tto
France and the United States indicated the early presence of the transatlantic connection crucial
in spreading cannabis knowledge in the middle of the nineteenth century. Confessions of an
English Opium Eater paved the way for Dr. Moreau, his subjects, and for the Americanization of
the genre, which reached its peak with the publication of Fitzhugh Ludlows The Hasheesh Eater
in 1858.
Dr. Moreau’s experiments with cannabis, conducted in the latter two decades of De
Quincey’s life, continued the tradition of obfuscating the lines separating art and science. On the
other hand, Moreau’s medical education and interest in the psychological origins of
hallucinations distinguished his work from De Quincey’s. Indeed, Moreau’s interests were
unabashedly scientific and continued his important work on the psychological origins of mental
distortions. Yet, Moreau, even more than De Quincey, facilitated the literary exploration of drugs
by organizing and hosting the Hashish Club in Paris’s Left Bank. De Quincey may have inspired
the first moments of crossover between the two communities, but Moreau redefined the
interactions by hosting relatively controlled experiments with cannabis using the most prominent
writers in Paris at the time.
Charles Baudelaire’s description of Moreau’s trials offer a unique view of the privileged
world in which the doctor conducted his work. Baudelaire rented a room in the Hotel Lauzun, the
Hashish Club’s headquarters, and described the rooms as “noble lodgings” being “worthy of
Lords.” He chose one of the establishment’s smaller rooms, which had very high ceilings and a
nice “view of the wide green river” from the window. The wallpaper, patterned red and black,
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“perfectly matched the antique Damask curtains that fell in heavy folds to the floor.” Baudelaire
had an “immense table of walnut and several armchairs of oak;” an entire series of Delacroix’s
Hamlet lithographs; a large collection of Latin and Roman poets; and a shelf of Rhine wine.
Baudelaire wrote that the back portion of the hotel “was illuminated by the light of several
suspended lamps” and that the wood panel walls were lavishly decorated with antique paintings.
The ceilings were “rounded into a cupola” and painted with “allegorical figures.”22
Far from the dank milieu in which De Quincey descended into opium addiction, the
members of the Hashish Club created an environment of art, privilege, and experimentation. In
one account, as Baudelaire approached the back of the downstairs room in which the club met,
uncharacteristically late to a meeting, his friends greeted him warmly as he stepped into the light.
Dr. Moreau stood next to a “buffet of oak, upon which rested a tray crowded with porcelain
saucers.” The doctor then offered the guests a “small morsel of Oriental hashish” from a crystal
glass. After the drug had been fully ingested, the doctor offered coffee “in the Arab manner; that
is to say, with marc, and without sugar.”23
Reports of Moreau’s eccentric gatherings spread quickly. A New York periodical
exclaimed, “amongst several subjects of scientific inquiry in France, placed for the meantime in
abeyance by the revolution of February, one of the most remarkable was the peculiar influence of
certain drugs upon the human mind, and the alterations which they produce upon the perceptive
powers, the imagination, and reason.” It continued, “whilst discussing the nature of
eccentricities, or fantasias, and illusions, [Moreau] was led to describe the singular power of a
drug, the produce of the Indian Hemp, called Hashish.” The drug, it continued, led to an
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“awakening in the mind a train of phenomena of the most extraordinary character, entrancing the
senses in delicious reveries, and modifying the organic sensibility.”24
Dr. Moreau used the experiences to write his widely regarded 1845 book, Du l’hachisch
et de l’aliènation mentale, which translated to Hashish and Mental Illness. In the work, he
explored the idea that cannabis could be used to induce a form of mental illness that offered
insight into the origins of psychological disturbance. By the 1840s, Moreau had situated himself
on the cutting edge of experimental psychology and his extracurricular activities at the Hotel
Lauzun proved it. The doctor also inspired many of his students and colleagues to try cannabis.
A relatively obscure American periodical, The Albion, noted that “so invitingly did [Moreau]
paint the nature of the new impressions which arose from its use, that in a short time all the
physicians and medical students were indulging in doses of the new addition to the charms of
life.”25
While Moreau’s work impacted the Parisian medical community, the recently published
writings of the authors who served as his subjects circulated through the literary world. In 1849,
a Vermont paper noted that “public attention” had recently turned towards cannabis and that,
“particularly in France, since 1846,” there had been strong interest in hashish. It reported that
French authors had “published memoirs on the subject” and closed with an extensive sampling of
Gautier’s writings. In it, Gautier claimed that within a few minutes after taking the drug “it
appeared to him that his body was dissolved, that he had become transparent” and that he clearly
saw in his chest “the hashish, under the form an emerald.” Due to the transatlantic exchange that
brought De Quincey to the United States, Gautier’s audience expanded from the Left Bank of
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Paris to include rural Vermont. He, like De Quincey, O’Shaughnessy, and Moreau, had gone
global.26
As Americans read translations of Gautier’s work, French physicians copied the
unconventional style of Moreau’s cannabis trials. In 1850, the Scientific American pulished an
article titled “Curious Drugs for Producing Hallucination.” The piece featured an unnamed
French physician who, instead of conducting his work in a laboratory, “went to a familiar Café,
selected his subjects” and gave them each one grain of cannabis. The doctor overseeing this
peculiar trial then dissolved another grain of cannabis in a glass of Curacoa, a liqueur flavored
with dried citrus peels, and gave it to “the master of the house.” The man had two “young and
handsome daughters” who he forbade “to taste of the drug.”27
The French doctor featured in the article epitomized this newer style of uncontrolled
experimentation. Whereas O’Shaughnessy and Moreau kept their work confined to closed
spaces, this physician went public. He randomly selected participants from a café and then
administered cannabis on site. His work created a few moments of very public mayhem. The
“the youngest daughter, for whom the owner of the café forbade from cannabis use, ultimately
“tasted of the forbidden fruit,” which caused her to sink into a “delirium” accompanied by
“hysterical movements of a very alarming appearance.” Her “shrieks” were “rapid, most violent”
and she appeared only half-conscious of her condition, imploring those around her “not to
conclude that she was mad.” As the doctor led the troubled girl to bed, the men in the café began
having similar fits. One man, who had otherwise remained poised, began laughing hysterically
before rolling “up on the floor” and proclaiming he felt as if he was rising to heaven. Another
individual simply fell asleep standing up. Later, the benches were arranged around the café for
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“the slain” to rest on and they fell into “delightful dreams, producing strange laughter” which
ultimately “repaid the adventurous tasters for their curiosity.”28
The experiments in the French café introduced an unusual methodology that deviated
quite significantly from established scientific norms. The Scientific American, withholding
judgement, instead transitioned into the ways in which “Hindoos” used the substance. “A man
under [cannabis’s] influence looks like a madman,” the periodical argued, and expressed himself
by “dancing, singing, shouting, and tossing his arms.” These individuals claimed to use the
substance because “it made them forget all their pains and fatigue.” Like other publications, the
magazine warned against excessive use and suggested that cannabis could be “dangerous to
sanity and health, as is the use of all unnatural stimulants.” It concluded with a balanced
perspective, “in commenting upon any subject, authors and editors should always have a moral
in view—to warn where there is danger, to encourage where this hope.”29
In many ways, this new style of experimentation confirmed the results of work carried
out by American and European physicians in testing the medical viability of cannabis by
showing how dramatically unpredictable the drug could be. The behavior of the individuals in
the café would not have surprised William O’Shaughnessy or the multitude of physicians who
worked to corroborate his findings. These revolutionary experiments also maintained an aura of
scientific validity. In the café, a physician oversaw the lacing of the drinks and the periodical
reporting on the events that transpired promoted the results as valuable medical evidence. The
magazine’s conclusion that all use of the drug should have a “moral” objective provided a loose
criterion for experimentation. Moreau, the Hashish Club, and the French doctor working in the
café certainly had objectives—even if they pursued them in unconventional ways.
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The literary descriptions of the effects of cannabis offered a far more thorough view of
the substance’s impact on the mental faculties, which benefited physicians like Moreau. In
Artificial Paradises, Baudelaire wrote:
This giddy cheer, poignant or languid by turns, this uneasy joy, this insecurity, this
permutation of the malady, generally lasts but for a short time. Soon the links that bind
your ideas become so frail, the thread that ties your conceptions so tenuous, that only
your accomplices understand you. And here again you cannot be completely certain;
perhaps they only think they understand you, and the illusion is reciprocal. These
outbursts of loud cries and laughter, which resembles explosions, seem like true madness,
or at least like the ravings of a madman, to all those who are not similarly intoxicated.
Likewise will wisdom, good sense, and the logical thoughts of the sober, prudent
observer, delight and amuse you like a particular form of dementia. The roles are
reversed. His detachment drives you to the extremes of sarcastic mockery. Now is this
not really a mysteriously comic situation, when a man is moved to incomprehensible
mirth by a person whose condition differs from his own. The lunatic pities the sane man,
and henceforth the idea of his own superiority begins to dawn on his intellect’s horizon.
Soon it will explode like a meteor.
These narratives enabled Moreau’s pursuit of deeper insights into how cannabis induced a
momentary sense of mental illness. In Moreau’s world, that larger scientific objective placed
Baudelaire’s work within the realm of science. The nature of the subject and the artistic prose,
however, also allowed it to double as literature.30
Indeed, Baudelaire focused on the gulf cannabis created between the mind of an
individual under the influence of and one not. Baudelaire wrote, “I once witnessed a scene of this
sort, pushed to extremes, the grotesque aspect of which was only intelligible to those who knew
of, or at least had heard of, the substance and the enormous varieties of effect it can produce even
on two supposedly equal intellects.”31 Baudelaire’s story involved a famous musician, “who was
unfamiliar with hashish and who, perhaps, knew nothing of it even by name.” The subject
arrived at a party where almost everyone “was under [Cannabis’s] sway.” Those at the party tried
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to educate the man, who refused to listen and, instead, “smiled graciously, obligingly, upon
hearing these fantastic accounts, like a man willing to be tolerant for a moment.” Those “whose
wits had been sharpened by the poison quickly sensed his scorn” and began laughing. Their
laughter “wounded him” and the “wild demonstrations of mirth and joy, the altered
countenances, the strings of puns, the whole dissolute atmosphere of the place irritated him” and
he confronted them. “Amusement,” however, “like lightning, flashed over their faces” and they
laughed harder.32
Cannabis, in crucial ways that De Quincey’s opium could not, did seem to offer a
window into hallucination, delusion, and, more generally, the underlying phenomenon of mental
illness. The musician in Baudelaire’s story recognized the disparity in reasoning caused by the
substance and shouted “this extravagance may be good for you, but it doesn’t suit me in the
least” to which they replied “it suits us, that’s all that matters.” The musician could not tell
whether they “were truly mad or merely simulating madness,” but he nonetheless decided to
leave. He quickly found that they had locked the door and removed the key. One of the
partygoers then dropped to one knee in front of the musician and apologized profusely.
Ultimately, he agreed to stay and play the violin for them, but several of the attendants began to
cry and he became frightened.33
The Americanization of the Drug Confessional
By the 1850s, American writers began to produce hashish confessionals that maintained
the surrealist imagery outlined by the French. In April of 1854, Putnam’s Monthly published “A
Vision of Hasheesh,” written by poet and essayist Bayard Taylor. Like so many English and
French writers, Taylor became fascinated with the Middle East and Asia and travelled to Syria in
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the 1840s, a decade after Jacques Joseph Moreau accompanied wealthy French tourists there.
Taylor’s travels resulted in journalistic accounts of his time spent in Europe. In 1846, he
published a collection of articles entitled Views Afoot, or Europe Seen with Knapsack and Staff.
He did not reach widespread attention, however, until he arrived in Syria, which led to a flurry of
publications: A Journey to Central Africa; or, Life and Landscapes from Egypt to the Negro
Kingdoms of the White Nile, The Lands of the Saracen; or pictures of Palestine, Asia Minor,
Sicily, and Spain, both published in 1854. His most significant work that year, however, was “A
Vision of Hasheesh,” a short essay about a respite in Damascus, where he sampled hashish.
His story began with the purchase of the substance from “a dark Egyptian,” who spoke
“only lingua franca of the East.” After securing the drug, he took it back to the hotel to share
with his friends. It was difficult for Taylor to remember when it overtook him, but he recalled
that “the sense of limitation—of the confinement of our senses within the bounds of our own
flesh and blood—instantly fell away.” Consequently, “the walls” of Taylor’s frame “burst
outward and tumbled into ruin.” As Taylor’s visions turned more ominous, they resembled that
fall into despair described so articulately by De Quincey.34
The hashish confessionals typically recounted the story of a single night and did not
include the ongoing and long-term degradation of the body like De Quincey. They rather focused
on a momentary overthrow of the mind. The visions, which could certainly turn nightmarish,
were also far more surreal and shorter lived. They were sudden hallucinations more than
experiences derived from entrenched addiction. Taylor believed his body had turned into “a mass
of transparent jelly, and a confectioner poured [him] into a twisted mould.” He struggled to free
himself, but like so many others who had taken cannabis and reported their experiences, seemed
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to straddle two realities. He noted that “the sober half of me went into fits of laughter” at the
absurdity of the visions. Simultaneously, however, he realized the visions were quite real and it
struck him with horror. Taylor then claimed to laugh until his eyes overflowed with tears and
“every tear that dropped, immediately became a large loaf of bread, and tumbled upon the shopboard of a baker in the bazaar of Damascus.”35
Taylor’s confessions borrowed heavily from both De Quincey and the works that
emerged from the Hashish Club. His work mirrored Baudelaire’s in its focus on two realities—
the sober versus the inebriated. In the process, Taylor’s writing also overlapped with the
scientific themes of hallucination and mental illness that Dr. Moreau explored throughout his
career. Even more imaginatively unmoored from reality than the Hashish Club, Taylor claimed
to believe he was floating over the desert in “a barque made of mother of pearl…studded with
jewels of lasting lustre.” The sand was made of grains of gold and the “air was radiant with
excess of light, though no sun was to be seen.” Taylor “inhaled the most delicious perfumes” and
heard harmonies in his head that “Beethoven may have heard in dreams but never wrote.” Even
though his experiment led to a kind of surrealist mental terror, Taylor “did not regret having
made it” and concluded that “it revealed to me the deepest rapture and of suffering which my
natural faculties would have never sounded.”36
In the end, Taylor’s experience with hashish conformed to the style De Quincey
innovated and he repented and returned to his faith. The experiment taught him the power and
“majesty of human reason,” and he hoped, like De Quincey, that his account did not encourage
others to follow his lead. If his work happened to inspire other, he encouraged readers to “take
the portion of hasheesh which is sufficient for one man, and not, like me, swallow enough for
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six.” Taylor spent “two days afterwards” recovering from the experience because he was “weak
in body and still confused in [his] perceptions.” For a change of scenery, Taylor “started for
Baalbek,” a town in Lebanon. He found that “pure mountain air” and the sleep he got that night
“completed his cure.” The next morning, he rode through a mountain valley with the “towering,
snow-sprinkled ridge of the Anti-Lebanon on [his] right, a cloudless heaven above [his] head.” In
that moment, he realized that the “last shadow had rolled away” from his brain. Taylor felt that
he was once again master of himself and confessed that “the world glowed as if new-created in
the light of [his] joy and gratitude.” He thanked God for leading him out of “a darkness more
terrible than the Valley of the Shadow of Death.”37
The literary community embraced Taylor’s cannabis confession just as it had De
Quincey’s stories about opiate addiction. The unsuspecting Maine Farmer instructed its readers
that the next edition of Putnam’s would feature a “portrait of the author of ‘Visions of
Hasheesh,” Bayard Taylor, in Turkish costume” and argued that “the contents were of a kind that
will bear reading more than once.” It went further to suggest that Putnam’s had, “as an
experiment…demonstrated to our satisfaction the existence of a purely American literature.”38
The literary embrace of the cannabis confessionals accompanied the medical
community’s advocation of the substance as a potentially powerful new medicine. While this
overlap occurred, there were crucial differences. First, the medical community, which had
become aware of cannabis’s hallucinatory power, focused instead on its therapeutic qualities.
The hashish confessional took the opposite approached and highlighted its hallucinatory powers
while scarcely mentioning any healing effect it may have possessed. In the process, Americans
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were given a holistic portrait of the drug and, as a consequence, the public developed an
ambivalence towards its use. While understanding it to be an increasingly common medicinal
available in local pharmacies, Americans also perceived it to be a source of hallucinations and
delusions that were simultaneously amusing and terrifying.
In a popular poem written by John G. Whittier in the mid-1850s, titled “The Hashish,”
the author compares pro-slavery advocates with hashish users, thus amplifying in stark terms the
popular notion that cannabis caused destructive hallucinations. His work began “Of all the Orient
lands can vaunt/of marvels with their own competing/the strangest is the hashish plant/and what
will follow on its eating.” The author then claimed that the west had a plant that created even
deeper delusions than hashish—cotton, which compelled support of slavery. “It makes the
merchant class, with ware/and stock in trade, his fellow sinners/and factory lords, with equal
care/regard their spindles and their spinners,” it continued. For ministers, it noted, “the preacher
eats, and straight appears/his Bible in a new translation/it’s angels negro-overseers/and heaven
itself a snug plantation.” Whittier’s poem concluded, “Oh, potent plant! So rare a taste/Has never
Turk or Gentoo gotten/The hempen hashish of the East/Is powerless to our Western cotton.”39
As the American Civil War rapidly approached, the American literary scene produced the
first true heir to De Quincey’s style. Fitzhugh Ludlow, a young New Yorker, published his
novella The Hasheesh Eater in 1858 and it became something of a national sensation. Ludlow’s
work, like those writers who had so clearly inspired him, first appeared in Putnam’s. The title of
Ludlow’s first piece, “The Hasheesh Eater,” paid direct homage to De Quincey’s Confessions of
an English Opium Eater. Ludlow also borrowed from Taylor’s popular essay and began his story
began in Damascus. Continuing the appropriation of eastern culture, Ludlow commented that
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“certainly no other spot could be so worthy, unless it were Baghdad, the marvelous city of the
marvelous Sultan, Haroun al Rashid.”40
The author’s hallucinatory journey began with “a sudden nervous thrill, followed by the
whirl and prodigious apparent enlargement of the brain.” His head “expanded wider and wider,
revolving with inconceivable rapidity, and enlarging in space with every revolution. It filled the
room—the house—the city; it became a world, peopled with the shapes of men and monsters.”
He then lost “all perception off time and space, and knew no distinctions between the realities
around [him] and the phantasmata [sic] which sprung in endless succession from [his] brain.”41
Three months after Putnam’s published the piece, it followed with a sequel—Ludlow’s
“The Apocalypse of Hasheesh.” Based on the popularity of his cannabis writing, Ludlow secured
a book deal with Harper and Brothers and the company produced The Hasheesh Eater; Being
Passages from the Life of a Pythagorean in 1858. Evidenced by the subsequent editions of the
work, Americans widely read the book. By the time of its publication, however, the confessional
style had been well-established and Ludlow obsessed over the perception that he had copied his
work from Thomas De Quincey. He wrote “I am deeply aware that, if the succeeding pages are
read at all it will be by those who have already learned to love De Quincey.” Still not satisfied,
the author admitted he would “not for a moment compare the manner of [his] narrative with that
most wondrous, most inspired Dreamer.” Still insecure, Ludlow added, “Frankly do I say that I
admire De Quincey to such a degree that, were not imitation base and he inimitable, I know no
master of style whose footsteps I should more earnestly seek to tread.”42
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To guard himself “against the risk of burlesquing the inimitable,” Ludlow claimed to
have not looked at De Quincey’s Confessions “from the beginning to the end of [his]
undertaking.”43 Ludlow continued by stating that the only explanation he had for any overlap
“was that we both saw the same thing.” It seemed obvious to Ludlow that “the state of insight
which [De Quincey] attained through opium” was similar—if not exact—to what he reached “by
the way of hasheesh.” Later in his work, Ludlow felt the need to revisit the topic, “if in any way,
therefore, except servilely, I seemed to have followed De Quincey, I am proud of it.” He also
wrote that “it was the hasheesh referred to by Eastern travelers, and the subject of a most graphic
chapter from the pen of Bayard Taylor, which months before had moved [him] powerfully to
curiosity and admiration.”44
Whether Ludlow was comfortable with the comparisons or not, he nonetheless emerged
as the American De Quincey. There were many similarities between the two works beyond the
titles and the style of writing. The Eastern imagery that characterized all the hashish
confessionals was especially prominent in Ludlow’s work. On the other hand, there is little
evidence to suggest that The Hasheesh Eater crossed the Atlantic or significantly influenced
British or French culture the way in which American society had been influenced by De Quincey
and Moreau. There is also no indication that Ludlow’s work infiltrated the medical community to
the degree De Quincey and Moreau had. With that being said, the American pharmacy played a
significant role in his writing.
Ludlow wrote that “About the shop of my friend Anderson,” who ran the pharmacy in his
hometown, “there always existed a peculiar fascination, which early marked it out as my favorite
lounging-place.” In the essays he published with Putnam’s, Ludlow stated he took hashish in
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Syria, but in the preface to his novella, he admitted he also obtained cannabis from his local
pharmacy. In his writing, the author exhibits behaviors that would later be attributed to a drugseeker. Ludlow wrote about his friend’s pharmacy:
Here the details of surgical or medical experimentation has held me in as complete
engrossment as the positions and crises of romance; and here especially, with a disregard
to my own safety which would have done credit to Quintis Curtius, have I made upon
myself the trial of the effects of every strange drug and chemical which the laboratory
could produce. Now with the chloroform bottle beneath my nose I set myself careening
upon the wings of a thrilling and accelerating life, until I had just enough power
remaining to restore the liquid to its place on the shelf, and sink back into the enjoyment
of the delicious apathy which lasted through the few succeeding moments.
Ludlow presented himself as a De Quincey like figure—the alpha and omega of his
particular drug scene. The primary difference, however, is that Ludlow wrote as an active drug
user not in recovery. That fact pushed the drug confessional into new territory. Ludlow did not
have advice for the reader on how to overcome the habits that once seized him because he was
still in their throes. Still, he thought of himself as a kind of scientist, explaining that “in all these
experiences, research and not indulgence was my object, so that I never became the victim of any
habit in the prosecution of my headlong investigations.” Here, he emulated Moreau and, while
clearly using chloroform for a recreational intoxication, he ultimately claimed it was all done in
the interest of “investigation.” That sense of scientific pursuit had, since De Quincey’s work,
characterized the seemingly non-medicinal experimentation with drugs.45
Fitzhugh Ludlow, the self-proclaimed “hasheesh-eater,” considered himself to be a
master of drug use. “When the circuit of all the accessible tests was completed”—or after he had
tried very drug in the pharmacy—Ludlow sat back and “ceased experimenting,” feeling like a
“pharmaceutical Alexander, with no more drug-worlds to conquer.” It was in one of those
moments of triumphant repose that Ludlow found cannabis. His friend Anderson asked him if he
45
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had seen the pharmacies “new acquisitions?’” Ludlow excitedly checked the shelves searching
for a drug he had not yet experimented with. “Added since my last visit,” he stated, was “a row
of comely pasteboard cylinders inclosed [sic] vials of the various extracts prepared by Tildon &
Co. Arranged in order according to size.” The sight of these new drugs “comforted [him].”
Ludlow then “approached the shelves” so that he could better take the new narcotics “in review.”
He analyzed the new additions and realized they were, for the most part, drugs he had already
been acquainted with—“conium, taraxacum, rhubarb.” Then, he spotted a new one: “what is
this? Cannabis Indica?”46
Ludlow’s friend warned him not to take cannabis unless he had suicidal intention. Being
a self-proclaimed Alexander of “drug-worlds,” however, Ludlow waited until Anderson was out
of sight so that he would not “terrify him by that which he considered a suicidal venture.” He
then uncapped the cannabis and ingested it. At first, Ludlow experienced no effect whatsoever.
He then escalated his use until he achieved the desired result: “Ha! What means this sudden
thrill? A shock, as of some unimagined vital force, shoots without warning through [his] entire
frame.” Ludlow, on successive doses, finally found the experience he was looking for.47
The author’s experience in the pharmacy illustrates several important points. First, it is
likely Ludlow first ingested cannabis in New York and not Damascus, Syria, as Bayard Taylor
had. Secondly, Ludlow pursued a recreational style of drug use that did not adhere to the
standards of the writers he emulated. Unlike Gautier and Baudelaire, his work was not for the
benefit of scientific advancement—and did not culminate in the publication of a work like
Moreau’s Hashish and Mental Illness. Unlike De Quincey, Ludlow did not offer a message of
repentance and hope. Indeed, he appeared to be taking cannabis—and chloral and opium—for
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the sake of simply feeling its effects. In that sense, he emerged as the first famous recreational
drug user in the United States.
On cannabis, Ludlow wrote that “the value of this experience to me consists in its having
thrown open to my gaze many of the sublime avenues of spiritual life, at whose gates the soul in
its ordinary state is forever blindly groping, mystified, perplexed, yet earnest to the last in its
search for that secret spring which, being touched, shall swing back the colossal barrier.” Ludlow
argued that, under the spell of a hashish vision, he had, “in a single instant…seen the vexed
question of a lifetime settled, the mystery of some grand recondite process of mind laid bare, the
last grim doubt that hung persistently on the sky of a sublime truth blown away.” To Ludlow,
cannabis use represented a search for meaning and a way to clear his mind, but it ultimately had
no higher purpose.48
This relatively unrepentant recreational use of cannabis did little to dampen the
enthusiasm over his contribution to the genre of the confessional, however. The National Era, a
mid-nineteenth century abolitionist newspaper, claimed that Ludlow’s work was “in the vein of
De Quincey’s Opium Eater,” and that readers would find it immensely interesting, and that the
style of the prose was “nervous and graphic.” The Maine Farmer, ever an advocate of the
hashish narrative, wrote that Ludlow’s “graphic confessions” would “interest both those who
delight in spiritual phenomena, and lovers of the curious and marvelous.” Graham’s American
Monthly Magazine of Literature went further, arguing that “those desirous of reading one of the
most extraordinary, fantastic, and beautifully-delirious books ever written, should get ‘The
Hasheesh Eater’ published by Messrs. Harper of New York.” It also noted “we should prefer not
instituting a comparison between it and the Opium Eater by De Quincey, but the press has
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generally done so, and we take the liberty of giving our own views.” Graham’s argued that
“inferior as a polished writer and trained metaphysician to De Quincey, The Hasheesh Eater
excels his prototype in wild gorgeous imagery.”49
Just as De Quincey inspired copycats, so did Ludlow. In April of 1858, Russell’s
Magazine printed excerpts of a hashish confessional from Benjamin West Ball’s book of poetry
Elfin-Land, which had first appeared in 1851. In a brief preface explaining his decision to
publish the account, the magazine’s founder and editor, Ed Russell confessed that he did so
“somewhat against [the publication’s] convictions of propriety.” Russell’s sense of decency was
not strong enough to prevent him from printing it, however, and so he “consented to publish this
curious account of Hasheesh experience, differing as it does, in certain details, from all other
accounts we have seen.”50
The emulations of Ludlow—who had masterfully channeled Thomas De Quincey while
adding his own renegade touch—continued and the subsequent writing oftentimes involved
confessions from individuals recounting their experiences with different drugs like chloroform
or, in one case, tea. In the summer of 1858, the Indiana Farmer published the story of a man
who drank too much tea and claimed “the resemblances to some of the most peculiar effects of
hashish, in large doses” would be noticed in his work. The author had been under unusual stress
at his job and the turmoil led him into the habit of overconsuming tea at night. At his worst, the
young man took in “a basin of very strong tea four or five times a day” for several days straight.
One night, while sitting with his mother, he “felt a sudden dizziness” overcome him after
consuming “a draught of tea stronger than any [he] had taken before.” He asked his mother to get
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him a glass of sherry, but before she could return with it, “consciousness of surrounding objects”
completely left the man. The best way he could describe the ensuing experience was
“indescribably perfect.” Moreover, the experience “seemed to last for ages” and he “awoke in
horror of a soul which had been for ages in woe.” When he regained consciousness, he found his
mother standing over him with a glass of sherry and he asked her how long he had been
unconscious and she informed him only the amount of time it took her to get the sherry.51
As these writers confessed to excess, American collapsed into Civil War. The same week
that Quantrill’s Raiders entered Lawrence, Kansas, for example, to kill any man old enough to
carry a gun, Zion’s Herald published a story in which an unnamed author detailed an intoxication
stemming from the recreational use of Quinine, an ancient muscle relaxant later used to treat
malaria. The author noted, “I have learned from De Quincey some of the singular effects
produced upon mind and body by the use of opium” and confessed “I have read Bayard Taylor’s
account of his experiments with hasheesh” and it made him curious if Quinine might produce
similar results. After taking the drug, the author noted his spirits became elevated and he felt
invincible. Then, suddenly and sans prelude, he fell “from this vast elevation to the Infinite and
Absolute,” ultimately falling “with Hegel into the abyss of nihilism.”52
Due to this level of popular exposure, the idea that hashish undoubtedly excited
hallucinatory aspects of human psychology gained traction. Hashish use became a kind of avatar
for off-kilter, fanatical, or delusional thinking. During the Civil War, in fact, hashish was
sometimes cited as a metaphor for the political views that led to the outbreak of violence. In
1862, a soldier writing back home to Michigan from Benton Barracks, Missouri, wrote:
“We have had a long night of weary, weary months, and now none but a prophet can tell
when day-break will come. We know light follows darkness in regular succession, and
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our faith in the Union is almost as strong as in the regularity of the laws of nature, but the
last are divine and the first human, and the strength of our Union is being tried by a
population of twelve millions, with an army of half a million fighting on their own soil,
and commanded by able and desperate men. Let those who dream of peace, speedily, take
hasheesh and get a different, if not more sensible vision.”
In other words, those who thought there was still a chance of peace in 1862 were even more
delusional than those operating under the influence of cannabis. Hashish, to the young soldier
observing the conflict first hand, would have likely produced a less absurd vision than the one he
outlined.
A soldier writing from a Pennsylvania regiment reported that, at one point in a recent
battle, his side “occupied the town” and “proffered the friendship of the Union to its inhabitants.”
In the process, they had been able to lift “the cloud from the eyes of many of the deluded,” who
had “so many hasheesh visions of sectional Independence.” A different Pennsylvania paper
offered this view: “the black poppy, Abolition, whose opiate seeds are the deadly Hasheesh upon
which the people of the North, have, alas! too long been feeding, has at last opened its dark
leaves in full blown maturity to the astonished gaze of the deluded populace.”53
Hasheesh Backlash
Just as the Civil War had become a moment of transition for medicinal cannabis, in
which the optimism of the mid-nineteenth century faded into skepticism and frustration with the
plant, the same occurred in the psycho-literary arena. Not only had it entered the American
psyche as a problematic delusion inducing agent, incidents of cannabis use seemed to cite
different reactions. On May 4, 1863, under the simple headline “Horrible,” a Buffalo, New York
paper reported that “several promising young men” of the city had taken to eating hashish and
“in some instances” had become “slaves to the terrible vice.” A few nights before the printing of
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the story, “several of them “assembled together and drugged themselves to such an extent that
they sank, one by one, into utter insensibility.” It represented an issue of perception. Most
narratives from the mid-nineteenth century featured individuals sinking—one by one—into utter
insensibility, but it had been greeted then with bemusement, not consternation or scorn. That
began to change in the Civil War period.54
The idea that young and vulnerable Americans appeared to be emulating Ludlow alarmed
the press. The Yale Courant, in 1865, addressed “vague rumors” that many students had been
“dabbling” with hashish and “putting into their mouths an enemy to steal away their brains.” It
reported that “these things go by fashion” and understood “you are confident in your strength;
you think that you can stop when you choose. You are influenced by curiosity; you desire to try
everything and this among others.” It asked its readers, “Do you want to become a Palaeaster
Niagerensis, (vulgo starfish,) your mouth in the center of your body, five arms sprawling out to
infinity, fixed on a pivot, whirled till red-hot, and then struck by a hammer about as large as a
State House? If so, take hasheesh.” Even in its repudiation of the drug’s use, the Courant
resorted to the absurdist imagery and stream-of-consciousness style of the confessionals.55
The premature death of Fitzhugh Ludlow did not help save the hashish—or quinine,
chloroform, and tea—narratives. His reputation had been in decline throughout the 1860s. In
May of 1866, Rosalie Ludlow, Fitzhugh’s wife, divorced him on grounds of “neglect and
infidelity” and immediately married his friend, the artist Alfred Bierstadt. The Buffalo
Commercial, in which the divorce announcement was published, added: “Poor Ludlow is fast
becoming broken down in person and reputation.” It was rumored “that he is a slave to the
fascinating vices of which he gives such thrilling description in his ‘Hasheesh Eater.’” In late-
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1867, the Hartford Courant wrote that Ludlow had returned to the “Elmira Water Cure,” where
he was trying his methods for curing opium addiction. The same paper noted that Bayard Taylor
was deathly ill in Rome, suggesting an era of liberality had come to an end. While De Quincey
likely saw the publication of The Hasheesh Eater from his deathbed, there seemed to be no
willing heirs to Ludlow and Taylor’s work.56
In Albany, Oregon, the local paper argued that “many of our readers will remember a
fellow named Fitz Hugh Ludlow, who journeyed through Oregon two years ago.” It then
reported him to be “an unmitigated bore, a sponger, and a nuisance where he stopped.” The
purpose of the article, however, was to let its readers know that “the poor wretch” had gone
insane and lived at the Lunatic Asylum in New York. It then suggested that “Eating ‘hasheesh’
did the business for him.” Four years later, at the age of thirty-four years old, Fitzhugh Ludlow
died in Geneva, Switzerland, after being chronically ill and riddled with addiction for years.57
His obituary began by honoring “his first important literary venture,” The Hasheesh
Eater, arguing that it “suffered by the comparisons that were necessarily made” between it and
De Quincey’s Confessions of an Opium Eater. When his widow, Maria Owen Ludlow, died
twenty-seven years later, her obituary similarly focused on her husband, pointing out that he was
the author of “The Hasheesh Papers,” a volume “in imitation of De Quincey” and that he died
tragically “in a reckless desire to imitate De Quincey.” Philadelphia’s The Evening Telegraph
wrote that “his constitution” had been “shattered by his indulgence in opium” and that “his death
was not unexpected.” It closed by pointing out that he had been married to Rosalie, “but the
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union was not fortunate, and his wife obtained a divorce from him, and was subsequently
married to a distinguished artist.”58
The confessional lost its social and literary power after the death of Ludlow. The news
covering the dangers of hashish use began to supplant earlier ambivalence. The public had
finally picked a side in post-bellum America and it was not in favor of liberal cannabis use. An
1878 expose on hashish published by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch argued it was “a more potent
drug than opium,” which was certainly not the medical opinion of the mid-nineteenth-century.
The story then mentioned the work of Bayard Taylor, but this time he was not upheld as a
literary genius, but as “grotesque.” Whereas the alleged insanity caused by the drug had been
downplayed or ignored throughout the mid-nineteenth century, the Post-Dispatch argued that
“madness in particular” was always on the horizon when one used the drug and that “permanent
insanity” frequently followed even minor use.59
Hashish users still frequented newspaper columns, but in a decidedly less romantic light.
The New York Times, for example, noted that police discovered “a “hasheesh eater” in the vein
of Fitzhugh Ludlow in 1866. Miss Isabella Calkins reported the man, Mr. Charles Weston, for
indecent exposure and told the police he had been pacing back and forth in front of her shop
window, “with his clothes very much disarranged, and his person indecently exposed.” Weston
claimed he was unable to say whether the man was guilty, but he reported he had “lately been in
the habit of taking opium, laudanum, hasheesh, and other narcotics for the purpose of deadening
the pain resulting from neuralgia.” Weston turned two bottles of laudanum over to the police.
Witnesses claimed they saw Weston pacing in front of the store, but could not be certain if he
exposed himself. In the end, Weston begged for his bottles of laudanum back, the court refused,
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and he was held for sentencing. It represented quite a turn from Bayard Taylor’s exquisite
hashish prose from Damascus.60
This kind of coverage aligned with a general change in Americans’ perceptions of drug
use, which was brought on by a post-Civil War intravenous morphine crisis. That drug, perfected
by army medics, hit the marketplace at the conclusion of the war and almost immediately led to a
drug addiction crisis that would transform society for decades to come. Cannabis, however
tangentially connected to the far more ravenous outcomes involved in the use of hypodermically
injected morphine, would fail to inspire the ambivalence—or even excitement—it did in the midnineteenth century. The American public, the media, and medical profession that often inspired
and guided thinking on the topic of narcotics, would lead society into a new and far more antidrug era.
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Chapter Three
An American Opiate Crisis, 1870-1905
After the death of her father, a prominent Seattle hotel owner, Ella Henderson started
taking morphine to ease her grief. She was thirty-three years old and, because of her education
and intellect, frequented social circles “most exalted by her sex.” Her “thirst for morphine,”
however, had successfully “dragged her down to the verge of debauchery.” Ella’s story, first told
by Seattle’s The Daily Intelligencer in an 1877 article entitled “A Beautiful Opium Eater,”
circulated through the American and European press. Her doctor’s wife, Mrs. Stone, took Ella
into their home in hopes of “restoring her once more to her proper sphere.” All efforts at
rehabilitation failed, however, and Ella’s concerned friends took her kids. When deprived of her
drugs, Ella would say “give me morphine, give me something that I may quench this terrible
thirst, or let me die!” The Intelligencer surmised that only the coldest of hearts could endure such
suffering, which it claimed was so severe it could make an angel cry. Towards the end of her
addiction, Ella secluded herself in her room and took morphine until she poisoned herself to
death.1
Ella Henderson was the kind of addict most often reported about in the late-nineteenth
century press. She had been prescribed morphine by a trusted physician, enabled to continue its
use by that same doctor, and then developed an addiction that ultimately led to her death. That
narrative captured the public’s imagination. Not only did it highlight a threat to the middle-class
home—one aimed at daughters, mothers, and grandmothers—but it also indicted the medical and
pharmaceutical communities as culprits. Those professionals were increasingly portrayed as
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reckless. The publicizing of addicts such as Ella Henderson and the apparently unscrupulous
doctors pointed to a dramatic change in America’s relationship with drugs.
From the 1860s to the first decade of the twentieth century, drug reform developed into a
powerful political force and a topic that inspired a great deal of activism. That was primarily due
to the fact that intravenous morphine significantly challenged the nineteenth century medical
community’s cavalier style of testing narcotics for the pharmaceutical marketplace. As doctors
pursued a trial-and-error style of vetting drugs, the peripheral damage had been largely
contained. That changed after the Civil War when doctors began prescribing a more potent form
of morphine injected through a hypodermic needle. These advancements allowed physicians to
treat pain far more effectively, but also laid the foundations for an opioid epidemic that would
define the latter two decades of the nineteenth century.
As the press highlighted the rise of opiate addiction, often through compelling narratives
like Ella Henderson’s, physicians were increasingly cast as negligent, callous, and
unprofessional. In the media’s storyline, doctors thoughtlessly overprescribed narcotics and
ignored the consequences, which manifested in the form of addiction—a social disease that the
American public then had to address. While there was some truth to the accusations, the media’s
assertions were overly simplistic and mostly inaccurate. The truth was more complicated and
pointed to a reality far more difficult to correct.
In an era lacking a centralized and government sponsored agency capable of testing the
safety of new drugs, doctors pursued a practical and experimental approach in which the
consequences and benefits of new drugs were determined by how they performed in the daily
practice of medicine. That had been the case with opium, cannabis, chloroform, laudanum, and a
host of other narcotics. It was an imperfect system, to be sure, but it was professional custom and
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it had worked well enough in the mid-nineteenth century. In the social, political, and economic
turbulence of the immediate post-bellum years, however, the hypodermic syringe exposed the
dangers of that approach and generated broad social concern, anxiety, and anger.23
This new medical delivery apparatus was introduced to a profession trained to rapidly
implement modern remedies and report the results obtained from daily practice. As they had
done for generations, then, the American medical community eagerly injected patients with
morphine for a wide variety of ailments and commenced noting the results. Did it work to
mitigate the symptoms of neuralgia? Could it cure asthma? Might it be a logical treatment for
alcoholism or—interestingly—opioid addiction itself? With hypodermic needle in hand,
physicians sought the answer to those questions. The resultant tragedies created by this relatively
unregulated medical experimentation, unlike in the past, generated higher rates of narcotic
addiction and inspired a widespread sense of legitimate anxiety, one increasingly stoked by a
sensationalist press that had gained significant ground in shaping post-bellum Americans’
perception of reality.4
In the process, that spirit of “further experimentation,” actively cultivated by Dr. William
O’Shaughnessy, Dr. Jacques-Joseph Moreau, Bayard Taylor, Fitzhugh Ludlow, and the press
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that supported them, began to lose favor. As the media introduced the American reading public
to women like Ella Henderson, support for tighter regulatory control over the medical profession
and the pharmaceutical industry grew. No longer ambivalent about drug experimentation,
municipal, state, and federal politicians—representing their alarmed constituents—began to
elevate opioid policy to the forefront of American politics. Uncertainty regarding the true extent
of the crisis, however, abounded. There were no reliable statistics pointing to the exact number
of drug addicts in the United States. Nonetheless, the public, with the help of the media, came to
believe there were millions of them and that perception fueled the notion Americans faced an
unprecedented opioid epidemic.
In the wake of changing public opinion on drugs, the use of narcotics in any way
considered recreational or unnecessary was not only considered socially unacceptable, but
increasingly criminal. A variety of factors inspired that pivot, but it was primarily due to the
ways in which the hypodermic syringe intersected with a set of aging medical practices that had
developed in a time characterized by less powerful narcotics. As doctors worked to modernize its
practices in an age of seemingly epidemic levels of drug addiction, the newspaper industry
continually indicted physicians for causing the problem they worked to solve. Ultimately, the
profession slowly reformed, but the damage had already been done and a new generation of
journalists and politicians championed the ongoing transfer of America’s drug problem from the
private to the public sphere—from a clinical setting to a political one.
The Proliferation of Hypodermically Injected Morphine
The problems facing American doctors in the 1860s resembled those encountered by their
early-nineteenth century counterparts. Both generations struggled to determine how to best treat
pain with a lack of reliable medicines. During the American Civil War, intravenous morphine
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seemed to resolve the problem. Its instant narcotic effect appeared to do what pharmaceutical
compounds of opium and cannabis could not: reliably numb pain in doses prescribed with
confidence and accuracy. At first, physicians used it in cases of unique muscular disorders, like
neuralgia or arthritis, and in prolonging surgeries by coupling it with chloral. In that sense, they
used the new drug just as they had previous ones. Opium and cannabis tinctures had been
similarly used but with less success. As they gained confidence from initial results, the
profession then began to use morphine in more diverse ways. That, of course, mirrored the
strategies that guided the use of cannabis in the mid-nineteenth century. From asthma, bronchitis,
and nausea to alcoholism, opium addiction, and mental illness, the use of intravenous morphine
proliferated to become a common remedy. Physicians, ignorant at the time of the total power
morphine possessed, this widespread use of the drug planted the seeds of an epidemic that rather
quickly came to define fin-de-siècle American society.5
Although the medical community embraced intravenous morphine use, the practice
generated early anxiety in the press. In November, 1869, the Cincinnati Enquirer argued that this
popular new treatment involved an injection that “can be made instantaneously, without the
knowledge of the victim.” It also “left no mark upon the skin” and involved only the “slightest
prick of pain” while delivering “morphine enough to produce death.” The article concluded, “For
this latest result of infernal scientific ingenuity, there is one beneficial use, it appears, that may
save it from utter condemnation”—it produced pain relief “even under the most aggravated
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suffering, when the heaviest doses of opiates, administered in the ordinary way, fail to produce
it.” That, of course, was an undeniable benefit: it relieved pain more effectively than any other
known medicine in an age feeling a great deal of it. As a minority warned of its potentially
destructive qualities, the breadth of American pain—and the lack of effective options available to
treat it—led to a relative dismissal of those concerns.6
Within an environment long challenged by “the most aggravated suffering,” the
introduction of the drug inspired hope and pointed to the unfolding of a truly enlightened era in
medical treatment; one in which precise and uniform doses of smaller amounts of masterfully
distilled opium finally delivered narcotic results the community had been in search of for over a
century. Physicians quickly put it to use. As early as 1858, Edinburgh physician, Dr. Alexander
Wood, wrote an article entitled “On a New Method of Treating Neuralgia by the Direct
Application of Opiates to the Painful Points.” Neuralgia, a beguiling nerve disorder, responded
well to the subcutaneous injection of opium. By the 1860s, in fact, the medical community had
followed Dr. Wood’s suggestion of using hypodermic morphine to treat neuralgia and it had
become a common treatment.7
Knowledge about the use of hypodermic morphine travelled through a transatlantic
information exchange—just as it had with cannabis and opium. Dr. Fuller, a physician at St.
George’s Hospital in London, said “I have seen it produce effects as satisfactory as they were
astounding.” He observed patients who had not slept for days lulled rapidly to sleep by the
“internal administration” of opioids. Medicating the energy depleting symptoms of diseases like
neuralgia—which consisted of the loss of appetite, weight loss, insomnia, and “nervousness”—
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was no small feat and it allowed practitioners to better treat the underlying causes of sickness. In
that sense, the early and more liberal dosages seemed not only appropriate, but the only ethical
response to the widespread pain they encountered.8
Even as the profession experimented with hypodermic morphine, the ongoing issues
associated with overdoses, accidental poisonings, and suicides involving the older powder
morphine continued to exist in the backdrop. In 1866, for example, the ten-year-old son of a
Brandon, Wisconsin doctor, died from an accidental morphine poisoning. He had suffered from a
common sickness for which his medically trained father gave him magnesia—a decision that
seemed to put him on the path to recovery. When his parent’s left, the boy’s six-year-old sister
“got hold of a bottle of morphine and administered several doses to him.” He died five hours
later. These situations, while tragic, were complicated scenarios to interpret. It was true that
morphine caused the death, but it also pointed to a need for the drug to be better stored in the
home. Thus, the cases reported were tragic, but seemingly preventable; the cause of human error,
a flawed system, and the unfortunate byproducts of the way progress was made through trialand-error.9
The next year, in a similar case, Brooklyn resident Mrs. Matilda Webster, a forty-fiveyear-old housewife and mother of eight children, similarly died of an accidental poisoning. She
had been “for some time in poor health” and was often seen by a doctor in her home. After
receiving a prescription that contained morphine, she sent her twelve-year-old daughter to a
nearby pharmacist to collect her medicine and the pharmacist misread the script, which had been
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written for a “sleeping powder.” He instead gave the girl two grains of morphine. “The heavy
dose the unfortunate woman took soon after,” The Brooklyn Daily Eagle reported, “and never
woke thereafter.” In this case, a child was once again involved in a tragedy compounded by the
misreading of a script at the pharmacy.10
Before the Civil War, physicians and pharmacists were rarely implicated in these deaths.
They were viewed as isolated tragedies that did not necessarily speak to systemic problems. That
began to change in the post-war years. The Brooklyn Union reported in October of 1867 that
“another drug clerk has blundered, and another man has been killed by too strong a dose of
poison taken as medicine.” The author wondered who was to blame and reported that “public
opinion fastens first on the drug clerk.” Others, however, did not rush to judgement and waited to
see how poorly the script had been written by the physician and if the “figures were as plain as
they should have been with a true regard to the average stupidity of drug clerks.” It was an
environment characterized by a certain looseness; an accommodating culture that avidly reserved
judgment until the facts were fully compiled. That was the spirit that continued to guide
community. In the popular press, however, quick judgement was not so dutifully withheld.11
The Brooklyn Union blamed the drug itself. “It is a deadly poison,” it argued, and was “of
little use in ordinary cases, which does more harm than good.” Those who had trouble sleeping,
experienced bouts of nervousness, excitement, or pain, were “generally troubled with some
disease which morphine would not help.” It concluded that Americans had “no business taking
it” and doctors had no “business prescribing it to them, except in extreme cases which ought to
be very extreme.” On the other hand, the tendency to blame morphine itself did appear to be
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somewhat misguided. If the misreading of scripts led to premature death then the issue had less
to do with morphine and more to do with questions of competence within the pharmaceutical
industry. Similarly, cases involving children finding morphine in the home pointed to issues
involving access to powerful drugs once they left the pharmacy. Few of the cases offered
irrefutable evidence that the prescription itself constituted an emergent problem that required
governmental intervention.12
Still, the proliferation of the hypodermic needle created an environment of increased
public scrutiny and physicians received a great deal of focus. While the press fixated on doctor’s
roles in the burgeoning epidemic in ways that were often unfair, there was ample evidence the
medical community used the needle rather freely. In 1865, Dr. D.L. McGugin reported that he
had recently treated a Civil War soldier, who suffered from delirium tremens and could not
sleep, with a hypodermic injection of morphine. He allegedly cured the patient, who soon left his
care. Shortly afterwards, he saw another veteran of the war, troubled by a “delirium” that could
not be contained with any known treatment. The doctor injected him with morphine, which
“calmed the delirium” within an hour and “quiet repose followed.”
The use of hypodermic morphine to ease post-traumatic stress or to quiet delirium
tremens pointed to an alarming trend that could easily be seen as misuse. If a physician took a
shortened perspective and understood their task to involve only the rapid remediation of the
ailment presented, the use of morphine seemed logical. That was especially true if one
considered its addictive power—even when administered hypodermically—to be no greater than
the opium, cannabis, and morphine of the mid-nineteenth century. The profession also produced
very little information regarding successes gained in follow-up visits. Data resulting from long
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term and more holistic care did not often appear in medical journals. The results of
experimentation, then, seemed to come from quick visits, in which the ailment was identified and
rapidly treated. The patient was then discharged—oftentimes with a prescription for morphine to
be injected hypodermically at home by the patient.13
For every incident in which use of the drug seemed questionable, there were scores of
cases in which morphine use appeared appropriate and exceedingly helpful. That was especially
true in the prolongation of anesthesia during surgery. The Medical and Surgical Reporter
suggested in 1865 that when injections of morphine were added to the commonly used
chloroform, patients often remained unconscious throughout the entire procedure. In a medical
landscape in which those being operated on frequently awoke in the middle of extraordinarily
painful surgeries, writhing in pain and threatening the success of the procedure, surgeons readily
embraced the power of morphine. They also used injections in the post-operation phase to reduce
pain and assuage the impact of the shock that often followed. At England’s Middlesex Hospital
“all the amputations, ovariotomies, herniotomies” had been followed with “a third to half a grain
of morphia subcutaneously.” That style of use provided a level of unparalleled comfort to men
and women who had just endured one of the most traumatic experiences the nineteenth-century
had to offer.14
Defining the scenarios in which the drug proved most beneficial was, of course, the result
of trial and error and it was difficult to strike a logical balance. The Surgeon General of North
Carolina, Dr. Edward Warren, delivered a lecture to the Baltimore Medical Association in 1867
and argued that “in the early stages of pneumonia, pleurisy, bronchitis, enteritis, phlebitis, and
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inflammations generally…the subcutaneous injection of morphia plays an important role in
scientific therapy.” Like in cases of alcoholism, depression, or post-traumatic stress, the use of
intravenous morphine in bronchitis was likely an overreaction. Yet, he made those
recommendations in the accommodating medical culture prior to the opioid epidemic, in which
the breadth of the consequences that intravenous morphine use could engender were relatively
unknown. So, again, in that mindset, being able to immediately arrest the symptoms of a sickness
as common as bronchitis with minimal effort, seemed a reasonable and advisable form of use.15
There were also borderline cases, like back pain, that would confound the medical
profession for decades to come. A Pennsylvania doctor wrote in 1869 that he stood in awe of the
“great advantages arising from the use of the hypodermic syringe” and commented that it was “a
blessing” for “suffering humanity.” Even though others warned that intravenous morphine use
could cause death, he embraced it. The doctor then used it in the case of William H., aged fifty,
who suffered from sciatica—or lower back pain. After receiving a “full dose of morphia” via
hypodermic syringe, his pain disappeared within minutes. The doctor repeated the cycle over the
course of two days and the patient, allegedly cured, left his facility. He also left convinced that
the most effective cure for lower back pain came in the form of an injection of morphine into his
veins. The doctor’s confidence in that treatment, which fueled his prescriptions, which were then
filled by a local pharmacist, only corroborated that notion.16
That same Pennsylvania physician treated Mrs. S, forty-eight years old, who had a breast
removed from cancer a year prior to him examining her. The pain that visited her in the
aftermath of that operation had not ceased over the course of the year and so the doctor injected
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her with morphine. Thereafter, when treated with injections, her excruciating pain was finally
relieved with “entire satisfaction.” For that doctor, who would have been otherwise incapacitated
when it came to efficacious pain-relieving treatment, morphine gave him the power to heal those
who had long suffered, like Mrs. S. It would have been easy, at that point in time, to view
hypodermic morphine as a miracle medicine, shunned only by those backwards doctors still
intent on plant-based pastes and folk cures.17
In these ways, the path to America’s first opioid epidemic was largely paved with wellmeaning and seemingly effective uses. As the journals indicated, the crisis was also not confined
to the United States. British, Irish, French, and German physicians similarly struggled with the
consequences of the perceived overuse of morphine. The problem, however, was that established
custom within the medical profession encouraged what could be perceived as excessive
morphine use. Indeed, those practitioners existed in an environment in which powerful new
drugs were often deployed to treat ailments society had long suffered from—neuralgia, tetanus,
bronchitis, seizures, etc. Had there been better options proven to treat those illnesses, the
profession no doubt would have used them. There were not. Also, hypodermic morphine worked
wonders on common sickness in short-term care situations. The prolonged use, in a milieu in
which morphine was legal, laid the groundwork for larger social problems.
Dr. John Kent Spencer recommended using intravenous morphine to treat “obstinate
vomiting” amongst pregnant women. In the case of “Mrs. E,” a twenty-four-year-old woman
who was six months pregnant and had struggled with episodic and intense vomiting throughout
her pregnancy, Dr. Kent offered the drug intravenously. Mrs. E. was then able to hold down food
and showed improvement and so he continued the treatment which restored her appetite during a
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difficult pregnancy. His use of the narcotic in limited and targeted ways may have stabilized her
pregnancy and saved the life of the baby.
As was often the case, however, Dr. Kent then provided an example where he used
intravenous morphine in a manner that may have been ineffective. He introduced “Mrs. T., a
middle-aged married woman” who suffered from “brandy-sickness, the result of secret
drinking.” He began by giving her a grain of opium, which relived her “quasi-delirium,” but did
little to address her vomiting spells. The physician then injected her with a quarter grain of
morphine and she immediately began to take food again and generally regained her appetite. He
noted, however, that the same cycle of events would undoubtedly reoccur because “her habits
[were] incorrigible.” Having found success using hypodermic morphine to treat Mrs. T’s
alcoholism, Dr. Kent most likely continued its use.”18
Throughout the 1860s, American and British physicians continued using intravenous
morphine in a wide variety of medical settings. Although addiction rates had yet to spike,
producing cases like Ella Henderson’s, there was evidence that the seeds of a potential morphine
crisis had been planted. In 1866, an Oregon, Missouri newspaper printed a story regarding a Mr.
Fagan, whose daughter had recently died of a morphine overdose when the local pharmacist
filled an order for that drug instead of quinine. The girl’s little brother, Johnny, was also
prescribed morphine for a fleeting sickness. He allegedly resisted it claiming “it killed sissy, and
it will kill me.” His family assured him it was not the medicine that killed his sister, but a
mistake in the filling of the prescription. Knowing he would be forced to take the medicine,
Little Johnny replied “I wish you would let me see my pony before I take it, because I do not
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believe I will ever see him again.” His family, unconcerned, placated him and took Little Johnny
to see his pony. He then took the medicine and, one hour after taking it, he “was a corpse.”19
The story of Little Johnny was a folkloric tale that mirrored the narratives of Greek
tragedies and illustrated the power of a growing storyline in mainstream culture surrounding the
dangers of morphine use in everyday life. For every case of physicians successfully treating the
pain accompanying breast cancer surgery, the prolongation of anesthesia, or the stabilization of a
pregnancy, there appeared to be an equal number of gut-wrenching suicides, tragic cases of
misread scripts, and rampant overdoses. In the early phase of morphine’s introduction to
American medicine, the benefits seemed to outweigh those anecdotal cases of addiction and
seemingly avoidable tragedies, however. That situation began to change in the 1860s as the
profession transitioned from powder morphine to the intravenous application of the drug.
The Reality of an Opioid Epidemic
In the fall of 1899, “a strange epidemic” struck the town of York, Pennsylvania. There, “a
morphine epidemic…brought shame and even death to prominent people” in the city. In one of
the court sessions that year several women, “formerly reputable, were proven guilty of
immorality” and divorces were granted to their husbands. Locals alleged that several of the
town’s pharmacists maintained standing orders of morphine for citizens. In many cases, those
pharmacists were proven to be morphine addicts themselves. One of them, Robert Noll, had
recently injected a young man named Henry Ross, who immediately died of an overdose. Noll
then skipped town and was wanted by the authorities. “One of the saddest cases here,” the article
concluded, was “that of a mother and daughter, both of whom [were] victims of the drug.” In
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York, Pennsylvania, according to the story, morphine had nearly single-handedly upended an
entire American town.20
The narrative of the fallen woman would become a centerpiece of opioid crisis reporting,
one that drove the storyline for decades. The middle-class woman, once respectable and chaste,
then reduced to unfathomable lows by morphine became the face of the crisis. These “fallen
women” were similar to Ella Henderson who, by merely trusting their local physician, entered
the world of deadly drug addiction. They had been tricked by American doctors, who were then
presented as reckless and cruel figures with undeserved power. The consequences of their liberal
prescriptions of morphine, according to countless tales, proved to be devastating. In these
narratives, morphine addiction rapidly evolved into a public menace, attacked the average
middle-class American family, addicted mothers and daughters to one of the most potent drugs
available, and left incomprehensible wreckage in its place.
While it was true that an unprecedented number of women seemed to develop morphine
addictions in the late-nineteenth-century, the drug did not discriminate along gendered lines.
In 1871, Henry B. Castle, fifty-one years old and a notable resident of Cleveland, walked to a
dock off the city’s Superior Street and jumped into the river. A private watchman observed it,
found a rope and threw it to him, but he would not accept it and drowned. Castle had immigrated
to Cleveland from Canada, where he then became a successful businessman. In 1870, one year
before his death, he lived with his wife Mary, son Orville, and two domestic aides in a house
valued at $35,000—or $715,000 adjusted for inflation. It was later reported by his brother that,
for six years before his death, he developed a hopeless addiction to morphine “by injection under
the skin.”
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Much like Ella Henderson, Mr. Castle began taking morphine to treat chronic pain from a
mysterious sickness. Before he began using the narcotic, Castle had developed a reputation as a
man who not only “had business perplexities” but also “the highest pride.” The morphine slowly
took that from him. He used it regularly and excessively and “sought encouragement, and got it,
from those whom science should have held up a warning finger to.” In his final hours, Castle
exhibited a “bewildered brain” not controlled by “will or purpose.” It was a tragic mindset that
led him to “wheresoever insane caprice or intent” dictated. In one of his bouts with mental
illness, an episode likely onset by the symptoms of longtime morphine addiction, he hurled
himself into the Cuyahoga and refused to be rescued.21
While these stories did not prove the existence of a drug epidemic that had spread beyond
the medical community’s ability to contain it, but they slowly transformed the public’s
perception of morphine use. The stories of men like Mr. Castle highlighted issues related to easy
access to potentially destructive drugs. Consequently, the medical community came into clearer
focus. The Chicago Tribune argued in April of 1872 that doctors were responsible for the
creation of “nineteenth-twentieths” of the “opium eaters” in the United States. Those “habitual
givers of narcotics” could be blamed for “all the misery, the wasted life, the early death” that
accompanied addiction to opium and morphine. Sure, the Tribune contended, it was “sometimes
pleasant to benumb the senses with opium and morphine,” but those drugs primarily covered up
the source of the real disease by lessening its symptoms. It encouraged physicians, instead, to
focus their skills on uprooting the disease itself and less on treating its symptoms. It was an aged
argument at that point, one that neatly highlighted the enduring power of that persistent and
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nuanced question: to what extent should physicians, when presented with cases they could not
feasibly cure, focus instead on easing pain and reducing the bodily impact of the disease’s
symptoms? It was in those cases—assuaging the excruciating symptoms of common ailments—
that physicians found the bulk of their workload.22
The root cause of the nation’s alleged drug problem became an issue of perception. So,
too, did theories on the true dimension of the epidemic (if one existed). A New York journal
argued that, as of 1875, the United States harbored 100,000 “confirmed opium eaters” and it
immediately wagged it finger at “careless physicians.” These doctors allowed their patients “to
acquire the habit” because of the “deliberate preference of many for opium eating to dramdrinking.” Whatever the full extent of the problem might have been, it was indisputable “that an
immense amount of opium [was] consumed in this country.” The article concluded there was no
cure for addiction once firmly rooted, but that greater control over the writing and filling of
prescriptions could stall the “acquisition of the deadly habit in many cases.”23
It was a strong reaction to the relatively miniscule number of opioid addicts, which—if
the estimate that there were 100,000 addicts could be trusted—represented less than one tenth of
one percent of the total United States population in 1875. Those figures lent credibility to the
assertion that opioid addiction was a manageable clinical problem best dealt with in medical
facilities. Moreover, it might also help explain why, in a cost-benefit analysis of morphine’s
benefit versus its consequences, the medical profession continued using it as they had been
trained to. If the social consequences of addiction were rare occurrences, then it was reasonable
to treat bronchitis, alcoholism, and—strangely—opioid addiction itself, with hypodermic
morphine.
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In lieu of official statistics offering valuable perspective on the true extent of the
problem, Americans had little choice but to rely on newspaper reporting and the accumulation of
anecdotal information. Despite its sensationalist tone, however, the press often provided in-depth
reporting revealing an alarming lack of organization in the medical and pharmaceutical
communities. One reporter embedded himself in the crisis as it unfolded in the Virginia Valley.
There, he discovered Mr. Tyree, a “druggist,” who was “waiting on a bevy of dashing girls.”
There were four of them and they “seemed to be ‘sweet sixteens.’” As they left the store Mr.
Tyree told him, “there they go; they are some of your opium eaters.” The writer was perplexed,
“What! Those pretty things?” he asked, incredulously. Yes, Mr. Tyree explained, the girls had
just started using opium and now spent six dollars weekly to indulge their habits. As he moved
through the valley, the stories the writer heard confirmed that—at least in the Virginia Valley—
there was an entrenched epidemic.24
In one of those small Virginia towns a pharmacist asked the reporter if he saw the
“handsomely dressed English lady” standing on the other side of the street from them. After the
reporter noted he did, the druggist outed her as one of his best customers. According to the
pharmacists’ story, the well-dressed British woman had started taking morphine two years prior
to her being spotted on the street that day and frequently sent her servant for a quarter grain dose
a day. She had since graduated to four grains. The reporter asked if there were many similar
cases in the town and the clerk confessed to having “15 regular lady customers” who took more
than two grains of morphine daily. He also noted that twelve men regularly ingested between two
and six grains per dose. “You think the evil here is on the increase?” the reporter asked. “My
goodness! Yes,” the pharmacist answered. One of the last druggists the reporter visited in
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Virginia, who wished his name to be kept secret, checked his books and reported that he had sold
79,593 doses of morphine in the past year. If the pharmacist’s numbers were trustworthy—and
their specificity suggests they may have been—then there appeared to be sizable opioid problem
in the American countryside.
The issue also seemed to be as pronounced in the North as it was the South. In Rochester,
New York, the use of the drug was similarly on the rise in the 1870s and a local pharmacist
claimed it was not uncommon for “some ladies” to take more than 1 ½ ounces per day. “One
lady is reported as taking half a pint of laudanum daily, and another consumes from 120 to 180
grains every week,” wrote The Edinburgh Evening News. Opium addicts also included many
“high society” men and women, individuals who were “as closely wedded to the drowsy drug as
are the habitues of our bar-rooms to their cups.” The more respectable opium-eaters never visited
the drug stores in person and instead sent children or servants to procure it. “In some instances,”
the paper continued, “where husbands have forbidden druggists to sell opium to their wives, the
women resort to all sorts of strategy to obtain the pernicious drug.”25
While the apparent epidemic reached much further than the middle-class household and
did not discriminate along gendered lines, it was true that many privileged women found
themselves addicted to morphine. It was also a fact that the press, looking for stories that
captured the collective imagination, seized upon that gendered imagery to enhance the narrative
of drug addiction in America. This style of reporting thrived in a situation in which latenineteenth century state and federal agencies failed to gather information pointing to the actual
number of drug addicts in the United States. Similarly, there was little data outlining who used
the American healthcare system most. From anecdotal newspaper reports, however, middle-class
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households seemed to be most reliant on physicians and, consequently, more exposed to
experimental medical practices. It made sense, then, that addiction rates spiked within that
demographic.
Thus, the often sensationalist reporting on the crisis continued unchecked by verifiable
fact. A correspondent for the Cincinnati Inquirer argued that there had been “no deaths equal to
that of the lady who dropped dead from disappointment because she could not get her opium.”
The British and Irish presses widely reprinted the article, entitled “Opium Eating in Virginia.”
According to the story, the relatively small town of Staunton, Virginia, the location in which the
unfortunate woman fainted, went through 100 pounds of opium per week, which “is pretty heavy
for a city of 8,000 or 10,000.” A large quantity of the drug was “bought by country people, for
the craving for it all down the valley is strong, if not stronger than it is in the city.”26
While the media accounts obviously harbored an alarmist mentality, the stories appeared
to be realistic at the time and stoked real anxiety. Indeed, the figures from the Virginia Valley
suggested that the nation had far more than a mere 100,000 opioid addicts. Those figures also
indicated that the problem was just as prolific in the American countryside as it was in
Philadelphia, New York City or London. Adding to the alarm, it was exceedingly difficult to
determine what constituted an addiction. Not only did individuals tend to hide their overuse, but
the morphine crisis was not completely defined by physical dependency. It was also propelled by
accidental poisonings, overdoses, suicides, and general abuse. Those tragedies, many of them
having little to do with addiction, nonetheless contributed to the sense that the United States
suffered from a significant drug problem that threatened to grow in intensity.
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The reporting also highlighted a variety of problems in the way the United States
distributed opioids. While druggists in Virginia lamented the rise of an epidemic they claimed to
witness firsthand, they nonetheless felt obligated—either from a sense of professional duty or
profit—to continue dispensing the substance without prejudice. The substance was legal and so
they sold it to sixteen-year-old girls without a prescription and to scores of men and women they
recognized as exhibitors of drug seeking behavior. Worse, many of them did not keep records of
transactions and so the drugs flowed, unaccounted for, throughout the countryside. The statistics
from Virginia suggested it was impossible that 100 pounds of opium, consumed by a town of
10,000 people, could solely be attributed to a handful of isolated addicts—nor by a small group
of women. The media’s focus, however, remained on that aspect of the story. The Ladies’
Repository argued in 1872, “We [ladies] get a habit of taking mental poison, as we do stimulants
and narcotics” and even claimed that reading novels was “very much like dram-drinking and
opium-eating.” It seemed that women of the era had developed “a habit of tickling the palate
with indigestible dainties” and “villainous compounds that ought never be taken into a
Christian’s stomach.”27
As the medical and pharmaceutical community, the popular press, and a growing number
of Americans sought an answer for the rising drug crisis, many competing theories emerged. It
was alleged that younger, urban, and middle-class women pursued morphine highs due to the
boredom of home-life. The British press claimed that “fine dames and demoiselles were found to
be addicted to tippling laudanum and morphine” because the potent drugs worked “almost
magical effects on the mind.” The drugs were delivered by “a fashionable chemist” near Hyde
Park in London who oversaw a “handsome trade in the retail of peculiar little bottles of opium
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essence.” He delivered the opium to his customer “in her brougham” where she could “drink the
contents, and then enjoy a solitary drive, lost in the fascinating dreamland conjured up in her
brain by the pernicious poison she had swallowed.” It was an escape for modern women, or so
the press insinuated, and that detour from reality was enabled by a pharmaceutical industry that
bordered, at times, on functioning as a primary purveyor of narcotics in a recreational drug
market.28
In these cases, the recreational use of opium and morphine overlapped with reports of
addictions created by physicians through their treatment of underlying conditions. The women
who took opium and then enjoyed a solitary drive lost in thought resembled the experiences
pursued by those who wrote hashish confessionals, which circulated at the same time. That
reality pointed to the ongoing interaction between medical experimentation and a more
recreational use. Also, newspaper reports suggested that American and British pharmacies
readily supplied both styles of users, which accelerated concerns about practices within the
medical and pharmaceutical professions. At the same time, social theories regarding the origins
of the drug problem spread.
The rising narcotic crisis was variously blamed on moral erosion, a tendency towards
diversion and entertainment over self-mastery and restraint, boredom, genetic defection, laziness,
modernity, Godlessness, etcetera. In one case, the growing narcotic crisis was blamed on fashion,
which tended to “crush out every atom of independence” and encase “its votaries in fetters
stronger than brass, and as irksome to some of them as the chain that bound Prometheus to the
rock.” The article concluded, “No one outside the aristocratic circle can guess the misery which
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such habits must produce, superadded to the changeless misery of living a life regulated every
hour by the remorseless rigid demands of a thing called etiquette.”29
While the medical community worked to solve a crisis it had been blamed for creating,
their efforts were less publicized than the relentless stories regarding the horrors of morphine
addiction. As the epidemic continued, tales of drug-related woe became more detailed, personal,
and tragic. In one of the more severe cases involving morphine and the imagery of the fallen
woman, the Washington Post covered the case of Andrew McGort’s petition for divorce from his
wife Sarah F. McGort. Sarah had become a morphine addict and thereafter took many trips to
Richmond, Virginia (ostensibly to visit her sister). When she left for the city and failed to return,
Andrew filed for divorce. The documents were sent to a lawyer named Wilkinson in Richmond,
who found “the fallen wife in a tenement of one of the most notorious bagnios in Richmond and
almost without clothing.” Worse, Sarah “made no defense to the action” and, as an excuse, only
said that she could make more money “by that life” than she could any other way. In court,
Andrew testified that his wife was a victim of “the terrible opium habit” and that was, he
thought, “the cause of her degradation.” He further noted she would “sell her clothes and lead a
life of shame to secure money for the purchase of morphine.” Sarah did not pursue this life
because she could not otherwise indulge her taste for the finer things in life, like many women
apparently did, but rather because of her unquenchable thirst for opium and morphine. “She
would even sell the clothes she wore,” the story reiterated, “barely retaining enough to cover
herself.” The Post suggested that a more terrible commentary on the state of the opium habit
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could not have been found. The emphasis on clothes, or the idea of selling them to gain
morphine, stood in as a euphemism to conceal the prostitution.30
Newspapers continually covered the many morphine related tragedies and their reporting
offered unique glimpses into the drug economy of the late-nineteenth century. James Sheffield,
for example, committed suicide in July of 1871. His behavior leading up to death offered several
warning signs that apparently went unnoticed. In one case, a witness testified that the last words
were “Good bye; I am going to take poison.” Other witnesses reported seeing him on the
Monday prior to his death in a “state of intoxication, and appearing as if he had been beaten.” He
behaved erratically and, according to several witnesses, announced that “he intended to shoot
someone.” Joseph Rowan, a drug clerk, testified that Sheffield had purchased twenty grains of
morphine from him the day before he died. Rowan said he thought Sheffield to be “under the
influence of liquor at the time” and corroborated other accounts claiming he “looked as if he had
been badly beaten.” Nonetheless, Rowan sold a clearly intoxicated man, who appeared to have
recently been in a fight, twenty grains of morphine in the evening hours. Sheffield was forty-one
years old at the time of his suicide.31
In a singularly tragic case, Dr. James Connolly, an Irish surgeon in New York City, killed
his children and became “The Mad Irish Doctor” of the city. He had developed such a problem
with alcoholism that he was removed from his house on Eleventh Street and forced into an
inebriate asylum. He returned happily cured and then relapsed. On June 18, 1871, after having
allegedly taken heavy doses of morphine the preceding two days, Connolly locked himself in his
room at about four o’clock with his two children, aged two years and seven months old. The
neighbors were first to report that it sounded as though “some violence was being perpetrated” in
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Connolly’s home. The police forced the door open and found Mr. Connelly and his two children
“all dead—literally bathed in blood.” Horrifyingly, “the throats of the children had been cut with
surgical skill” and the physician’s own throat was cut from ear to ear. The “desperate
determination of the suicide-assassin was evinced by several stabs in the region of the heart.” His
true motivations—and if morphine exacerbated his mental illnesses—could not be determined.
The police and the paper suspected so, however, and so his behavior became an example of what
unchecked morphine addiction, combined with alcoholism, could wreak.32
These types of stories continued to crossed the Atlantic as well. The Lancet, a prestigious
British medical journal, expressed alarm over “the increasing prevalence of opium eating on the
American continent” and noted the efforts of the State Board of Health of Massachusetts. The
board had recently issued a survey to gain a better understanding of opiate use. One hundred and
twenty-five physicians responded to the questionnaire and forty reported that “they did not know
any cases of opium eating, or that it was used for other than medicinal purposes.” The remaining
eighty-five “stated that the habit prevailed considerably in their various districts and localities,
and was increasing in extent.”33
By the 1870s, the medical community, the press, a growing number of social
commentators and political figures, and the reading public, seemed to accept the notion that the
United States suffered from a significant drug problem. An increasingly alarmist media then took
the often-complex reality underlying that alleged crisis, amplified the tragedies it had
engendered, and worked to destabilize a medical profession it blamed for negligence. The
medical and pharmaceutical community had enabled individuals like the Mad Doctor of New
York, who killed his family, assisted in helping unstable Americans commit suicide, and led
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women like Sarah McGort into a life of prostitution. Whether or not those individuals’ opium
habits began with a physicians’ prescription was unclear, but the profession nonetheless suffered
from the association.
The Ongoing Search for a Solution
The growing presence of morphine-related tragedy forced a conversation within the
medical community about how and when morphine should be prescribed and dispensed. The
Lancet argued that the problem involved the “opiate treatment of certain nervous and chronic
disorders, with injudicious and often unnecessary prescription of the drug.” The publication
confessed it did not know how to answer the question definitively, conceding it was most
“difficult to devise a remedy for what threatens to become a corroding cancer in the national life
of this great republic.” Indeed, it was a complex problem. Morphine had revolutionized the
treatment of pain and for every tragedy it enabled, there were many who had been relieved of a
level of suffering that had been impossible to treat a generation earlier. In that sense, the drug
had become, and would continue to be, a staple of medical practice.34
The most effective response to the crisis came from the medical community itself. It
began to reconsider its use of morphine while also expanding its knowledge of addiction. Dr. Ed
Levinstein delivered a paper to the Medical Society of Berlin in 1876 and argued that the
excessive use of morphine created an addiction very similar to alcoholism. He likened “a
morphinic delirium” to delirium tremens and introduced one of his patients, a thirty-year old
married man, who developed the habit of injecting fifteen grains of acetate of morphine daily to
treat rheumatism. After five years, he developed what Levinstein called “morphinism,” which
manifested as “insomnia, irritability, neuralgic pains, muscular contractions, and dryness of the
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tongue.” His wife, also thirty, similarly developed a morphine habit to “assuage certain hepatic
cholics.” She used the drug, allegedly, to “get tranquility of the mind” and to “conquer violent
moral emotions.” After diagnosing them both with a new disease—morphinism—Levinstein
tapered their use of the drug and restored them to good health.35
Just as the medical community used a trial-and-error approach to determine which cases
morphine proved most effective, it did the same with incidences of morphine dependency. While
many advocated for a gradual lessening of the patient’s addiction as opposed to a moral
interpretation of the problem, it was a difficult balance to strike. Dr. Henry P. Wenzel of
Theresa, Wisconsin, for example, argued addiction was the result of the fact that his generation
lived “in a fast age, and the motto is hurry.” Even the sons of Esculapius [the Greek god of
medicine] were “in the throng of neck-breaking progress.” The Scientific American averred that
“from an ethical standpoint” there was but one viewpoint to have on “inebriety”: an “unsparing
condemnation of the practice, and earnest endeavors on the part of society to reclaim those
addicted to it.” Science, on the other hand, had to draw a “broad distinction between drunkenness
as a vice and drunkenness as a disease.”36
As those within the medical profession made advancements, like labelling morphine
addiction a disease to be treated under the term “morphinism,” others remained skeptical and
continued to rely on perceptions that its use was a matter of choice and was inspired by a
reaction to social pressure, moral weakness, etc. They represented a minority, however, and the
disease concept of addiction began to reign in mainstream medical circles. Dr. George M. Beard
delivered a paper to the American Association for the Cure of Inebriates in 1876 and equated

35

“Morphiomania,” Dundee Courier, August 7, 1876.
“Inebriety as a Disease,” Scientific American (1845-1908), January 27, 1877, Vol. XXXVI, No. 4; Henry P.
Wenzel, “Three Cases of Narcotism,” Medical and Surgical Reporter (1858-1898), Vol. 37, No. 7.
36

118

addiction to a nervous disorder, like neuralgia or dyspepsia. He reiterated the words of an
American physician of the period, “he who drinks because he cannot help it, being led by an
irresistible impulse is a sick man and needs not a temperance pledge, but a physician.”37
Despite these interpretive gains, however, alarming trends continued to set the profession
back. As the medical community’s reputation continued to suffer for its alleged role in spreading
a morphine epidemic, physicians turned to a celebration of the medicinal value of cocaine.
Backlash quickly followed. “An old doctor” from St. Louis, Missouri, informed a reporter in
1885—while holding up a bottle of “colorless water-like fluid”—that “with this fluid and with an
hypodermic syringe it would hardly be too much to say that I could change St. Francis of Assisse
[sic] into Charles Guiteau.”38 He continued to emphasize his point, “I could take the purest and
best man or woman in the city of St. Louis, and, after a course of treatment reaching not over two
weeks, change him or her into a beast, unworthy, base, and wretched.” He concluded by arguing
it was “the devil’s own drug.”39 Cocaine, a new and allegedly Satanic concoction, had—like
opium, cannabis, and morphine before it—crossed the lines separating limited medicinal use
from a more recreational style of consumption. Worse, however, it combined with the
democratization of the hypodermic needle to significantly accelerate the nation’s drug crisis.
Cocaine use did not spread as widely as intravenous morphine. It did, however, play a
crucial role in nurturing the image of doctors as out of touch with the dangers of modern
“medicine.” First, the medical community’s use of the narcotic confirmed the idea that the
profession still adhered to practices that the general public increasingly saw as dangerous. While
that portrayal, a continuation of the narrative established during the morphine epidemic, was
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unfair, there were also a multitude of cases that provided evidence for those who wanted to
demean the profession. Thus, as news of the community’s supposed mishandling of the
morphine crisis reached apex, physicians were then charged with taking a dangerously liberal
approach to the dispensation of cocaine.
Sir Robert Christison, a Scottish physician and toxicologist, argued in the 1880s that
cocaine proved an ideal remedy for treating exhaustion and fatigue. He noted that it especially
restored strength after “severe exercise” and encouraged two pupils, after they returned from a
sixteen-mile walk, to forego water or food in favor of cocaine. They were, he claimed,
completely relieved of fatigue and even walked another hour before supper. Dr. Christison also
suggested cocaine was a good fit for treating “female nervousness” and for the suppression of
appetite. In cases such as this, in which cocaine was prescribed for casual use, it certainly
appeared the profession had yet to learn any lessons from the morphine epidemic.40
The news that physicians had addicted themselves to cocaine—just as they had
intravenous morphine—further undermined public trust in the everyday practice of medicine. In
Chicago, the newspaper press reported that Dr. Charles Bradley had become “a cocaine slave”
and eagerly printed the “thrilling recital of his downfall.” Bradley, once “accomplished and
prosperous physician” in the city “ruined himself and his family by becoming a slave to
morphine and cocaine.” His case attracted “considerable attention, not only among the medical
fraternity, but from the general public, owing to its remarkable and sensational features.” Dr.
Bradley’s case read like the sensationalist reports that emerged from the morphine epidemic and
further corroborated the startling theory that many physicians themselves had become addicted to
drugs. Bradley confessed that he became so “absorbed” in his “scientific experiments with
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cocaine” that he failed to realize the “insidious and dangerous nature of the drug” until it was too
late.41
The public impression that the medical profession had lost control of the nation’s narcotic
crisis created a growing sense that the problem had to be transferred to the political realm. On the
other hand, just as intravenous morphine proved immensely valuable in appropriate scenarios, so
too did medicinal cocaine. Evidence of incidences in which doctors properly deployed the drug
countered the widespread claim they were essentially incompetent. As with morphine, use of the
drug depended on context, dosage, and the long-term management of the patient. Doctors, in
fact, often used cocaine quite effectively as a local anesthetic in ophthalmological procedures, in
which they cautiously dropped it into the eye. The drug also proved productive, according to
medical journals, in cases of trachelorrhaphy, or the stitching of a laceration of the uterus.
Additionally, dentists used cocaine to arrest pain resulting from toothaches, and some
doctors found, when injected hypodermically, cocaine could also ease stomach pain. Other
physicians employed it as ear drops to treat infection. Then, it followed the trail of all new and
promising drugs when physicians used it in cases of muscular disorders like neuralgia. Cocaine
also appeared to treat dysphagia, or difficulty swallowing, alleviated the symptoms of
menstruation, and eased pelvic spasms in women; it was also an effective anesthetic in the
removal of cancerous tumors, a quick way to quell the vomiting associated with pregnancy, a
treatment for hemorrhoids, and etcetera. In short, like opium, morphine, and cannabis before it,
there was enough evidence redeeming the use of cocaine to justify its continued use.42
41

“A Cocaine Slave,” St. Louis Globe Democrat, December 31, 1887; “Praying for Death: Pitiable Downfall of a
Once Flourishing Chicago Physician,” The San Francisco Examiner, May 21, 1888.
42
“D.C. Cocks, “Cocaine as a Local Anaesthetic in Ophthalmic Practice,” Medical News (New York), Vol. 45, Issue
17 (October 25, 1884); “Cocaine Hydrochlorate (the New Local Anaesthetic),” Medical and Surgical Reporter
(Philadelphia), Vol. 51, Iss. 19, (November 8, 1884); “Muriate of Cocaine in Gynaecology,” Medical and
Surgical Reporter (Philadelphia), Vol. 51, Iss. 19 (November 8, 1884): 123; C.R. Agenew, “Cocaine as a Local
Anaesthetic to the Eye,” Medical News (New York), Vol. 45, Iss. 20 (Nov. 15, 1884): 559; Carl Seiler, “The New

121

The problem with cocaine—just as it had been with morphine—had less to do with the
drug itself and instead often involved nuanced issues like dosage and the duration of use. In
1890, shortly after the popularization of medicinal cocaine, the Societe de Biologie in Paris
reported cases of “chronic poisoning” by physicians. One man, forty-eight years of age, had been
prescribed morphine for colic in 1878. In 1886, his physician switched the patient to the use of
cocaine. The story suggested, first—and alarmingly—that the man had continued his use of
morphine for eight straight years. Secondly, instead of seeing a physician who tapered him off
that level of usage, he found one that recommended cocaine instead. After two months of
consistent cocaine use, he began “to have many and various hallucinations—he saw things
moving around him, heard strange sounds which frightened him; and was in a state of abnormal
excitability.” This man, eight years after being given morphine for colic, began presenting with
drug-induced mental illness and no follow-up on his case could be found in the record.43
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In the ensuing battle over who was better suited to manage the nation’s drug crisis, the
medical profession continued to lose—fairly or unfairly. The relentlessly sensationalistic news,
which fixated on drug-related tragedy and drama, underwritten by burgeoning local political
action, proved no match for an insular community of often aging physicians. Already covering
the morphine epidemic with sensationalist flair, it was relatively easy for media attention to pivot
towards a focus on cocaine as well. In a syndicated article entitled “The Cocaine Habit,” a South
Carolina newspaper argued that use of the drug was “a comparatively new addition to the evils
by which humanity is beset” and argued that it promised to “excel even morphinism in the
insidiousness of its growth, in blasting destructiveness and the number of its victims.” In 1902,
the New Orleans Times-Democrat suggested that “never a vice was killed, though, that another
did not spring up in its place” and that cocaine had “superseded opium.”
As the medical community sought to address the growing problem with intravenous
morphine addiction, doctors’ use of cocaine as a potential therapeutic continued to raise concerns
about their approach to vetting new narcotics for the marketplace. Moreover, the medical
community, which expressed itself primarily through journals, failed to counter the oftenmisguided portrayals of its work. Thus, the situation often centered on the social power of
messaging more than it did a nuanced conversation on modern medical practices. Instead, the
profession’s alleged misuse of cocaine continued to nurture theories of widespread medical
incompetence; one that gave credence to media narratives and that justified political
intervention.44
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As the profession struggled with the use of cocaine within the context of an opioid crisis,
it did develop a new empathy in approaching morphine addiction. While that modified approach
did not dramatically change the rhythm of the opioid epidemic, it led to a gradual reformation
within the practice of medicine. By framing morphine dependency as a disease, some physicians
pursued a more thoughtful approach to its use. That was especially true when it came to the
counterintuitive practice of treating disease by implanting a new one in the form of a chemical
dependency. Moral prejudice was difficult to eradicate, however. One doctor compared inebriety
in the upper-classes and lower-classes and found lower-class Americans were less prone to the
“functional nervous disorders” that caused addiction while the “vice of drunkenness” abounded
in its “most revolting aspects.” In other words, middle-class Americans often developed an
accidental and organic form of addiction that could be treated in the clinic. They had trusted their
local physician and accepted treatment for chronic pain or nervousness and, through that faith,
developed a dependency. They were, in this telling, mere victims of a system that had not
responsibly regulated itself.45
Within the lower-classes, however, it was an altogether different story. Those individuals
did not seem to suffer from fundamental psychological or physiological issues other than a desire
for perpetual intoxication. They had not been duped, like the middle-class had, but had instead
manipulated the system intentionally to get what they craved—inebriation. Both the popular and
academic presses reinforced the need to be able to distinguish a debauch from a victim. Often,
the formula seemed to be rooted mostly in social prejudice, and poor whites, immigrants, and
anyone of color represented the debauch while the middle-class white American stood apart as a
victim. The tendency to united prejudice and professional theory nurtured an unfortunate
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storyline that would hold significant sway for the remainder of the twentieth-century and
dramatically influence the trajectory of public policy.
The Scientific American suggested the best response to the crisis was to simply wait it out
and let evolution deselect those involved in it. The publication theorized that degenerates would
soon become unable to procreate because of substance abuse, thus eliminating their influence on
humanity. It argued that “the excessively feeble and nervous stocks must perish…and thus, by a
process of successive eliminations, a race may be developed that shall be every way adapted to
the complex conditions of high civilization.”46 For any advance made within the medical
profession to combat the epidemic, other theorists—like eugenicists, in this case—also
contributed to the conversation. The crisis then became something of a national debate that
extended far beyond the clinical setting and entered the arena of pseudo-science, spiritualism,
literature, entrepreneurism, and politics.47
That reality did not stunt the medical community’s efforts at reconsidering the nature of
opioid addiction, however. J.B. Mattison, of Brooklyn, argued that “the vast majority of opium
habitues become such not from choice, not from merely vicious indulgence—an idea mistakenly
held by many both in and out of the profession—but from a physical necessity.”48 To him, the
source of addiction began with a painful ailment eased by the use of morphine. After that
legitimate use, the drug often “forged around its unsuspecting victim a chain so powerful that
self, unaided, was powerless to break it.” In the last ten years, Mattison claimed, he had treated
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many cases of opium addiction and the diversity of the users surprised him. He had even treated
other physicians, typically men of “iron will,” who proved no match for the power of the drug.49
Innovative new terminology continued to function as a key way to combat the crisis.
Instead of presenting those addicted to morphine as “opium-eaters,” the medical community
advanced its experimentation with more clinical labels like morphinism or morphiomania. The
shift was subtle, but it placed the blame on the drug itself and removed the “eater” from the
equation. Dr. Seymour John Sharkey, an English neurologist, argued in 1887 that new diseases,
especially those considered a vice, required changes in the English language. He argued that “we
now find ourselves face to face with a new vice, which some French writers have named
morphinomanie, and which the Germans call Morphiumsucht.” Sharkey called users
morphinomaniacs; others in the field preferred morphinism. He wrote that “most people will be
startled to hear that London society resorts freely to the use of morphia injections for the purpose
of killing time or of producing certain vague and pleasurable sensations similar to those which
are derived from tobacco-smoking.” While Sharkey considered moderate doses of morphine to
be medically beneficial, the drug was “only safe in the hands of medical men who appreciate its
dangers; abuse almost certainly follows if its administration be left to the patients themselves.”50
The fact that the opioid crisis, specifically the rise of “morphiomania,” was not a
uniquely American problem validated opinions that morphine addiction had become a major
global issue. The international reach of the crisis also undercut notions that American physicians
and pharmacists were solely to blame. Morphine addiction seemed to be a broader crisis
highlighting systemic problems within the practice of Western medicine. Considering that the
British and American medical community collaborated in the development of a trial-and-error
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style of vetting new medicines for public use, it made sense they would also share any
consequences resulting from that shared approach. An Australian paper based in Sydney reported
that in France morphine use had spread from rich to the working classes and that they were
trading in their “pipe, pouch, and matchbox” for a “prickling needle, a syringe, and a small phial
of morphine.” The Parisian elite felt “some feelings of shame at their degradation,” but,
according to sources, they rarely missed opportunities to indulge in morphine. Even at the opera,
“there [were] ladies” who would “retire to the back part of the box, and indulge in the puncture
and the pump.”51
Outlying newspapers, like the Indiana State Sentinel, published articles on the morphine
crisis abroad. It noted that “morphiomania” had become “a great scourge in Berlin” and that it
began with the overuse of morphine to treat “bodily suffering and sleeplessness.” Those afflicted
included men and women from all walks of life, “tradespeople, merchants, judges, barristors
[sic], soldiers, students, doctors, and clergymen.” By the time most patients sought treatment, the
addiction had deepened to a level difficult to treat. The article repeated what had become a
common tale in the press: “First, these subcutaneous injections offer the quickest and easiest
means to allay pain and bring rest to the sufferer.” Afterwards, however, the patient became so
“accustomed to these skin injections that they [became] indispensable.” The article appeared in
Fort Scott, Kansas, Oakland, Washington, D.C., Wilmington, North Carolina, Staunton, Virginia,
Pennsylvania, and Marion, Ohio.52
From rural Indiana and the Virginia Valley to Berlin and Paris, France, morphiomania
appeared to tighten its hold. The trend of blaming physicians was also apparent in Europe.
“When physicians discovered that pain could be subdued by inserting under the skin a small
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pointed instrument provided with a tube containing morphia,” a British reporter expounded,
“they little thought they were paving the new way for a vice.” Those who took it fell into “a
delicious langur” where “happy thoughts and bright imagination” filled the body. The piece
concluded by arguing that “the heritage of insanity, of inebriety, of imbecility, will in the future
be traced back to those tiny tubes.” Morphine, which was once looked at as “a blessed means of
relieving pain” had been unleashed by an overly optimistic medical profession that failed to
understand that “blessings and curses go hand in hand in a crooked world.” This “later born
sister fiend,” it wrote, “is morphiomania.”53
Connecticut physician T.D. Crothers announced, in 1892, his “emphatic dissent against
the common use of the word habit, in describing the opium disease.” He asserted that healing
from morphine addiction required an extensive knowledge of physiology and psychology, skills
beyond what could be expected of everyday citizens. It was a clinical issue. Crothers railed
against the notion that those addicted to drugs reached that point through personal choice. He
claimed that most attempts at resolving entrenched drug addiction was due to overreliance “on
the old superstition of a moral origin, and some wilful [sic], wicked impulse.” Not only had
many doctors created drug addictions through their liberal approach to prescriptions, but they
then pivoted to a condemnation of the addict afterwards.54
Crothers had theoretical problems of his own, however. He claimed that signs of
addiction could be observed early in life and used one of his colleague’s sons as a case study.
He believed the two-year old boy already exhibited traits consistent with alcoholism. The doctor
claimed the child ate and drank excessively from all placed before him. He “ate exclusively of
such foods as he liked, for days living on potatoes or bread alone, then changing to soups or

53
54

“Morphiomaniac,” Choctaw County News, November 9, 1881.
T.D. Crothers, “Some New Studies of the Opium Disease,” Medical and Surgical Reporter, March 5, 1892.

128

liquids.” As the boy grew, he had trouble focusing as a student, “drank too much cider when he
visited the country, and only seemed to take interest in eating or in taking in the odors of
perfumes or drugs.”
At the age of fourteen, the boy “became very licentious” and was sent to a boarding
school. At eighteen, he drank beer every day and associated “with low characters” and, by the
relatively young age of twenty, he had been institutionalized as a drunk. While the boy’s father
blamed his son’s friends for his alcoholism, Crothers argued that the signs had been evident early
in the boy’s life. Crothers was so confident in his analysis that he urged colleagues to look for
“impulsive and unregulated tastes for foods and drinks, morbid selfishness and changeableness
of plans and purposes, great irritability and sensitiveness, emotional disturbances, conditions of
depression and exhaustion, insomnia, and always neurasthenia.” Given that broad methodology,
a great percentage of Americans would have likely showed traits of addictive behavior.55
There also remained legitimate fears about drug addiction within the medical community
itself, which was an alarming proposition considering the reality at the time. Crothers reported
that, based on a survey of 3,244 physicians “residing in the Eastern, Middle and some of the
cities of the Western states,” 21 percent of the medical profession used “spirits or opium to
excess.” Six percent of them used morphine openly and ten percent were found to use opium or
other drugs “secretly.” In a separate study of 170 physicians, seven percent were found to use
opium or morphine and six percent were “secret drug takers.” Crothers argued that “from the
personal observations of a number of physicians who have a large acquaintance with medical
men, from 8 to 10 per cent are either secret or open drug and morphine habituès.”56
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These kinds of stories, in this case generated by a fellow physician, did not help the
medical community’s reputation. The internal divide over whether compulsive inebriation was a
disease or evidence of moral blight also slowed reform measures within the profession. In the
meantime, other agents began to address the problem. In the early-1900s, as the opioid crisis
peaked, a rehabilitation industry emerged to treat drug and alcohol addiction. It was a freemarket response to the crisis that appropriated medical language and practices for profit.
In Pittsburgh, the Rational Treatment Association, LTD, offered a cure for the “alcohol,
morphine, and tobacco habit” and provided a space where “habitues” would be “treated by
competent physicians without going to an institution.” They would return home cured “without
publicity—without loss of time from business—without excessive cost—without FAILURE.”
The Keeley Institute developed into one of the most prolific early-twentieth century
rehabilitation centers and funded facilities across the United States. It offered services to all
Americans suffering from “liquor and morphine diseases, cocaine, chloral, and drug addictions”
and boasted that over 400,000 men and women had been cured of “drug slavery.” The institute
operated a four-week program for alcoholism and a four-to-six-week cure for drug addiction. It
also offered to treat women in their homes or outside the institute if they desired that approach.
“Why be a slave” it asked, “when you can be free?” Dr. Keeley, founder of the institute, was a
native of New York and trained at the Rush Medical College in Chicago. He had made “inebriety
his life-study” and, as a surgeon in the Civil War, began studying it “practically as other doctors
studied surgery.” He refused to reveal his method and “the formula [had] always been a
secret.”57
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At the Pittsburgh Sanitarium, which opened in 1898, physicians administered Dr. R.
Parks White’s Improved Vegetable Cure, which allegedly treated alcoholism, morphine “and
other drug addictions, and the tobacco and cigarette habits.” The Dr. Long Co., in Atlanta,
Georgia, guaranteed a cure that could would be instantly noticeable for only $10.00. At the more
prestigious Ocean View Sanitarium, in Provincetown, Massachusetts, which served primarily as
a “private home for invalids,” doctors began to accept “nervous cases, convalescents, and a few
selected cases of drug addiction.” The facility overlooked a picturesque harbor, promoted
bathing in the sea, and declared that insomnia was “almost unknown” within its walls. Dr.
Crothers, a tireless reformer within the medical community, tried his hand at rehabilitation as
well and promoted Antikamnia Tablets, produced by the Antikamnia Chemical Company based
in St. Louis, Missouri. He claimed that he had used them with “excellent results to quiet the pain
following the withdrawal of morphia.”58
The Oppenheimer Institute, in New York City, declared “the medical profession has,
after many disappointments and failures, succeeded in educating the public to understand that
victims of alcohol and other drugs are not to be regarded as criminals.” Instead, they were to be
seen as “patients worthy of the utmost consideration, care and sympathy.” The advertisement
continued: “this is an age of specialism” where results came from “careful and systematic work”
carried out by “those who have followed one idea through good and bad report to the conclusion
which leads to accurate results.” Ironically, Oppenheimer reiterated the ethos of the nineteenth
century medical community, which had long trumpeted the notion that all gains in medicine were
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made by following one idea extensively while reporting both successes and failures along the
way.59
While the medical community struggled to find a consistent voice regarding America’s
alleged drug crisis and for-profit rehabilitation centers proliferated, the epidemic increasingly
developed into a political issue. At the New York statehouse in Albany, The Assembly of Public
Health passed a bill on February 8, 1900, that banned “the sale of drugs, whether in original
packages or otherwise, in department stores.” Four days later, the same Assembly worked to pass
a bill that would establish a “reformatory asylum” for the habitual users of drugs and alcohol.
The institution planned to accommodate “300 inmates, each to be studied individually and
compared to their peers.60
While the bill banned so-called “incurables” from entering such facilities, those who
showed promise were to be confined for up to five years where a system of “discipline and
labor” aided their recovery. Those committed would be sent by magistrates. Legislators believed
this system would “result in a better knowledge of alcoholism and narcotism [sic] and other
methods for prevention.”61 The day after the proposal for a reformatory asylum, the bill to ban
drugs sold in department stores advanced to a third reading on a vote of 65-40. While it had its
opponents, including state representative Mr. Green, who considered it “entirely radical” that,
under the bill’s provisions, a department store could not sell “cough-drop packages,” the law
seemed destined to pass. Those in favor argued that it was a public health measure aimed at
preventing children in New York City from selling drugs on the streets obtained from popular
department stores.62
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Those who adopted a more legislative reform approach argued that their “cousins across
the water did not prescribe or swallow one-fourth as much medicine” as the United States did.
They suggested that “the common-sense practitioner knows by experience that the constant,
frequent prescribing of innumerable drugs only ends in detriment to his patients.”63 A journalist
for the New York Times reported that one employee of a city drugstore said that he had tasted
every narcotic in stock and that the practice was “probably not an uncommon one.” The writer
added that “many a victim of drug poison which is slowly corroding all that is best in him,
physically and morally, can trace his deadly habit to that unfortunate day when he began
indiscriminate tasting, when he first ate from the tree of knowledge.”64
Even in small towns like Union Springs, Alabama, a movement against morphine gained
ground in 1905. The city passed a “cocaine and morphine law” to counter the “promiscuous sale
of these baneful drugs.” That was especially true of cocaine, which had become “widespread
among the negroes” and threatened a “rapid deterioration of an already poor class of laborers.” In
adopting the ordinance, the City Council had done “the proper thing” and urged the town’s
“officers and all good citizens to see that the law is enforced.”65 The City Council in Austin,
Texas, passed the Paregoric Bill, which prohibited the sale of laudanum, morphine, cocaine, and
opium without a prescription. It further stipulated that physicians were not to prescribe those
substances to habitual users.
On the eve of America’s first attempt at comprehensive narcotic reform—the Pure Food
and Drug Act on 1906—a sizeable municipal and state level movement towards anti-drug policy
had already taken shape. While the medical community worked to reform its practices, the opioid
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epidemic had already entered the popular vernacular, gained an outsized presence in the national
media, and inspired political activists. From the close of the Civil War to the early 1900s, drug
abuse and inebriety rose to become a preeminent American socio-political problem. Turning the
opioid epidemic back to the medical clinic would prove an impossible task. As the public
searched for a culprit on which to convincingly blame the nation’s drug problem, the average
American physician had been indicted. While convincing arguments could have been made—
both then and now—that it was an unfair categorization, the narrative held real sway and had the
effect of transforming the issue of drug abuse from a clinical problem to a political one.
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Chapter Four
The Making of a Prohibition State: The Social and Political Response to an Opioid Crisis
On the afternoon of Feb 5, 1901, a group of women approached a drug store owned by
Charles G. Foucek at Eighteenth Street and Central Avenue in Chicago. They were in a “well
organized band” and “most of them wore automobile coats, under which they concealed their
instruments of destruction.” As they quietly entered the store, Foucek greeted them as he did all
his customers—with a pleasant eagerness to help. This would not be an ordinary encounter,
however, as one of the ladies, presumably the leader of the band, quickly “upbraided [Foucek]
for dealing in traffics of the devil” and another asked if he was not aware that “all the ills of
humankind” could be cured through prayer. “Hurray for Dowie!” the women allegedly screamed
before removing canes, umbrellas, and actual pitchforks from their overcoats, which they then
used to assault Foucek. He took cover behind the counter and “the women turned their attention
to the shelves and showcases and began to strike left and right.” In makeshift counter-attack, the
clerks of the store filled buckets of water and began dumping it on the women, who promptly
fled, but not before leaving a trail of destruction.1
The group of “middle-age and well dressed” women, true believers in turn-of-the-century
faith healer John Alexander Dowie, were conducting an anti-drug crusade. The group visited
four other stores that afternoon, threatened the managers with violence, and destroyed valuable
product. As word spread, frightened pharmacists looked for immediate ways to defend
themselves. They used what was on hand: ammonia, a charged soda suddenly opened and
pointed at their targets, and buckets of water. By late afternoon, pharmacists had armed
themselves with loaded guns while waiting anxiously for more attacks. Headlines claimed the
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women were “On the War Path,” that “Chicago Faith Purists Begin Anti-Drug Crusade” and that
they were armed with “pitchforks and canes.” These “female disciples of Dowie” did not hesitate
in carrying out their mission. As far away as Buffalo, newspapers printed the story of the “the
women who adopted Mrs. Nation’s methods and partially wrecked five druggists’ establishments
on the West Side of the city.”2
The pharmacy attacks that February illustrated the growing intensity of the anti-drug
movement in the United States, which came, in part, as a reaction to the ongoing opioid
epidemic. That crisis, which had significantly eroded faith in the medical profession and the
pharmaceutical industry, began to inspire the kind of social backlash exhibited by the women in
Chicago. As part of the reaction to the opioid epidemic, the media, the general public, and
political reformers broadened the definition of what constituted a dangerous narcotic. For
decades, the focus was fixed on morphine, thus creating the sense that the crisis was manageable.
By the opening decades of the 1900s, drug concerns broadened to include cocaine, smokable
opium, cannabis indica, chloral, hashish, marijuana, and heroin. The seemingly endless deluge of
new and dangerous drugs—some of them being the same drugs with different names—nurtured
the idea that narcotics were an overwhelming menace that threatened the country on multiple
fronts.
In response, the movement for the political reform of narcotic policy accelerated at the
turn-of-the-century and included a wide conglomeration of concerns. In the face of what seemed
to be an intractable problem, municipal, state, and federal governments reacted by pursuing drug
reform measures to better protect the public. The work of grassroots activists, state and federal
politicians, lobbyists, philanthropists, anti-drug vigilantes, judges, ministers, and diplomats

2

“On the War Path,” Voice of the People (Buffalo, NY), February 9, 1901.

136

overlapped, ultimately facilitating a profound rethinking of the country’s relationship with
narcotics. Their combined efforts inspired a drug reform revolution that transformed American
politics, reshaped public opinion, and placed historic oversight on the medical profession and the
nation’s pharmaceutical economy. No longer confined to the reified pages of medical journals,
considerations of how to best control the spread of narcotics in the United States developed into
a pressing national concern.
The Government Response to the Domestic Drug Crisis
As medical and political reformers continued to critique common practices within the
profession, political interventions became increasingly common. Oregon introduced a bill in
1887 stating that “no person shall offer for sale opium, morphine, eng-she or cooked opium,
chloral hydrate or cocaine who has not previously obtained a license from the country clerk.”
The license cost one dollar and would be valid for one year. The only individuals who qualified
for the license, however, were physicians or pharmacists. The drugs in question were also not to
be prescribed except “for the cure of disease.” The punishment for violating the law was either a
fine between $50-$250 or a prison sentence ranging from thirty to ninety days in jail. California,
an early leader in anti-opium legislation, followed by passing restrictions on cocaine in 1892.
The State Assembly of New York drafted its own anti-cocaine and anti-morphine bill in 1893,
which prohibited the sale of both without a physician’s prescription. At the Texas statehouse in
Austin, in 1895, politicians and reformers pushed for the passage of a similar bill outlawing the
sale of cocaine and morphine without a prescription. The Nashville City Council followed in
1900 with a similar law and, one year later, the Tennessee House passed it nearly unanimously.
Kentucky, Nebraska and Alabama soon followed with similarly worded laws.3
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While the flurry of new state laws aimed at curtailing access to drugs did not directly
address perceived failures within the medical profession, they made it clear that local
government intended to address the nation’s alleged drug problem with political solutions. It was
not a widely disputed fact—even amongst practicing physicians—that the medical community
had significantly contributed to spiking addiction rates in the United States. Consequently, as
politicians sought answers to address what had become a public problem, few turned to the
somewhat discredited medical profession. Thus, within that power vacuum, local politicians
introduced laws that not only curtailed public access to “dangerous” narcotics, but also sought to
place strict limitations on the discretion typically granted to physicians in prescribing them.
At the same time that state governments began regulating the sale of drugs, government
agents commenced the raiding of opium dens and, to a large degree, those moves represented the
end of an era in which drugs could be freely attained through a loosely organized and unchecked
pharmaceutical culture. Indeed, the process of more strictly curtailing access to narcotics began
in the wake of the Civil War, in the 1860s, as public opinion turned against seemingly
unnecessary or excessive dispensations of drugs. In the 1870s, as the morphine crisis accelerated,
there were a variety of responses to the question of how to best manage its spread. The medical
community consistently worked to change certain practices within the profession indicted with
causing the problem, but it was a slow process that yielded unconvincing results in the shortterm. Consequently, the state took more definitive action and pursued a fairly uncontroversial
enforcement strategy—the heavy policing of American opium dens.
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Opium den raids also presented a new kind of drug user to the American public, one far
less sympathetic than middle-class women inadvertently addicted to morphine through a
physician. Those pulled from dens were considered the dredges of society and shown little
mercy. According to media reports, they were misfits, rebels, and criminals. In an 1877 article,
“Opium Smoking in Nevada,” it was reported that “the class who patronize these resorts” were
“outside the pale of society—men and women who [had] lost all self-respect and [sought] the
comforting influences that steal over them after their indulgence, and possibly to obtain some
moments of forgetfulness and calm contentment.” They were “gamblers and lewd women” and
they could be found in opium dens in “great numbers.”4
In an 1894 opium raid, the St. Louis, Missouri Police Department arrested “eleven
fiends” in one afternoon at 717 Walnut Street. The St. Louis Post-Dispatch confessed the city
had known about the dens for years, but police chose “not to molest Chinese proprietors as they
carried on their business quietly.” The city changed course because the Chinese had become
“bolder in opening their doors to the general public.” St. Louis mothers, who recently organized
an awareness campaign, inspired the new vigilance. “So as Jeu-Jeu’s had become particularly
bold in his operations,” the department decided to conduct a Friday night raid. From “ill-smelling
holes,” police pulled Jeu-Jeu, John Hong, Joe Ling and Jo Jas, all Chinese men. Accompanying
them were May Bennett and William Seymour, both white, and Delia Walker, Ida Johnson,
Bessie Payne, Ida May Bolnies, and Blanche Blackwood, who were black residents of the city.
The “Chinese paid costs,” the paper exclaimed, while “the negroes got a continuance,” and May
Bennett and William Seymour were “too sick to appear in court.”5
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Those found in the dens were typically from America’s marginalized classes—poor,
immigrant, and people of color. The Chicago Tribune reported on September 30, 1907 that “of
nineteen colored men arrested in the city’s opium dens, saloons, and other resorts on Saturday
and yesterday, seven [had] police records and were wanted for crimes in other cities.”6 The
arrests, in this case, were made under city’s “vagrancy act,” which police believed was “the most
effective way of preventing crime” and promised that more arrests would “be made at once in
saloons, cheap billiard halls, and other rallying places of the idle and criminal classes.”7
This raid-and-arrest style of enforcing the law complemented, in uncoordinated ways, the
more institutional approach that sought to create new pharmaceutical industry oversight. In some
cases, the strategies overlapped. In 1908 San Francisco, for example, the California State Board
of Pharmacy conducted “a sudden swoop” of San Francisco’s Chinatown as part of a “campaign”
for the “prevention of the sale of opium without a prescription.” So, in addition to the raids
conducted by the San Francisco Police Department, Chinatown also began to endure similar
sweeps carried out by the unsuspecting California State Board of Pharmacy. The fact that opium
dens were not pharmacies did little to slow the drive nor did it create significant create backlash.8
The opium dens raids benefited from the media’s coverage of a similar crackdown on
those sites in China. Those stories also provided an ongoing global context for the drug crisis
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that validated domestic concerns. In a 1901 expose on the opium problem in China entitled
“Macao’s Big Opium Farm,” the author suggested that the opium den provided a gateway to
morphine use. The piece also argued it was nearly impossible to break an opium habit and that
“some of [the addicts] pretend to be permanently cured, but upon investigation it [was] usually
found that they [had] changed from opium to morphine.” Those Chinese men and women who
took morphine pills were “as many as the opium smokers.” It further noted that “in some cities
along the Yangtse the hypodermic method of injecting morphine” had become commonplace.
Injections were delivered by “professional morphine peddlers” who traveled with “hypodermic
syringes up their sleeves” and offered subcutaneous delivery for one cent a piece.9
By the opening decades of the twentieth century, there were several competing
approaches to solving America’s perceived narcotic crisis. On the West Coast, state government
had successfully wrestled the drug problem from the medical community. Not only had states
like California and Oregon passed laws limiting the public’s access to narcotics sold at the local
pharmacy, but they also instituted a hardline raid-and-arrest style of policing opium dens and
marketed it to the reading public. Those early laws regulating the statewide flow of morphine
and cocaine complemented another local push for pure food and drug legislation. At that point, a
layered (and oftentimes confused) approach to managing the broader drug crisis emerged. On
one hand, states experimented with an early form of anti-drug policing through the continually
raiding of opium dens. Those efforts existed parallel to a local, legislative, and administrative
attempt to politicize the dispensation of cocaine and morphine. At the same time, these efforts
intersected with a grassroots movement for the purification of the nation’s drug and food supply,
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which had been active in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. Even in areas not related
to the prescription of so-called “dangerous drugs,” the medical profession seemed to struggle.
In St. Louis, Missouri, in October 1901, May Baker, the 4-year old daughter of Minnie
Baker, a widowed single mother who also ran a confectionary shop in the city, died in the middle
of the night of lock-jaw. The day before, Minnie’s eldest child, six-year old Bessie Baker, passed
away from the same sickness. The children’s physician, R.C. Harris, told the St. Louis PostDispatch that Bessie’s only remaining child—Frankie—had also developed lock-jaw and would
likely share the fate of her siblings. Experts cited contaminated anti-toxins produced by the city
chemist’s office as the culprit. Other deaths soon followed until, at the height of the outbreak,
thirteen children lost their lives in St. Louis that fall.
A horse named Jim proved to be the cause of the crisis. In the 1890s, scientists
discovered that immunized animals produced antibodies that fought against certain diseases like
diphtheria, a bacterial infection that haunted turn-of-the-century children. As this new treatment
reached market, St. Louis, like other major cities, fully adopted its use. Jim, a reliable equine
donor, had—unbeknownst to his handlers—recently contracted tetanus and it toxified his
sample. During the decade leading up to October of 1901, this horse-extracted antidote had
reliably worked in cases of diphtheria; that is until news broke that the city of St. Louis
distributed contaminated antitoxins that were confidently injected into sick children, unwittingly
causing their deaths. Reports of the tragedy spread through the syndicated press and fueled an
already heightened anxiety over drugs, poisons, and accidental deaths. The New York Times
covered the tragedy extensively with a series of articles titled “Lockjaw in Diphtheria Cure:
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Eight Deaths in St. Louis from the Antitoxin,” “Another St. Louis Antitoxin Victim,” and
“Antitoxine and Lock Jaw: Scientific View of Fatal Diphtheria Cases in St. Louis.”10
Shortly after the St. Louis tragedy, Dr. Thomas C. Smith, secretary of the Medical
Society of the District of Columbia, endorsed a congressional bill regulating virus, serums, and
toxins. He wrote to Congress, “although the preventative and curative powers of virus, serums,
toxins, and analogous products, when properly prepared, has long since been established,” he
nonetheless agreed that “certain unfortunate accidents which have resulted from their
administration, notably those which recently occurred in St. Louis, Mo., have tended to discredit
their use.” With the support of the mainstream medical community, Congress unceremoniously
passed the Virus-Toxin Law—later known as the Biologics Control Act of 1902. It was an
uncontroversial law, but nonetheless proved to be the moment in which the federal government
began asserting legislative control over the medical profession and the pharmaceutical
marketplace.11
The Biologics Control Act, now largely forgotten, served as a crucial foundational piece
in the construction of an American Prohibition State. Within a highly decentralized medical
community resistant to oversight, passing the law was no small feat. It might be argued, in fact,
that because it dealt with vaccines—and not opioids or cocaine—it entered the political arena as
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a kind of Trojan Horse. The law also led to the creation of a board within the Department of
Treasure immediately empowered and funded to enforce the new standards. In that sense, the bill
blazed a trail for the far broader and more controversial Pure Food and Drug Act and thus
provided an example of coalescing policies that laid the foundation for a platform of continued
regulation. Whether it came in the form of state laws regulating morphine and cocaine, law
enforcement raids on opium dens, the diphtheria crisis in St. Louis, or the movement for pure
food and drugs, the control of narcotics became one of the most prominent political issues of the
early-twentieth century.
A mere four years later, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug Act, a revolutionary
piece of legislation that transformed the food industry and the pharmaceutical economy in one
fell swoop. Often attributed to a single novel—Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle, which exposed the
horrors of Midwestern meatpacking—the process that led to its passage came as the result of an
extensive and lengthy political campaign. The campaign began in 1898, when politicians,
lobbyists, and representatives of the industries to be affected met in the National Hotel in
Washington, D.C. to confirm a set of political and economic principles regarding food and drug
reform and then drafted them into widely distributed pamphlets. They conferred again in 1899
and then in 1900, where representatives lobbied, networked, and perfected pitches for a truly
monumental reshaping of the government’s role in the pharmaceutical and foodstuff
economies.12
Indicating the deep level of support the movement gained in the latter years of the
nineteenth-century, the 1900 conference included representatives from “46 states and territories
and some 300 delegates were in attendance.” Speakers focused on the latest issues preventing
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passage of earlier iterations of a pure food and drug law and highlighted talking points—like the
fact that eleven states already passed their own versions of the law. Leaders of the movement
argued that the language of state laws differed from region to region and the result of putting the
lives of Americans in harm’s way by sewing confusion. They also suggested that the subsequent
incoherence validated the old snake oil salesman of the previous generation by enabling the
laissez-faire economy in which they thrived. “Give us,” Mr. W.B. McMeechin appealed at that
1900 gathering, “a national law on the subject.”13
McMeechin got that national law when President Theodore Roosevelt signed the Pure
Food and Drugs Act on June 30, 1906. It went into effect on January 1, 1907. The bill ratified
similar movements at the state level and confirmed Congress’s power to oversee interstate
commerce to exert stricter controls on the flow of drugs across state lines. Along with the
Biologics Control Act, it more firmly established the legislative foundations of the Prohibition
State; or, at the very least, corroborated the notion that the national government could be
empowered to control the dispensation of the nation’s narcotic supply—a controversial notion in
1906. Perhaps most importantly, the bill led to the creation of one of the first drug control
bureaucracies—the Chemistry Bureau of the Department of Agriculture—which evolved into the
Food and Drug Administration.
When combined with the state laws intended to control morphine and cocaine and the
raids on opium dens, the Biologics Control Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act represented a
government seizing control of drugs away from the medical community. While seemingly
unconnected, those movements combined to create the building blocks of the Prohibition State.
Indeed, the two acts marked the federal government’s entrance into drug reform legislation. In
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the process, it complemented and stabilized more aggressive anti-drug movements at the state
level. Having secured those victories, government officials then looked at the reformation of
American foreign policy around the issue of narcotic control. By 1909, the United States’
approach to the nation’s drug problem had been remarkably transformed. From San Francisco to
The Hague, a new strategy towards managing the flow of drugs took shape.
Just before passing the Pure Food and Drug Act, the federal government began
developing drug restriction policies within its newly acquired foreign territories. These territories
served as a laboratory for the federal government to test policies that would eventually be
implemented domestically. After the United States took possession of the Philippines at the
conclusion of the Spanish-American War in 1898, opium and alcohol prohibition quickly
became one of the central features of America’s New Imperialism. At the end of a tour of
Southeast Asia in 1900, missionaries argued that “the baleful effects of liquor and opium on the
natives of every country visited” presented a dire situation. Consequently, “strong pressure” had
been put on President McKinley to “prohibit its sale in lands over which the country exercises
control—notably the Alaskan Territory, Hawaii, and the Philippines.” These new holdings
proved an ideal site for the immediate implementation of a prohibitionist agenda. Not only was it
a landscape void of the strong liquor and pharmaceutical interests that characterized American
politics, the Philippines also lacked an entrenched system of democratic politics that required
decades of lobbying to achieve the implementation of even basic consumer safeguards. Even in
that environment, however, anti-opium policy proved hard to establish.14
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The Federal Government takes its Anti-Drug Crusade Global
In 1903, the War Department announced that the Philippine government would create an
“opium monopoly” that would then be sold to the highest bidder. “The contemplated action of
the scheme,” according to the press, was to create a situation in which the use of opium would be
restricted to protect the Chinese, “who had used it all their lives,” and Americans and Filipinos,
“many of whom [were] falling victims to it.” The Chinese protested against this idea first. They
considered the monopoly to be a centralization of power that would drastically cut into their
profits; the second from the American and Filipino evangelical community, who wanted to see
all sale and use strictly prohibited.15
In response to this resistance, Governor Taft appointed an opium commission tasked with
investigating “the laws and conditions with regard to opium in all Oriental countries.” Major
Edwin C. Carter, Bishop Charles Henry Brent, and Dr. Jose Albert would visit Japan, Formosa,
Hong Kong, Singapore, Java, and Burma to determine the most effective way to eradicate the use
of opium in the Philippines. A year later the committee delivered its verdict: that all opium sales
should be brought under a governmental monopoly “at once.” After the passage of three years,
the plan suggested, federal authorities would be in a position to totally prohibit it. Opium could
still be used as medicine and, generously, “confirmed habitues” who were over the age of
twenty-one years old could get a “smoker’s license.” The committee also recommended that antiopium lessons be a part of primary education, that all opium addicts be allowed to receive
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treatment at local hospitals free of charge, and that any Chinese citizen found smoking it in the
Philippines be deported.16
The questions that animated the Opium Wars between Britain and China in the midnineteenth-century reemerged, however, to slow the progress of establishing a federal monopoly
over the Filipino opium economy. Missouri Representative John Joseph Cochran argued that the
bill establishing the market essentially legalized the sale and use of opium and that the United
States would profit from such an economy. Cochran’s resistance touched on the infamous history
of Great Britain’s profit from the importation of opium into the Chinese market and he did not
want the United States to follow that model. Nebraska Representative Gilbert Hitchcock
introduced a counter bill that would prohibit the importation of opium to the Philippines except
for medicinal use, a strategy modeled after legislation being shaped locally in the United States.
Congress ultimately decided to leave the issue to the Filipino government and to the counsel of
the commission established by Governor Taft.17
The Opium Wars between China and England lingered in the backdrop of the
negotiations. If the United States seized the opium supply of the Philippines for profit—even if it
did so with the interest of destroying that supply—then it was no better than England. Reformers
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in England and the United States had long chastised the country for fighting to keep opium
markets open in the interest of revenue. In order to determine how the global opium supply
should be managed, the United States created a coalition of nations who gathered to provide
insight and reach conclusions. In May 1908, President Roosevelt, transitioning into his last
months in office, sent a letter to Congress “counseling the immediate beginning of an
international investigation into the opium question in the far east.” His request accompanied
another: the granting of $20,000 to fund the United States’ participation in a global conference
focused on the spread of opium. The conference, originally scheduled for New Year’s Day,
1909, in Shanghai was postponed to February 1st due to the deaths of the Emperor and Empress
Dowager of China. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the “limitation or total prohibition
by the nations of the production and importation of opium” for any non-medicinal reason. Those
gathered included Great Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, Holland, Turkey, Persia, Japan,
Russia, China, and Siam (Thailand).18
Indicating a building anti-drug synchronicity, the conference, held just three years after
the signing of the Pure Food and Drug Act, led directly to the passage of the nation’s first drug
prohibition—the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act. That bill, which banned the same substance in
the Philippines, not only gave the United States credibility in the international sphere of opium
regulation, but it also codified the excessive policing of opium dens on the West Coast. By
criminalizing smokable opium, rarely sold outside of dens, Congress joined the drive against
America’s Chinatowns. It also highlighted overt connections between municipal, state, federal,
and international drug policy. While Congress pursued the ban on smoking opium to bolster its
anti-opium credentials in Shanghai, the bill also codified a rather illogically aggressive style of
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law enforcement moving across the county from the West Coast. The American periodical
Outlook nonetheless argued that Congress acted “in the nick of time to save our delegates at the
Shanghai Conference from the mortification of being a less favorable light than their colleagues
as to recent action in their own constituency in the warfare against opium.” The First Opium
Conference in Shanghai essentially served as the Third Opium War and included many of the
same players. This one, occurring over a half century since England and China warred over a
drug market, was bloodless. “Except in reference to opium and morphia in the commercial
treaties with China,” the American periodical Outlook explained, “no international action in the
matter [had] been taken since the Opium War sixty years ago and more.”19
On the domestic front, political attention focused on the enforcement of the Pure Food
and Drug Act. Chief Chemist at the Department of Agriculture, Dr. Harvey Washington Wiley,
who had implemented the core values of the law, praised its success in 1909. As the first
International Opium Conference left for Shanghai, Wiley spoke to the American Association for
the Advancement of Science in Baltimore, Maryland. He argued the bill had altered the ethics of
the food and drug industry and that “it was the universal opinion of all high-grade manufacturers
and merchants in food and drug products that the majority of the trade [had] been directly
improved.” Wiley noted that the stipulation forcing products to be named and labeled had the
effect of revealing them as fraudulent and driving them from the legitimate market. That being
the case, those who sold high-grade products no longer had to participate in “debasement” of
products in order to remain competitive.20
Dr. Wiley also praised the legal evolution of the bill. He cited a decision from a United
States District Court in Kansas City where the judge claimed the statute had been designed “to
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protect consumers and not producers,” which represented a significant change in public thinking
from just a few decades earlier, during a period when accidental poisonings and overdoses were
glossed over. He continued by proclaiming it to be a “righteous statute, and within the powers of
congress to legislate” before urging its continued enforcement. Additionally, a “rigid inspection
of imported drugs” kept from the country all drugs that were “not up to pharmaceutical standard”
and instituted a “careful control” at the federal level. The law had achieved, in a short period of
time, results that exceeded the wildest expectations and led to a situation in which the country’s
food and drug supplies had been cleansed, at least to Dr. Wiley’s mind. The New York Observer
and Chronicle urged its readers to remember that “selfish interests sway many men,
manufacturers or others, and for the sake of bigger dividends many merchants [were] willing to
take the risk of sacrificing the public health.” It would take several years, in fact, for the
Chemistry Bureau within the Department of Agriculture to gain the authority it needed to
prosecute violations of the act and overcome the resistance from the cumulative power of the
food and pharmaceutical industries.21
There were signs, however, that progress had been made. Dr. L.J. Desha, chemist
enforcing Pure Food and Drug laws in Tennessee, travelled to Chattanooga in 1912 to conduct
fifty-hearings involving pharmacists who had violated the act. The vast majority of them failed
to properly label popular “headache powders” that were alleged to contain “various forms of
dope.” Investigators found in many cases that mail-order cures for morphine and opium
addiction, and alcoholism, contained the actual drugs they were purported to cure. The United
States Post Office then issued “fraud orders against the manufacturers.”22
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Although significant gains had been made in the nation’s attempt to arrest the nonmedicinal use of drugs, challenges remained. First, there were few signs that the morphine
epidemic had been adequately addressed. The media continued to present numerous cases of
accidental poisonings, suicides, and overdoses. In that area, the federal government had not yet
been able to act. Perhaps more alarmingly, the racialization of the crisis, a longstanding tradition
dating to the West Coast’s anti-opium den drives, accelerated in the early-1900s and coexisted
with these rationalist institutional shifts.23
Indeed, during the rapid development of the Prohibition State, government began
implementing and enforcing drug laws in socially discriminatory ways. By the 1910s, that
tendency—always an underlying motive of the policing of opium dens in Chinatown—expanded
to include African-Americans and Mexicans. The media also did not hesitate in stoking racially
motivated drug anxieties. “One negro in every four uses cocaine,” declared the Times and
Democrat of Orangeburg, South Carolina in the summer of 1910. The paper further argued that
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“Negroes are very susceptible to the influence of cocaine and under its sway will commit acts
from which they would shrink under normal conditions.” That narrative, which directly mirrored
the ones already established with Mexican immigrants and marijuana and Chinese immigrants
and opium, had persisted for decades. The Charlotte News contended that “the cocaine habit was
most common among the river negroes, nearly all of whom are addicted to it.” It also reported
that the “cocaine habit is fast driving out the morphine habit, which, however, never had much
hold among the negroes.” By the 1910s, the problem showed no signs of easing. Reverend J.W.
Ham of Atlanta, Georgia wrote that “most every Southern city has now the problem of cocaine
dens to deal with.” If the problem persisted, he averred, it would “only be a short time before the
use of cocaine among the negroes [would] be as universal as opium [was] among the Chinese.”24
The racism that was increasingly becoming a part of the story of cocaine also more
intensely defined the opium den raids on the West Coast. In Salt Lake City, Detective George
Cleveland shot and killed sixty-two-year-old Louie Loy, who he suspected of running an opium
den in the city. Loy, “a pioneer Chinese resident of the city,” had been born in China,
immigrated to the United States, and lived in Salt Lake City for thirty-five years. When he fled
the scene of a police raid and failed to acknowledge calls to stop, Detective Cleveland fired a
bullet “that entered the Chinaman’s brain.” In San Francisco, in the fall of 1911, “two white
girls, a white man, and six Chinese” were pulled from an opium den. The two girls were given
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the choice of paying a $120 fine or serving sixty days in jail. The white man, Richard Bernstein,
was a salesman for a San Francisco firm and he was given a similar choice: pay $40 or spent
twenty days in jail. The six Chinese men obtained lawyers and had their sentencing hearings
postponed. The conclusions of their cases were never reported.25
Just as the political and institutional approaches began to coalesce to reshape American
social reality, so too did the punitive styles of addressing the issue, which often veered directly
into a method of racist enforcement. For decades, Chinese immigrants stood essentially alone as
the target of these practices. By the 1910s, police included African-Americans and Mexicans
with equal resolve. The El Paso Morning Times called the marijuana moving northwards with
Mexican immigrants “The Mexican Opium” and argued that it produced effects similar to that of
Chinese opium— “mental delusions and hallucinations” that most frequently ended in
“homicidal or suicidal mania.” The marijuana anxieties that would begin to continually haunt the
American mind coupled with similar characterizations of African-Americans and cocaine use
and Chinese immigrants and the smoking of opium.26
These multifaceted and seemingly disconnected attempts to control the flow of drugs
both domestically and internationally coalesced to become a broader war on drugs. Many of the
strategies occurred simultaneously. For example, it was impossible to separate the relatively
localized raiding of opium dens from the International Opium Conference in Shanghai in 1909, a
gathering that pressured Congress to pass the Smoking Opium Act. The connection of AfricanAmericans to rampant cocaine use aided in the passage of cocaine and morphine laws across the
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United States; acts then celebrated by reformers who pushed for a national law mirroring those
local ones. As anti-drug legislative victories mounted, there was a building sense that the nation
was not just fighting a national drug problem, but had rather declared war on it. As a Second
International Opium Conference approached in 1911, the Memphis Commercial Appeal noted
“nations of the world will join hands in a world-wide war on drugs.” Because of this new
“crusade, morphine, cocaine, and opium” would finally be destroyed. The article further argued
that “our Christian people” had been so dedicated to fighting for alcohol prohibition that they
had, “to present time, permitted the drug evil to grow to such an extent that society is
threatened.” After England protested that the revenue from the sale of morphine and cocaine in
the United States exceeded the profits it collected from opium, the United States committed to
inaugurating “a war against the three fatal drugs,” one that would “be waged relentlessly.”
Indeed, the State Department instructed delegates arriving at The Hague to push for a “worldwide fight” against narcotics.27
At the Second International Opium Conference, held July 1-9, 1913, the inauguration of a
World War on drugs seemed less certain than presented in the press. While thirty-five countries
signed an agreement to battle the spread of opioids, several were reticent to act, including
Bulgaria, Greece, Turkey, Switzerland, Austria-Hungary, Norway, Sweden, Romania,
Montenegro, and Serbia. Turkey, Greece, and the Balkan countries were in a state of war and
could not take on the responsibilities the Americans called for. Switzerland claimed that
cooperating would not enhance the countries interests and claimed it had no identifiable traffic in
drugs. Austria-Hungary, Norway, and Sweden refused because those countries believed it would
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require new legislation, a burden they were hesitant to pursue. Because Austria refused to sign
the agreement, Germany remained neutral; and because Germany hesitated, the British had
serious misgivings.28
The international hesitation did little to quell the United States’ growing support for an
international battle against drugs, however. In a 1913 article titled “China’s War on Opium,” the
New York Times praised the country’s efforts at cracking down on narcotics. The paper thought it
“one of the most hopeful and significant signs” of modernization because opium had done “more
than any one thing to retard China’s progress.” General Chang of the National Opium
Association of China even travelled to London “to lay before the British Government and its
people a plain statement of facts” to gain support for anti-opium legislation. A year later the
paper reported that “China, Too, Has a Drug War,” and noted it was being waged more
ruthlessly than in the United States. “The new Chinese government,” it continued, “is acting
energetically to stop the use of opium, as well its production and importation.” In waging this
war, the Chinese had resorted “to Oriental measures of severity,” especially in their provision
that anyone under the age of forty found in possession of opium “shall be shot.” It further
suggested that “New York’s campaign against the sellers and users of narcotics” had made
trouble, “but for a real drug war one must go to China.”29
From Shanghai and the Hague, through major new prohibition bills passed by Congress,
and to the grassroots movements that compelled them and continued to thrive, the anti-drug
agenda gained a strength that it had not previously enjoyed. Many publications argued that the
conventions even created monumental change. The American Review of Reviews argued that “the
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full significance of this admirable step toward a higher social efficiency” could not be
appreciated unless one kept in mind “the corresponding movement on the international scale.”
As of 1915, American Review reported that thirty-four nations had joined the United States in
pursuing drug prohibitions and concluded that “what the United States has done in Cuba, in
Porto [sic] Rico, and the Philippines it is doing in a wider sphere through its moral leadership of
the great movement to save mankind from a degrading vice.” The federal government, once
ambivalent towards the issue, resituated itself to become a moral leader in an international fight
to control the drug supply that purportedly threatened its society.30
Mrs. Vanderbilt’s War, the Harrison Narcotic Act, and the Expanding Prohibition State
Anne Harriman Sands Rutherford Vanderbilt, wife of William Kissam Vanderbilt, heir to
the family fortune, declared her own war on drugs. On January 21, 1914, the press claimed that
Mrs. Vanderbilt believed the New York City Police had been negligent in arresting the drug
problem and so she announced a personal campaign. It was a movement against “the sale and use
of cocaine and heroin.”31 Her battle also brought attention to a new narcotic that had been
overshadowed by morphine, cocaine, and opium—heroin. The Evening World of New York City
exclaimed “Crusade on Drugs Backed by Rich Society Woman” and reported that she was
“furnishing the sinews for a nationwide investigation of the whole subject preparatory to a
campaign for legislative and other action to restrain the evil.”32
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The Washington Post reported on January 22nd that Vanderbilt, in her role “as a leader of
society,” had “began, through her agents, a war on the drug evil.” She launched her campaign by
employing a team of investigators to analyze the problem on the streets of New York City.
Vanderbilt had allegedly been “stirred” by reports “of the promiscuous sale and use of cocaine
and heroin” and concluded this phenomenon had been enabled by the “failure of the police to
enforce the laws or of the courts to inpert [sic] them.” She instructed her lawyer, Ernest K.
Coulter, to “superintend an investigation into the situation” and then to start “a hard-hitting
campaign against the evil, not only in this state, but in all others.”33
Anne Harriman—or “Mrs. W.K. Vanderbilt”—had built a name associated with the
progressive causes of her time. She constructed model tenement housing to inspire better
building projects, helped create the Big Sister’s Movement, and generally worked to eradicate
poverty. Advocates of her work claimed Vanderbilt’s latest effort would be one of her “most
daring campaigns” yet and that she “would carry this drug war through to the end.” A New York
Magistrate told Ernest Coulter “to assure Mrs. William K. Vanderbilt, Sr. that he would
cooperate with her in every way in her campaign against the promiscuous sale and use of
cocaine.”34
Her well-funded operation spurred the police to immediate action. The Chief Magistrate,
now under Vanderbilt’s influence, claimed the laws needed to fight the war would “be wide
reaching and should include heroin as belonging to the habit-forming drugs.” O.F. Lewis, the
general secretary of the Prison Association of New York, offered his support as well, along with
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New York’s new health commissioner. She also had the support of the 40,000 pharmacists who
made up the state’s pharmaceutical association. At their 1914 meeting, Dr. William C. Anderson
introduced a resolution commending Vanderbilt’s effort and added that before anything could be
done to address the growing drug problem, the United States Congress had to pass legislation
“affecting the traffic in all states.” Headlines across the country proclaimed, “Mrs. W.K.
Vanderbilt Starts Crusade against Cocaine and Heroin Sellers.”35
Just days after announcing her “crusade” on the drug “menace,” The Washington Post
reported that her fight against the “indiscriminate sale and use of habit-forming drugs” would be
carried “to Congress, where national legislation to prevent the evil” would be strongly urged.
Ernest Coulter argued that even preliminary reports of the problem in New York City had
convinced him that only national legislation curtailing sale and use would suffice. “Since Mrs.
Vanderbilt started her crusade,” the Post continued, Coulter had received numerous letters from
“judges and municipal and state authorities in other states offering their heavy cooperation.”
From as far as Moscow, Idaho, mayors sent notes bemoaning the spread of drugs in their
communities and urging her to carry on the battle.36
A week after her declaration of war, the New-York Tribune claimed that “a definite
move” had been made on “the drug evil” after Coulter gained the cooperation of local federal
agents who told him their hands were “absolutely tied through a lack of sufficient laws to cover
the evil.” Those agents could only act at the federal level where it was demonstrated that opium
was “to be used for smoking purposes.” That, at the time, constituted the only real restriction on
drug use at the national level—the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act, passed hurriedly to gain
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firmer standing in Shanghai in 1909. The agents claimed national drug laws were tragically
limited and needed “radical amendment.”37
In March of 1914, along with William Kissam Vanderbilt’s first wife, Miss O.H.P.
Belmont, Anne Harriman Vanderbilt extended her drug war to Chicago too. On the Chicago
front, Frederick H. Robinson, president of the sociological fund of a New York medical journal,
led the charge. Robinson announced that the women intended the campaign to last a year and
that it would be entirely funded by Mrs. Vanderbilt and Miss O.H.P Belmont. Back in New York
City, three theaters played a new film called “The Drug Terror,” billed as the “Greatest Motion
Picture Ever Shown.” It claimed to expose the underworld and was shown “in conjunction with
Mrs. W.K. Vanderbilt’s Remarkable National Crusade against the Alarming Cocaine Habit.”38
The film toured the United States, arriving in Rock Island, Illinois, in April 1914. The
local paper claimed “for the first time in the history of the world the public is being given a
chance to see in all its blackness a true picture of the nation’s scourge—the cocaine habit,
through the six-reel photodrama, ‘The Drug Terror.’” The film allegedly showed “in perfect
detail the conditions that caused Mrs. Vanderbilt to start her great campaign for the saving of
drug-entrapped human souls.” The Chicago Tribune suggested that “every local citizen who
loves his county, self, relative, friend, or neighbor should see the thrilling photo drama.”39
Mrs. Vanderbilt’s drug war shone an even brighter light on the problem than the Pure
Food and Drug Act, the First International Opium Conference in Shanghai, the Smoking Opium
Exclusion Act, or the Second International Opium Conference in The Hague. The investigators
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she hired argued that 4.5 percent of the United States—or 4.5 million Americans—were addicted
to drugs compared to only 4.45 percent of the Chinese population addicted to opium. The St.
Louis Star and Times, in bold headline font, informed its readers, “American Drug Fiends
Outnumber Chinese.” It further lauded Mrs. Vanderbilt’s efforts at urging the passage of a
national law that strictly regulated the transportation of cocaine across state lines as a crucial
modern development.40
As Mrs. Vanderbilt’s war expanded to new fronts, the New York State Assembly passed
the Boylan Law, which restricted opium, chloral, morphine, and “other habit-forming drugs.”
The act stated that only small amounts of certain drugs could be prescribed and could not be
refilled unless the doctor approved. Later that year, Mrs. Vanderbilt attended a meeting
discussing the need for a “Farm Colony” in New York to house the addicts that had been
revealed since the passage of the Boylan law.
In response to the publicity and growing public concern generated by Vanderbilt’s war on
drugs, Congress passed the Harrison Narcotic Act in November of 1914. The Harrison Act—
America’s “New Dope Law”—was billed as modern legislation that would “greatly decrease the
use of drugs and tend to lessen crime in the country.” After March 1, 1915, all sales of morphine
and cocaine without a physician’s prescription were considered illegal and punishable by the
law; a law that specifically included opium, cocoa leaves, and all “compound, manufacture, salt,
derivative or preparation made from such drugs.” Included on the list were remedies which
contained more than two grains of opium, one-fourth grain of morphine, one-eighth grain of
heroin, or one grain of codeine.41
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It was not a total prohibition, and physicians continued to prescribe the drugs. They were,
however, ordered to pay a one-dollar per year licensing fee. If they refused, those physicians
were then subject to no more than a $2,000 fine, five years in prison, or both. To hasten
enforcement of the law, Congress immediately made $150,000 available to enforce it through the
Internal Revenue Service. The bill also required that all medical transactions, from the retail
filling of the prescription, to the wholesalers who supplied it, and down to the compounders, had
to be properly documented and reported to the government so that it could keep inventory on the
national supply. The Evening Sun of Baltimore believed that “anyone, no matter how clever”
could not evade the law for very long without facing a federal prison sentence. That reality was
largely due to ways the government worked closely with “reputable” pharmacies who helped “in
seeing that the Harrison Law is not violated.”42
In the meantime, pharmacies adjusted by advertising general compliance with the law. In
Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, Obrien, Apothecary, bought space in the local paper to say that
“The Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act goes into effect March 1st, 1915” and that the law would “be
welcomed by every reputable druggist, but will deal a death blow to the unfit.” In that sense, it
was a more aggressive elaboration of the Pure Food and Drug Act and represented the power an
incrementalistic approach to drug reform. Indeed, few, if any, connected the Harrison Narcotic
Act to the Pure Food and Drug Act that preceded it nearly a decade earlier. Fewer still connected
it with the Smoking Opium Exclusion. In reality, the Harrison bill was a hybrid of the two—a
consumer protection that required pharmacists to register with the government and a prohibition
on non-medicinal opioids and cocaine. Whereas the Pure Food and Drug Act sought merely to
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inform the public and gain a modicum of control over the pharmaceutical market, the Harrison
Act aimed to directly regulate it.43
The federal government made a show of vigorously enforcing the law. In May of 1915,
federal authorities issued sixteen warrants that included 100 people who were charged with
“conspiracy to violate the Harrison anti-narcotic act.” They were issued by an Assistant United
States District Attorney and an Internal Revenue agent. On one night in Chicago, “physicians
and druggists from all sections” of the city “had been arrested” and taken to a regional
commissioner, who had kept his office open late into the night to process bond money. The bail
for doctors stood at $5,000 and for pharmacists it was $2,500. The news spread across the
country and the New York Tribune exclaimed that “Chicago Gets 100 in Drug Crusade.”44
Two weeks later in the same city, police arrested H.L. Eberhard, who managed the drug
department of Siegel, Cooper, and Company. Along with Eberhard, they detained W. Henry
Matthes, employed by the Auditorium Pharmacy, Joseph Trinens, a pharmacist employed at 65
West Monroe Street, and Dr. W.H. Martin of 321 North Clark Street. They were all released
after posting $2,500 bail. At the same time, a judge released Dr. A. Baxter Miller, of 77 East
Washington Street, after his lawyer successfully argued that the illegal prescriptions for drugs
bearing his name had been forged.45
These men were not what most Americans would consider drug dealers. Joseph Trienens,
for example, was the son of German immigrants who made his way from being a clerk in a
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Chicago drugstore to owning it by 1920. He had four kids and, at various points in life, took in
his brother, widowed sister-in-law, niece, and widowed daughter and grandchild. Despite his
1915 encounter with the law, he remained in the drugstore business and retired in the 1930s in a
house worth $16,500 ($250,000 adjusted for inflation) with his wife of many decades, Annie
Bullock. W. Henry Matthes, the other pharmacists arrested in the group, had a similar story. He
was also the son of German immigrants. He married Amanda Blettner in 1899 and they had one
son, Henry A. W. Henry. Like Joseph Trienens, Matthes also worked his way up from an
apprenticeship in a drugstore to owner of one. He retired with his wife in a house worth $16,000
($240,000 adjusted for inflation). They were middle-class professionals and first-generation
Americans who made good on the promise of their adopted country. For a brief moment in
history, however, they were charged as illicit drug dealers under new federal law.
A year after its passage, the United States Department of Revenue claimed that the
Harrison Act had done more than expected. Collector Joseph P. Scott argued that the law had
“decreased the use of drugs by making them scarcer,” a result that required ongoing
collaboration. Agents were not randomly policing pharmacies, he argued. Rather, the bill had
effectively marginalized those who sought to evade the law, rewarded those who followed new
protocols, and created a situation where the industry basically policed itself. When pharmacists
observed one of their colleagues shirking legal responsibilities, the narrative suggested, they
reported him or her to the authorities. Because government intervention had worked, the illicit
supply of opioids had been greatly reduced while also maintaining sufficient amounts for the
medical community to address legitimate needs. The new conditions made the price of the drug
“beyond the means of many a poor drug fiend.” Scott also signaled the government’s intentions
for the future: “the effect of the Harrison Act will be one of gradual extermination. Within a few
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years the price of drugs will be so high and their quantities so small that there will be practically
no drug fiends left.” This was what Taft’s committee intended to do in the Philippines. It failed
there, and, over time, it could be convincingly argued that it failed at home too.46
There were also those who believed it did not go far enough. That sentiment continued to
inspire legislative evolution. At a 1916 meeting, the American Pharmaceutical Association
declared the federal law too weak and vague. They decried a recent Supreme Court ruling where
justices decided that, of those in possession of opium, only subjects actively selling it could be
subject to arrest and conviction. Those deemed mere users of the drug—maintaining addictions
and not seeking profit from an illicit supply—could be in possession of small amounts. Charles
B. Towns, one of the authors of the bill, noted that the “national law should be equally effective”
as state laws in prohibiting possession of drugs “if any actual reform is to be accomplished.”47
In three crucial cases, the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the constitutionality of the
Harrison Narcotic Act, which not only preserved the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act and the
Pure Food and Drug Act, but also paved a legal trail for the continued and incremental growth of
the Prohibition State. In United States v. Doremus, the court ruled that “while Congress may not
exert authority which is wholly reserved to the states, the power conferred by the Constitution to
levy excise taxes, uniform throughout the United States, is to be exercised at the discretion of
Congress.” More important to the continued development of the Prohibition State, the justices
concluded that the fact Congress “may have been impelled by a motive, or may accomplish a
purpose, other than the raising of revenue” could not invalidate laws like Harrison. That
stipulation undercut notions that the government could only intervene in American life in the
interest of raising revenue or in the interest of interstate commerce. According to this reading of
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the constitution, Congress could pass legislation with a moral goal that had little to do with
revenue raising or interstate regulation. Similarly, the Harrison Narcotic Act could not be
considered unconstitutional by the mere fact that such laws might “affect the conduct of a
business which is subject to regulation by the state police power.”48
That ruling had clear ramifications for the prohibition of alcohol. Had the Supreme Court
ruled that Congress had no power to govern in the interest of a motive other than raising revenue,
it would have created a precedent that would have made the Volstead Act—passed the same year
as the Doremus ruling—significantly more challenging. The case involved a physician—
Doremus—who “unlawfully and knowingly” distributed “one-sixth grain tablets of heroin” to
Ameris, a patient, “not in the course of the regular professional practice” of the physician “and
not for treatment of any disease which Ameris was suffering.” Rather, Ameris was a known
heroin addict and popularly understood to be a “dope fiend” and the drugs prescribed him “for
the purpose of gratifying his appetite for the drug as a habitual user thereof.” That verbiage, too,
was significant, as it took a measure of discretion away from the physician when prescribing
medicine. It was thereafter a federal offense to prescribe a patient opioids or cocaine in order to
“maintain” an addiction. Of course, what constituted maintaining an addiction versus relieving
pain also became a discretionary matter and would create controversy within medical circles for
decades to come.49
The next case, Webb v. US, involved a practicing physician at Goldbaum’s pharmacy in
Memphis. He—Webb—became known for prescribing morphine for habitual users of the drug in
order to stabilize their addictions. The court concluded that Webb and Goldbaum, although
wholly cooperative with the registration requirements of the Harrison Narcotic Act, nonetheless
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continued to indiscriminately supply morphine to customers in Memphis with no intention of
breaking their habits. The ruling noted that Goldbaum “purchased from wholesalers thirty times
as much morphine as was bought by the average retail druggist doing a larger general business,
and he sold narcotic drugs in 6,500 instances.” Goldbaum and Webb also wrote and filled
repeated prescriptions under fictitious names for the same patient.50
The rulings represented a stunning validation of the national government’s approach to
drug control. As cocaine spread throughout the medical community alongside morphine in the
latter two decades of the twentieth century, the federal government could do little more than
observe. Twenty-five years later, Congress had essentially seized control of the drug reform
agenda. It placed broad restrictions on the pharmaceutical industry through the Biologics Control
Act and the Pure Food and Drug Act, before pursuing a new opium control foreign policy that
resulted in the nation’s first outright prohibition of a drug. Finally, the Harrison Narcotic Act
nationalized those early state laws aimed at prohibiting the non-medicinal use of morphine and
cocaine. This profound legislative pivot created a new Prohibition State that, even with the
Harrison Narcotic Act, had not yet peaked.
Conclusion
Four months after the Supreme Court ruled the Harrison Act constitutional, a Republican
majority passed the Volstead Act, placing a historic prohibition on alcoholic beverages. It passed
287-100 and was vetoed by President Woodrow Wilson on procedural grounds, but, the House
and Senate quickly overrode his veto. Volstead, like Harrison, then made its way to the Supreme
Court, which ruled on seven alcohol prohibition cases on June 7, 1920 and grouped them into
what is known as the National Prohibition Cases. Relying on legal precedent established in part
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through rulings on recent drug laws, the court ruled that the Volstead Act was constitutional as
was the enormous power granted to the federal government to enforce it.
The legislative and legal foundation of the Prohibition State had been fully established. A
mere twenty years after the true believers in the philosophical wisdom of John Alexander Dowie
raided pharmacies in Chicago, a veritable revolution in drug reform policy had occurred. The
pharmaceutical practices the women loathed had been reformed through state laws, the Pure
Food and Drug Act, and the Harrison Narcotic Act. A new foreign policy centered on the control
of the world’s opium supply allowed the United States to mold a new international drug policy
just as Great Britain once had. The United States declared war on drugs in the opening decade of
the twentieth century and, as of 1919, that conflict had been won, at least legally and politically.
The medical profession would never regain the control it once had over its profession and the
pharmaceutical industry, despite valiant efforts, would fail to free itself of the historic regulations
placed upon it during that period. The issue of access to drugs had been fully publicized and
politicized and it was a trend difficult—if not impossible—to reverse.
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Chapter Five
And Then Came Reefer Madness
In the spring of 1887, in one of the first stories involving “marihuana” to hit the
American press, The Memphis Appeal reported that Jose Molinez, a young resident of the
Mexican state of Zacatecas, died while under the influence of cannabis. After hearing his “girl
had been untrue,” he began smoking “several enormous cigarettes of marihuana” with suicidal
intent. Afterwards, and for reasons that are not clear from the story, Molinez laid down in a pool
where “venomous insects…while he was insensible, destroyed his life.”1 One month earlier,
American newspapers reported about another incident in Zacatecas, in which a corporal in the
Second Cavalry “got drunk on the marihuana,” took out a light artillery rifle and forty cartridges
and fired on his fellow soldiers and their superiors. After he killed three and wounded five
others, “the troops, finding it impossible to capture him, managed to kill him.”2 These two
reports linking cannabis to violence and temporary insanity foreshadowed media coverage that
became commonplace in the early-twentieth century and culminated with the film Reefer
Madness in 1936.3
Time and again during this period, the American public encountered sensational stories
about the menace that cannabis use posed to society. By the 1920s and 1930s, the accumulation
of those stories shaped a new political reality in which anti-cannabis legislation seemed urgent
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and long overdue. How did these alarmist narratives, entirely detached from the science framing
cannabis as a relatively benign substance too weak for medical use, become so prominent in the
early-twentieth century? This work suggests that the public alarm about marijuana use, which
manifested in the “Reefer Madness” narrative, resulted from a complex set of factors, including
longstanding social anxiety about an evil side to human nature, fears that marijuana use
unleashed that darker aspect of human behavior, concerns about the spread of drugs due to an
opioid crisis that still challenged the medical community, and social prejudice against Mexicans.
By the time the “Reefer Madness” narrative gained prominence in the media, the public
had already been exposed to a morphine crisis, the spread of cocaine, and the rise of heroin use
on the streets of the United States. In response to this larger narcotic crisis, one centered
primarily on opioids, the American public abandoned any sense of tolerance towards drug use.
At the peak of this intolerance, marijuana, the Mexican name for cannabis, began entering the
country from the Southwest and was immediately associated with Mexican immigrants.
Consequently, this “loco-weed,” a raw and less powerful form of cannabis than what Americans
found in medicinal tinctures sold in pharmacies, received a disproportionately intense response.
A far more pronounced sensationalism distinguished coverage of marijuana from that of
morphine, cocaine, and heroin. In the late-nineteenth century, it was difficult to deny that
middle-class women, for example, were addicted to intravenous morphine use. While the press
may have overcovered those incidences, fundamental truths guided reporting. That was not
always the case in stories of alleged marijuana addiction. The idea that cannabis caused short
term hallucinations had existed for centuries, but there was no evidence that those delusions led
to rape, murder, and an inexplicable desire to upend civilized society. The media nonetheless
began to report those theories as fact. It became a “loco-weed”—a portal to instant madness.
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Indeed, the stories also seemed to draw on the Gothic fiction of the Romantic era, featuring
novels like Frankenstein and The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, and blurred the lines
between fiction and reality. Ultimately, the coverage of marijuana during this period sought to
sway audiences by appealing to long held anxieties and emotions regarding substance abuse. A
clear recitation of the facts regarding the substance and its impact became a very secondary goal.
The literature on Reefer Madness in the United States is often as sensationalistic as the
stories that propelled the phenomenon itself. Popular explanations harbor a distinct conspiratorial
tone. The marijuana hysteria, journalists have suggested, came as the result of a corporate coup
of public policy or were due to the delusions of a single man—Bureau of Narcotics Chief Harry
Anslinger—who forced the nation into marijuana prohibition. Moreover, these popular accounts
have gained credibility and acceptance in the absence of sustained scholarly analysis of the
subject.4
The historical literature on “Reefer Madness” in the United States is underdeveloped.
With the exception of Isaac Campos Homegrown: Marijuana and the Origins of Mexico’s War
on Drugs, there is little scholarly focus on the cannabis-related hysteria that swept the United
States in the early-to-mid nineteenth century. Campos locates the origins of cannabis anxiety in
the Mexican press of the early-twentieth century and argues that the sensationalist coverage
migrated northwards and ultimately influenced American perceptions of the drug. Campos work
complicates and complements an established narrative that the twentieth century response to
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marijuana was entirely rooted in a xenophobic reaction to Mexican immigration to the United
States in the 1910s.5
While this work does not challenge the claim that anxiety over Mexican immigration
fueled Reefer Madness in the United States, it nonetheless seeks to put the topic in deeper
historical context. For example, Eastern physicians claimed the recreational use of cannabis
caused insanity as early as the fifteenth century. In England, cases of temporary insanity due to
alcoholic intoxication proliferated in the early-to-mid nineteenth century just as “hasheesh”
confessionals portrayed cannabis as an agent that produced a profound loss of senses. These
examples then intersected with a style of literature that increasingly focused on the possibility of
losing one’s mind and inadvertently unleashing a darker side of humanity on the general public.
Then, in the late-nineteenth century, British officials argued that recreational cannabis use
amongst Indian laborers led to an unprecedented number of mental patients in Indian asylums.
This work concludes that the narratives responsible for Reefer Madness in the United
States were the result of a global collaboration. It suggests that in early-twentieth century
America, those storylines collided with a sensationalist press, an already established drug
epidemic, and a wave of Mexican immigration, and attained new power. Although it relied
heavily on centuries old theories about intoxication, madness, and the capacity for evil all
humans were assumed to have, the marijuana madness of the mid-twentieth century reinforced
public support for a vigorous Prohibition State, which proved especially important in the
aftermath of the end of alcohol prohibition.
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Pre-Victorian Alcoholic Violence, Hasheesh Visions, and Cannabis Induced Colonial
Insanity
In 1787, The Times of London offered a meditation on excess and sin. “Vice is decked in
all the gaudy apparel of fine taste,” it opined, pointing out that “here”—in the metropolis, where
vice commonly dressed up as sophistication—there were “numbers of unhappy prostitutes.” In
their “reflecting moments,” the women sincerely regretted that loss of virtue they could never
regain. They were unable to maintain any consistent devotion to improvement, however. As the
Times put it, they were “incapable of bearing the force of their sober reflection” and thus sought
to drown the unpleasantness of that clarity by indulging in “every species of excess.” When their
spells of “temporary insanity” ended, “terrible [were] the thoughts these unfortunate beings
experience.” It was a classic tale central to Christian ideology and it spoke to the travails of
overcoming the human condition, which was often guided by original sin. The narrative served
as an early rendition of the plot to Jekyll and Hyde where “sober reflection”—Dr. Jekyll—
appeared as a form difficult to maintain; one that gradually gave way to that monster Hyde, or a
plunge into “every species of excess.”6
In a pre-Victorian society, in which the spiritual and material world seamlessly
interacted, great importance was placed on mental stability, temperance, and a sense of diligence
in performing good works. Social critics, clergy, and the legal system consistently presented the
mind as a fragile and unpredictable agent capable of producing all varieties of social evil. These
notions characterized public thought in the western world as it transitioned from the eighteenth to
nineteenth centuries. In the United States, for example, the Salem Witch Trials, which had
occurred less than a century before, still weighed on the minds of early American commentators.
They grappled with its legacy and attempted to learn from it. What did it signify? To them, it
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pointed to that deathless societal instinct to privilege folkloric impressions of the world and
express them in a kind of mass delusion which often led to grave consequences.
After outlining the array of horrific executions following those famous trials, a writer for
The Rural Magazine; or Vermont Repository, argued in 1795 that “such was the credulity,
delusion, and infatuation of those times that in the year 1690 a scene opened up and plunged the
whole province into horror and bloodshed.” To the author of the piece, who went simply by the
letter H., it was an example of the unbelievable horror that could come from a false mental
formation allowed to take hold of the community. The whole scene, to this writer, was a classic
moral panic with devastating consequences. “The business of witchcraft was begun at Salem,” H.
continued, and then it proliferated until “the most intimate friends, children and parents, wives
and husbands, became accusers and witnesses against each other.” Even worse, “the magistrates,
courts, clergy, and people, were carried away with infatuation: delusion, iniquity, and revenge”
That fixation then “carried the accusers to the prisons, and the prisoners to the gallows.”7
H. and The Rural Magazine were one of several publications in the late-eighteenth and
early-nineteenth centuries still processing the social lessons of that event. Embedded in those
startling moments seemed to be a moral about maintaining mental stability and the importance of
isolating and marginalizing irrational or delusional thoughts before they could take hold. H.
noted that “when their reason returned, they were astonished at their former madness and
outrage” and even the “courts and clergy had no more wisdom than themselves.” H’s writing
mirrored The Times’ analysis of unhappy prostitutes, who fell into the comfort of sin; a sin that,
after passing, gave way to tremendous guilt and bewilderment. It was, it seemed, an inherent part
of what it meant to be a human; to err—oftentimes violently and reprehensibly—before taking
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up the work of making amends and setting it right. H. finally arrived at a startling conclusion: the
Salem Witch Trials and its lessons had still not been “eradicated from the minds of the gloomy,
fearful, and ignorant.” In the year 1748, in Wurzburg, Germany, an elderly lady had been
convicted of witchcraft and burned at the stake. A similar event, which H. did not elaborate
upon, had also occurred in the United States.8
In an age allegedly reborn with notions of enlightened liberty, with a successfully
separated church and state, another primal force seemed to linger beneath the surface and it
reminded all that the human condition did not change so suddenly. Illustrating that tendency in
1797, The Methodist Magazine reported “an extraordinary circumstance” which it claimed could
be depended on as “an absolute fact.” It involved a twenty-year-old Scottish girl who had a
dream about a local woman the town considered to be a witch. She dreamt the witch had put a
spell on her and the next day she began to suffer from inexplicable convulsions that plagued her
for weeks. The story was to be continued, but it never was.9
In Germany, Scotland, England, and the United States, occasional stories of witchcraft
illustrated the staying power of widescale social fantasy. To many writers, that was certainly the
case with those who failed to learn the lessons of the Salem Witch Trials. They were deemed
stubborn, delusional, and dangerously superstitious. The idea of resisting that line of thinking
became more of an imperative and critics felt it required the development of a mind devoted to
suppressing the hidden and animalistic aspects of human nature. An American magazine—The
Portfolio—argued in the summer of 1810 that “there is no property of human nature that excites
risibility on fairer terms than our total blindness to those follies and vices which form the dark
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shades of our character.” That darkness of personality threatened to “diminish and oftentimes
ruin the value of our good qualities” while exciting the “pity of our friends and the ridicule and
contempt of our enemies.”10
It was a pre-psychiatric age; or, perhaps better put: a full generation before a prepsychiatric age. Whether it came in the form of the Salem Witch Trials, the deathless idea that
individuals could be possessed by the devil and required exorcism, or even that it was possible to
transform into werewolves, folk beliefs about the nature of sanity and identity dominated from
medieval times well into the twentieth-century.11
It counterbalanced any sense of unfettered social progress. Even in industrializing and
urbanizing New York City in 1897—a full century after these reconsiderations of witch trials—
those ideas could still emerge. That year, James Rubinstein, a resident of the city, considered
himself to be a werewolf and took to walking “on all fours” while barking and howling at the
moon. He was eventually reported and taken to Belleville Hospital for treatment. The newspaper
considered it a delusion and explained to its readers that “a werewolf was in legendary lore
supposed to be a human who, having given some offense to some supernatural being, was
metamorphosed by the latter into the shape of a wolf.” The person retained “their soul” and its
“human attributes, passions, hopes and desires,” but in physical form, they existed as a beast. It
also argued that “in the middle ages the belief in the existence of werewolves was general” and
that “seemingly well attested instances were cited, and in some parts of Germany that belief
[had] come down to this day.”12
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In the early-nineteenth century, the critiques of “delusions” and a call for greater mental
self-control easily commingled with a nascent movement for alcohol temperance. It is difficult to
accurately reconstruct the extent of alcohol related violence and crime in pre-Victorian society,
but the news coverage suggests it was a significant problem. In an 1811 story resembling the
Drunken Corporal of Zacatecas, a Scottish man, “formerly in the army,” attempted to kill his
wife and, after failing, “put to death one of his children, a fine boy of four years of age, by
repeated wounds in the head and body.” He was arrested and after consulting his lawyer claimed
“he was at the time in a state of intoxication, which, in his case, always [created] a temporary
insanity.” The notion of temporary madness, thereafter, gained social acceptability and while it
had been defined legally, the basic storyline remained relatively consistent with Christian notions
of momentarily straying from God’s will only to return with a deep sense of remorse and
shame.13
Tales of alcoholic violence dominated British news in the early-nineteenth century just
like drugs and madness would the American press of the early-twentieth. In Truro, England, in
1815, John Sims, a soldier, killed a police officer who tried to disarm him during a fight. The
victim, Burnett, according to the judge’s record, was, “in the capacity of a Peace Officer” using
his “utmost endeavours [sic]” to prevent Sims from “committing that mischief” which he,
through his “intoxication and temporary insanity at that time was capable of doing.” The judge
regretted that Sims seemed wholly unprepared to deal with the consequences of his crime, but
the “circumstances of [his] intoxication” was no “extenuation” of his guilt. The judge felt it was
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his duty, which he considered painful, to deliver the sentence Sims himself had “drawn down
upon [his] own head.” Sims was then encouraged by the judge to make peace with a God that he
had so “grievously offended.”14
The notion of temporary insanity became an explanatory tool most used in incidences of
suicide where there was a short trial (as suicide was considered a crime) and the only victim was
the person who had been indicted. In the summer of 1817, Captain George Washington
Hutchins, had recently “thrown himself overboard from the sloop Friendship.” After questioning
all those onboard the ship the court, “it satisfactorily appeared” to the court and jury “that the
death of Captain H. was solely owning to temporary insanity.” In other words, these
investigations were pursued to ensure it was merely an outbreak of inexplicable madness and
not, for example, a homicide, accidental poisoning, or a reasoned decision to take one’s life.
Average and seemingly well-adjusted citizens did not, after all, throw themselves off ships to
their own deaths. It was, to them, common sense to label it an outburst of madness and in a
judicial environment based on intuition and instinct, temporary insanity became a broad and
elastic term.15
That was evident on a Saturday night in March of 1825, when the Honorable J.H.
Stanhope, of Waterford, Ireland, was found hanging from the rafters in an outbuilding used for
cattle on the property of the Earl of Mansfield in Northern England. A Coroner’s jury was
immediately summoned and they met at Fox-under-the-Hill Public House in Highgate at ten
o’clock Monday morning. J. Wheeler, Stanhope’s aide, reported that he had last seen the Colonel
at four o’clock that Saturday and, when he did not appear for dinner at seven, he went searching
for Stanhope. As the family ate dinner without him, many suspected he had gone back to town in
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order to address paperwork associated with a house he had purchased that day. Lord Mansfield
ordered carriages to check the town for his whereabouts and when they returned without leads,
the mansion at Caen Wood began to panic. A search party formed and eventually found him “not
quite cold,” but lifeless.
Stanhope, a war veteran and a Member of Parliament for Dartmouth, had hanged himself.
After gathering all information, the Coroner’s office determined that he suffered from a
momentary insanity caused by the lingering pain of an old war injury. While fighting the French
in the Basque Region in 1813, he had been shot through the shoulder during the Siege of St.
Sebastian. The wound had never properly healed and, years later, excruciating pain suddenly
seized his body. In the weeks before his suicide, he began to lose sleep because of the pain and
often sat motionlessly throughout the day for hours. The Coroner thus concluded that “the pain
and nervous irritation, created by the wound, acted upon by mental causes” most likely induced
temporary insanity. His wife, the eldest daughter of Lord Mansfield, had also died two years
earlier and that, friends observed, was when the pain from his war wound began to significantly
flare. He was thirty-nine years old when he died and even though his death was most likely due
to mental illness brought on by heredity, grief, or pain, it was ultimately attributed to temporary
madness.
These varied tragedies, likely caused by depression, personality disorders, post-traumatic
stress, and chemical dependencies, were neatly arranged under the idea that individuals were
prone to a short-lived and difficult to explain form of madness that often led to violence—visited
on oneself, family, or strangers. Whether or not the person demonstrated signs of actual mental
illness was not determined by a doctor, but rather by untrained judges and juries. Their
willingness to determine that “temporary insanity” played a part in the crimes depended largely
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on social standing of the perpetrator, the severity of the crime, and whether or not it was a case
of suicide. In the case of suicide, juries nearly always and unanimously declared it a situation of
temporary madness.16
While the practice was widely accepted in British and American courtrooms, it was not
completely without critique. In 1830, London’s The Examiner questioned the court’s leniency on
the topic. “Nothing can be stupider than this common indulgence for intoxication,” it began
before asking “what consolation is to an individual that his head has been broken, or ears of his
wife or sister polluted by the obscene [sic] ribaldry of a ruffian in a state of frenzy from
drunkenness?” The paper continued by declaring that “the excuses allowed for inebriety” were
“encouragements to inebriety.” It concluded that if the drunken individual “choses [sic] to part
with his reason, he should be made answerable for all the consequences of his temporary
insanity.” Even with this critique, the notion that an intoxicated person driven to violence was
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momentarily insane was not questioned. The counterpoint centered on the question of who was
responsible for his madness. Was it society, the alcohol, or the man or woman themselves? The
notion that they were transformed—like a witch or a werewolf—into a social aberration was
accepted as a given.17
The Dublin Penny Journal told the story of a once prosperous lawyer who was known to
dress well and exhibit good character. Until he became an alcoholic, that is. Thereafter, he
gradually transformed into a different being. He went from a stylish middle-class professional to
a person who wore clothes “besmeared with mud, from his rolling in the streets, or torn to
ribbons in his furious fits.” The young boys of the town—for their own amusement—often
followed him and “provoked a feeble and unavailing retaliation” while “females fled his
approach, for his besotted faculties were void of even the slightest sense of decencies required by
civilized life.” Often, locals lifted him up, “bruised and bleeding from the floor of the shop or the
pavement of the street” after he had fallen “from excess of drunkenness.” Eventually, he died,
“half-mad, half drunk.” It was, again, the transmutation of a functioning citizen into a social
menace; one who attempted assaults on local children who tormented him for his appearance; a
sad case who had to be lifted off the floor of the taverns and streets he often collapsed in.18
The prevailing understanding was that intoxicants transformed personalities and
facilitated those dreaded detours into the dark enclaves of the unchristian mind (where original
sin ruled). This distrust of intoxication, however, was not necessarily unique to Britain, the
United States, or even to alcohol. In Irish physician William O’Shaughnessy’s celebrated piece,
“On the Preparation of Indian Hemp, or Gunjah,” first published in 1843, he noted a similar
eastern distrust of cannabis that had centuries of precedent. In O’Shaughnessy’s work, he
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extensively quoted Egyptian historian Al-Maqrizi, who wrote at the turn-of-the-fifteenth-century
that cannabis caused “general corruption of sentiments and manners” and argued that “every
base and evil passion was openly indulged in” after even mild consumption.19
Al-Maqrizi also described the contrary effects of the substance, writing that, at first, it
exhilarated “the spirits, [caused] cheerfulness, [gave] color to the complexion, [brought]
intoxication, [excited] the imagination into the most rapturous ideas, [produced] thirst,
[increased] appetite, [excited] concupiscence.” After these emotional and physical highs,
however, consequences emerged just as they did in alcohol intoxication. “The spirits [sank], the
vision darkens and [weakened]; and madness, melancholy, fearfulness, dropsy, and such like
distempers, [were] the sequel—and the seminal secretions [dried] up.” He further argued that
continued use led to “weakness of the digestive organs,” “flatulence, indigestion, swelling of the
limbs and face, change of complexion, diminution of sexual vigor, loss of teeth, heaviness,
cowardice, depraved and wicked ideas; skepticism in religious tenets, licentiousness, and
ungodliness." In short, Middle Eastern views of cannabis from the eleventh through the fifteenth
centuries resembled conclusions drawn about the overconsumption of alcohol in early-nineteenth
century London.20
In the 1820s, Thomas De Quincey’s essays on drug abuse—later compiled into the wildly
popular novella Confessions of an Opium Eater—popularized the notion that drug use inspired
the birth of a darker side of the personality. In one of the first reviews of the work—in The
Freeman’s Journal of Dublin, Ireland—the paper claimed “of the incidents in this narrative, we
cannot pretend to offer any abstract; they detail the circumstance under which a sufferer was
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induced to seek relief and afterwards enjoyment from opium.” It then reiterated a theme that
surrounded issues of substance abuse and noted that “a terrible retaliation followed. Opium
possessed him like an evil spirit, and it made the night the time of its most exquisite
inflictions.”21
Opium, like alcohol, led to a form of insanity that overthrew De Quincey’s rational and
scholarly mind. It struck at night and took control of the body and mind like the devil often did.
Similar to those who alleged that witches lived amongst them, De Quincey had nightmares that
haunted “him with horrors, of which no language but his own [could] give an adequate idea.” De
Quincey, in a nod to St. Augustine’s Confessions, outlined the damage opium did to his life,
mind, and body and, in doing so, created a new genre of literature: the drug confessional. After a
resurgence in the mid-nineteenth-century, this style of confessing to one’s misdeeds—in this
case pursued in a form of intoxicated insanity—became a significant subgenre in American
literature. In the stories, hashish, opium, chloral, alcohol, and even sometimes tea and coffee,
served as a kind of supernatural agent—an avatar for the devil—that derailed the user. In the
confessional, however, the writer (like St. Augustine) survived the delusions and then detailed
them after having been restored to good health and rationality. Like the lyrics to “Amazing
Grace,” written a few decades earlier in 1779, the writers were grateful that “a wretch” like them
who had “once been lost” finally was found. In the beginning of the confessional they were blind
and by the end they could see again.22
Twenty-years later, Jacques Joseph Moreau and his Les Club des Hachichins ingested
cannabis and documented their reactions in emulation of De Quincey. These experiments led to
the 1845 publication of Moreau’s most significant work Hashish and Mental Alienation, which
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cast cannabis as an “agent provocateur” capable of inciting activity in the brain that resembled
mental illness. By doing this, he theorized, a sane person could manually trigger the mind into a
form of temporary insanity that could then shed light on the causes of mental illness and
potentially lead to better treatments.
In American writer Bayard Taylor’s “The Vision of Hasheesh,” the author wrote that “the
sense of limitation—the confinement of our senses within the bounds of our own flesh and
blood—instantly fell away.” He then noted it was “difficult to describe this sensation, or the
rapidity with which it mastered me.” In his state of “mental exaltation,” which he had been
“plunged into,” “all sensations, as they rose, suggested more or less coherent messages.” His
brain, however, showed them in “double form—one physical, and therefore to a certain extent
tangible; the other spiritual and revealing itself in a succession of splendid metaphors.” It walked
that thin line the genre had drawn between romanticizing the use of the drug, confessing the sin,
and outlining the horrific highs and lows it inspired. Even though Taylor did not lose total
control, he still entered a realm where it was clear to him the substance would “master” him if he
continued to use it. In Fitzhugh Ludlow’s The Hasheesh Eater, he acknowledged becoming a
“slave of the hasheesh” and “by the aid of this wizard of plants” he “fabricated” a “palace of
alternating pleasure and torture.”23
The most famous portrayal of mental and bodily transformation—The Strange Case of
Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde written by Robert Louis Stevenson—was published in January of 1886,
sixteen years after Ludlow’s untimely death. It also arrived one year before American papers
began printing the marijuana related madness in Mexico and it famously captured the horror of
transmutation in the life of an everyday character: Dr. Henry Jekyll. The classic novel centers on
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Jekyll’s ingestion of a substance he created to unleash that darker and less restrained element of
his personality. Mr. Hyde is introduced as the bodily manifestation of that dark spirit all assumed
lived within them. Moreover, it was a pharmaceutical product that brought him out. In the first
description of Hyde, the observer claims “there is something wrong with his appearance;
something displeasing, something down-right detestable. I never saw a man I so disliked, and yet
I scarce know why.” Mr. Hyde gave a “strong feeling of deformity” and was an “extraordinary
looking man.” Dr. Jekyll’s transformation into Mr. Hyde revealed to the world in human form
what lurked in the imagination of a handsome and respected doctor. A friend who knew Jekyll
throughout his life claimed that Mr. Hyde “seems hardly human! Something troglodytic” and
that he was “the mere radiance of a foul soul that thus transpires through, and transfigures, its
clay continent.” He told his friend “O my poor old Harry Jekyll, if I ever read Satan’s signature
upon a face, it is on that of your new friend.”24
In the last chapter entitled “Henry Jekyll’s Full Statement of the Case,” the doctor
confessed, “hence it came about that I concealed my pleasures; and that when I reached the years
of reflection, and began to look round me and take stock of my progress and position in the
world, I stood already committed to a profound duplicity of life.” He thus set about to sever
“those provinces of good and ill which divide and compound man’s dual nature.” Here, then, is a
return of that timeless concern about the double nature of humanity and the ongoing struggle to
suppress that side in possession of humankind’s original sin. In Stevenson’s last chapter, Jekyll
takes on the role of St. Augustine, Thomas De Quincey, Bayard Taylor, and Fitzhugh Ludlow.
“Though so profound a double-dealer,” Jekyll continues, “I was in no sense a hypocrite; both
side of me were in dead earnest; I was no more myself when I laid aside restraint and plunged in
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shame, than when I laboured [sic] in the eye of day, at the furtherance of knowledge or the relief
of sorrow and suffering.” The doctor engaged in a “perennial war” against himself, fought by the
“moral and intellectual” side which “drew steadily nearer to that truth” which was “that man is
not truly one, but truly two.”25
Stevenson wrote Jekyll’s confession during the onset of America’s first opioid epidemic
and in the aftermath of the popularity of the hashish confessional. The influence of those social
and literary trends was evident as he continues the narrative. Jekyll writes, “For any drug that so
potently controlled and shook the very fortress of identity, might, by the least scruple of an
overdose or at least inopportunity in the moment of exhibition, utterly blot out that immaterial
tabernacle which I looked to it to change.” That “immaterial tabernacle” of social custom and a
deep devotion to the ascendant manners of the Victorian period could be, Jekyll realizes,
overthrown by ingesting a narcotic. “I had long since prepared my tincture,” he writes and—like
an opium addict—“purchased at once, from a firm of wholesale chemists, a large quantity of a
particular salt which I knew, from my experiments, to be the last ingredient required.”26
This drug, possessed with the power of giving birth to Mr. Hyde, worked just as opium
did for De Quincey and hashish for Ludlow; it mirrored Arabic writers’ descriptions of how
initial cannabis use caused great joy in those hours and days before the full consequences
arrived. His “agonies began swiftly to subside” and he came to himself “as if out of a great
sickness.” There was “something strange” in his sensation—“something indescribably new and,
from its very novelty, indescribably sweet.” He felt “younger, lighter, happier in body” and then
a “current of disordered sensual images” ran like “a millrace” in his “fancy.” He no longer felt
the burden of responsibility. He also knew himself “at the first breath of this new life, to be more
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wicked, tenfold more wicked, sold a slave to [his] original evil.” Dr. Jekyll had taken a drug that
almost immediately shed off those manners he had learned through the civilizing process and
returned to a state of original sin. In the Victorian Era, an immediate return to what Jekyll
described as the “original evil” was a horrific idea.27
Jekyll then compares himself to an alcoholic. “I do not suppose that, when a drunkard
reasons with himself upon his vice, he is once out of five hundred times affected by the dangers
that he runs through his brutish, physical insensibility.” Neither had he. His “devil had long been
caged” and it “came out roaring.” Ultimately, however, Jekyll was no longer able to control
Hyde. It was like an addiction and Jekyll became “a creature eaten up and emptied by fever,
languidly weak both in body and mind, and solely occupied by one thought: the horror of my
other self.” It got worse as Hyde resisted Jekyll’s attempt to get rid of him. Hyde’s “terror of the
gallows drove him continually to commit temporary suicide.” Hyde loathed how far Jekyll had
fallen and resented the “dislike with which he was himself regarded.” He then completely took
over through “ape-like tricks” and scrawled “in my own hand blasphemies on the pages of my
books” after burning portraits of Jekyll’s father. Hyde was nihilistic and would have long ago
“ruined himself in order to involve me in the ruin.” In a moment in which Dr. Jekyll had clarity
enough to express his own thoughts, he wrote the confession that ended with the realization that
he would have to “bring the life of that unhappy Henry Jekyll to an end.”28
The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde captured the feelings of an era in which
anxiety over the social control of public spaces peaked. Two years after the publication of the
book, in fact, Jack the Ripper, notorious British serial killer, took his first victim. Literary critic
Jenny Davison writes that actor Richard Mansfield, who played Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde in a
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travelling opera, was momentarily accused of the crimes by a journalist suspicious of how
thoroughly he could transform into the character for the stage. The play, by all accounts, utterly
terrified audiences who—at least in London—walked home from seeing it in a new reality that
included Jack the Ripper. “Just as Mansfield’s performance blurred the boundaries between
theater and real life, so too, did Stevenson’s tale seem paradoxically to invent the figure of the
modern serial killer.” The serial killer also lived a double life; a respectable citizen and
oftentimes loving parent and spouse by day and social pariah by night; maneuvering tactfully
through the dark spaces of the city to indulge in unspeakable desires very much like a junkie.29
Robert Louis Stevenson’s book, which elaborated on the opium and hashish
confessionals, combined with concerns over insanity and the dual nature of men and women to
exacerbate a well-established fear of duplicity in the public sphere. Hyde, like witches,
werewolves, Thomas De Quincey, Fitzhugh Ludlow, and Jack the Ripper, transformed—
typically at night—into a monster. It was no surprise, in the late-nineteenth century, that the
substance that transformed Jekyll into Hyde came from a pharmacy. More, that substance did not
turn Jekyll into an entirely different person, but simply allowed another other aspect of his
personality—darker and less responsive to custom—to reign over this body.
In literary communities, in art, medicine, psychiatry, and law, Americans and Europeans
probed the issue of insanity, its social implications and threats, how it emerged in the mind, and
its legal viability in criminal cases. They did so with alcohol, opium, morphine, cocaine, and, by
the 1880s and 1890s, cannabis. In London, for example, attention turned to the empire’s Indian
colony and to reports that asylums were filling there with men driven insane by hashish use. In
September of 1893, T.W. McDowall published “Insanity from the Abuse of Indian Hemp” in the
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British Medical Journal recounting a recent lecture given by Dr. Thomas Ireland who argued
that “the excessive use of Indian hemp, or cannabis indica, has long been recognized in Eastern
countries as one of the most common vices, and as a very prolific cause of insanity.”30
He further noted that use seemed to depend solely on gender and religion as almost all
users were male and Hindu. In the question-and-answer period following the talk, Dr. Murray
Lindsay was “greatly impressed” by the fact that nearly all cannabis users were male “because it
was well known that in the United Kingdom the alcohol and opium habits were by no means
confined to one sex.” Mr. Peele Richards asked if any legislative action had been pursued to
arrest the problem and Dr. Tuke asked if the common problem of “running amok” amongst the
Malay population could be attributed to the use of cannabis. Dr. Ireland responded that women
did not smoke cannabis primarily because they did not have an opportunity to do so through lack
of exposure, that “stringent legislation” been introduced in Trinidad “with the purpose of
preventing the Coolies getting Indian hemp” and that, yes, the “persons who made homicidal
attacks on others (running amok) were at the time under the influence of Indian hemp.”31
This debate over “stringent legislation” passed in order to prevent working class Indians
from possessing cannabis, which caused homicidal insanity, illustrates the global roots of Reefer
Madness. A month later, the British Medical Journal published an article refuting the madness
cannabis allegedly inspired. Dr. Thomas Ireland pushed back and lamented the fact that the
writer—an interlocutor who referred to himself as Pyramid—had attempted “to throw doubt on
the statement that the excessive use of Indian hemp is a potent cause of insanity.” Pyramid
argued that cannabis use in Egypt was “almost universal” and, yet, there was “no country in the
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world where lunacy [was] so rare.” Pyramid admitted that he came to this conclusion after
travelling broadly and observing that the “number of idiots was surprisingly small.” Ireland
thought Pyramid’s methodology was “much too loose” and that, even by Pyramid’s own
admission, “other persons also acquainted with Egypt [did] not hold his opinion that the use of
haschisch [sic] is a salutary practice.” Ireland also referred a paper that had recently been
published in Zeitschrift fur Psychiatric in which a professor from Berlin found that one-third of
the asylum admissions (120 out of 367) were due to the influence of cannabis. Only 13 were due
to the abuse of alcohol.32
Even though Egypt passed anti-cannabis laws that created a situation in which “its sale
[was] menaced with imprisonment and even its indulgence with a fine,” several shops in Cairo
still openly sold it and it was widely consumed. As Ireland wrote the retort, the British
government planned a special Commission of “experienced officials” who would be
“empowered to inquire into the effects of the use of cannabis upon the people of India.” He
believed they would find that a person addicted to cannabis—in the form of local churrus or
bhang was “the analogue of a drunken sot” in English culture. It was also “undoubtedly the
cause of much noisy behavior and rioting in the bazaars.” Pyramid claimed that the insanity
attributed to Indian hemp had actually been there before the smoking of cannabis and was thus
being covered by it. Ireland found Pyramid’s theory to be the work of an individual suffering
from “a very great ignorance on the subject” and concluded “whenever a man takes to overindulgence in cannabis there is good reason for questioning his sanity.”33
Three days before Ireland’s letter-to-the-editor, The Pall Mall Gazette argued that “the
subject haschisch, or bhang [had] been a good deal before the public” and that every writer on
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the topic seemed to take it for granted that “the use, or abuse, of the drug—for in this case the
terms are apparently synonymous” was “invariably attended by the most frightful
consequences.” No one seemed to be willing to take up the opposite argument and, as a result,
defendants were “condemned in absentia without benefit of counsel” and judges were
uninterested in mitigating any aspect of the following punishment. The paper noted that “in spite
of what teetotalers may affirm to the contrary” it was nonetheless an “undeniable fact” that “all
nations of the earth, whether civilized or uncivilized, [were] in the habit of employing stimulants
in one fashion or another.” The paper opined that no legislation would be effective in prohibiting
a population into abstemiousness and that if one drug happened to be removed from the market,
people simply turned into another—and likely more dangerous—one.34
These debates in England highlighted the extent to which Reefer Madness was not a
uniquely American nor Mexican phenomenon. Indeed, had the British government not
intervened to study the issue and quell growing concerns that India’s laboring class had become
prone to fits of homicidal insanity, it is very likely that the phenomenon of marijuana hysteria
would have taken root in London and Calcutta much earlier than it did in the United States. It is
also clear from William O’Shaughnessy’s experiments with cannabis in the 1840s that Indian
doctors themselves believed that recreational cannabis use among the laboring class had the
potential to cause sudden insanity. O’Shaughnessy’s research, in fact, suggests that idea had been
prominent in eastern medicine since the fifteenth century.
The momentary outbreak of Reefer Madness in London in the 1890s influenced a similar
trend in the United States. A Buffalo, New York paper published an article entitled “Hasheesh
JimJam’s” on November 29, 1896 with the byline “Insane Asylums in Cairo are filled with its
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Victims.” It argued that in 1896, 253 “lunatics” had been admitted and that it was an “undeniable
fact that the habit was growing in Egypt.” The article categorized various forms of cannabis
related insanity. First, there was “hasheesh intoxication,” which manifested as “an elated reckless
state, in which optical hallucinations and delusions that devils possess the subject frequently
exist.” Another form emerged as “acute mania” induced by cannabis use, which caused “fear of
neighbors, outrageous conduct, continuous restlessness and talking and most insane ideas.” That
particular condition had the ability to persist for months while a mere “hashish intoxication”
passed within hours. Thirdly, hashish produced “weak-mindedness, with fresh outbreak of
mania.” The symptoms included “victims being lazy, unconcerned about the future, and having
no interest in anything but food and cigarettes.”35
During these lengthy discussions on the dangers of hashish use in the late-nineteenthcentury west, the British government created the Indian Hemp Drug Commission to further
probe the issues. It concluded that moderate cannabis use caused no discernable effects, physical,
mental, or moral. Excessive use damaged the body and frequently led to dysentery or bronchitis.
It argued that the drug did tend to weaken the mind and could, at times, produce a distinct form
of insanity, but it led mostly to “mental depravity and poverty, but rarely crime.” Importantly, it
concluded, “the injury caused by excessive use is confined almost exclusively to the consumer,
and scarcely affects society.” The Democrat and Chronicle pointed out that the report had been
made by a government which “derives a part of its revenues from a tax on hasheesh and
opium.”36
The new focus on hashish, insanity, and how it intersected with colonial policy had roots
in the phenomenon of “running amok,” or losing one’s senses because of intoxication of one
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kind or another and then perpetrating violence on the community. The term had a long history. In
1801, The Observer of London reported that two slaves had been executed in the British colony
of St. Helena for murdering two men and wounding several others “in the frantic and diabolic
practice of running a muck.” These “infatuated wretches,” it continued, “impressed with revenge
for real or supposed injuries, by the use of strong liquors work the passions to a state of frenzy.”
Often armed with a “crease or dagger,” they frequently ran through high population areas
“stabbing indiscriminately” at everyone they met. The Vermont Journal printed a story in 1821
recounting the travails of a slave and his master in Havana, Cuba. The “driver” of a person of
“considerable note” had been chastised by “his master for improper conduct” and as he
“reflected upon his disgrace, he grew desperate.” He then grabbed a sword and attacked
everyone he met, killing three, and wounding three others. After being captured, the man said
that his only regret was that “he did not murder fifty” and that he was prepared to meet his fate.
The title of the story was simply “Running A Muck.”37
A very similar story, which ran in November of 1828, reported that a black man in New
Orleans “ran about the city with a dagger in each hand, menacing every person who attempted to
stop him.” He was ultimately hit over the head with a brick, detained, and imprisoned.38
By the 1870s, reporters began to connect incidents of “running a muck” with the use of
hashish. The Elk County Advocate of Ridgway, Pennsylvania reported in 1874 that “running a
muck by Orientals” could be attributed to a variety of causes “as, for instance, to the
consumption of opium, hasheesh, (Indian hemp), etc. to religious frenzy, to a thirst for revenge,
or to acute mental and bodily suffering of some description.”39
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Early Reefer Madness, 1900-1920
On January 20, 1901, the Democrat and Chronicle of Rochester, New York published a
feature on Mexicans who baffled “the government by bringing in the marihuana which sends its
victims running amuck when they awaken from the long death-like sleep it produces.” It marked
the beginning of a twentieth century explosion of anti-marijuana writing. A widely reported and
particularly influential story appeared in 1904, about Manuel Guerrero and Florencio Pino, who
had spent weeks smoking “big cigarettes in which tobacco was mixed with the dangerous weed.”
On a Tuesday afternoon, they smoked cannabis and then “went out into the street shouting,
vociferating and attacking everybody.” They “marched hand in hand” and shouted that they were
the bravest men on earth “and would kill anybody who dared to say a word to the contrary.”
Then, Pino announced he was braver than Guerrero and the two attempted to kill each other. The
story concluded with an ominous prediction, “it is feared that the two men, if they recover from
their wounds, will lose their minds permanently, as is often the case with marihuana smokers.”40
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That simple story, featuring Pino and Guerrero, went viral in the summer of 1904 and
nearly two hundred papers reprinted it—many in Kansas, the first state in the nation to prohibit
alcohol. The article created a sense of anxiety and strengthened alarmist concerns about
cannabis. The two men compounded British fears of cannabis use by devolving into a form of
temporary insanity and “running amuck.” The latter activity, which the English attributed
primarily to Indian and Middle Easterners, had spread to Mexico and threatened to enter the
United States’ southern border. The narrative also highlighted the extent to which these tales
were transatlantic creations. The events told occurred in Mexico, not the United States, and
featured anxieties once prominent in the English press—insanity induced by intoxication.
Journalists and psychologists then inadvertently exported the theories to the United
States. More, a significant portion of the stories—including the tale of Pino and Guerrero—
emerged from the American owned Mexican Herald, which served British and American
business interests in Mexico City. On January 28, 1905, the Herald argued that the appointment
of special inspectors in Mexico to “see that Indian women do not sell ‘marihuana’ or other
dangerous plants in the markets of city” constituted a “move in the right direction.” The headline
demanded attention—“Drugs Act Like Black Magic.” The Herald argued that use of marijuana
caused “delirium, insanity or death” and reported “it is said that immediately after the first three
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or four draughts of smoke smokers begin to feel a slight headache; and then they see everything
moving around, and finally they lose all control over their mental faculties.” Additionally, users
tended to “see herds of tigers, lions, devils, and un-heard of monsters coming to attack them.”
Even worse, they “were not afraid at all” even as everything the smoker saw took “the shape of a
monster, and men look like devils.”41
From Pittsburgh, Raleigh, North Carolina, Hartford, Connecticut, Lancaster,
Pennsylvania, and Poughkeepsie to Buffalo, Wichita, Chattanooga, and Vicksburg, Mississippi,
the story connecting cannabis to black magic spread. The tale concluded by arguing, “people
who smoke marihuana finally lose their mind and never recover it, their brains dry up and they
die, most of the time suddenly.” These were ancient themes by the early-twentieth century and
quite reminiscent of the Salem Witch Trials, the narratives of De Quincey and Ludlow, and the
plot of Jekyll and Hyde. The theory that even limited cannabis use caused temporary insanity,
which served as a prelude to a permanent loss of the mind, echoed the theories of late-nineteenth
century British psychologists, Dr. Jacques Joseph-Moreau, and William O’Shaughnessy and
indicated the deep historical roots of the budding Reefer Madness story.42
In many cases, marijuana alarmists simply changed the headlines to stories that had
already circulated through the press. The York Daily, for example, changed the headline from
“Drugs Act Like Black Magic” to “A Weed Poison to Men’s Brains—Plant Whose Extract is
Maddening—Imparts Killing Mania—Men Who Smoke Marihuana Cigarettes Have an Insane
Desire to Slay, It Is Said.” An Oklahoma paper announced in 1907: “Marihuana Is the Name”
and argued that “United States marshals in the Indian Territory [had] discovered a new kind of
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‘dope’ which [promised] to cause even more trouble than morphine and cocoaine [sic].” Those
who indulged were “beset with the most homicidal mania” and “wanted to kill.” The “homicidal
mania,” very much like in earlier British cases involving temporary insanity inspired by alcohol,
was typically followed with “stupor and remorse. “43
Thirty years before Reefer Madness peaked in the United States, sensationalist marijuana
headlines proliferated. “Insanity and Death in Use of Marihuana Weed of Mexico,” The Fort
Wayne Sentinel howled. The Washington Post added: “Weed Sets Smokers Crazy: Marihuana
Produces Insanity in Form of Murderous Impulse Until Effects of Fumes Wears Off.” The stories
flowed through the syndicated press until, in the summer of 1907, Mexico declared war on
cannabis. The New-York Tribune published a widely shared article reporting “the effects of
smoking the marihuana weed” were so devastating that the government of Mexico planned to
exterminate it throughout the country. The article then turned to the case of Malquiades Mireles
as an example of why such extraordinary action proved necessary. In Monterey, Mireles smoked
a marijuana cigarette and, before he had even finished it, was “seized with a fit of insanity”
which caused him to “make a murderous assault on his wife with a knife.” He then stabbed a
police officer, who overheard the man’s assault on his wife and responded, and ran for several
blocks as police pursued. Mireles then turned to fight them and “was struck over the head with a
club and knocked senseless.” In Guadalajara, “several hundred convicts in the prison” were
“crazed by smoking a deadly drug known as marihuana, which was smuggled to them.” As a
result, they formed together and incited a riot.44
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As Mexican immigration rose in response to revolution, refugees moving north brought
marijuana across the border. Thereafter, the American press began characterizing the substance
as even more dangerous than opium. The El Paso Herald argued in 1912 that “the marihuana of
the Mexican” was “worse than the other drugs” but that all of them “wreck and ruin life.” The
Herald, an early exporter of marijuana related anxiety, called the substance “The Mexican
Opium” and claimed it produced “effects similar to those of the hasheesh of India or the opium
of China.” The plant, it averred, caused “mental delusions and hallucinations that frequently
[ended] in homicidal or suicidal mania.” The Arizona Republic also called it “stronger than
opium” and compared it to the “hasheesh of the east.”45
The emergence of the Reefer Madness narrative had a complicated history and its success
in swaying popular opinion depended on a variety of factors. First, the idea that intoxicants of
any variety could cause temporary madness or permanent insanity had become something of a
truism not just in the west, but on a global scale; an idea believed in China, Japan, India,
England, France, the United States, and etcetera. The media’s insinuation that marijuana revealed
a darker version of the user, one hidden under normal conditions from the public, highlighted the
Victorian belief in double forms. Journalistic insistence on this aspect of the storyline
represented an homage to Thomas De Quincey, the Hashish Club, Bayard Taylor, Fitzhugh
Ludlow, and Robert Louis Stevenson. The presence of black magic and demonic possession, a
persistent leitmotif, added a Biblical grimness of the kind that inspired the Salem Witch Trials.
As early as the 1910s, the emerging Reefer Madness narrative encouraged anti-marijuana
laws at the local level. In June, 1915, the El Paso city council passed an emergency ordinance to
prevent the sale of marijuana. The measure made “it unlawful for any person, firm or corporation
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or association of persons to sell, barter, exchange, or give away or have in his or their possession
any marihuana, or Indian hemp.” In Santa Ana, California, a local sheriff pushed for a country
law outlawing the substance. The local paper argued “the trouble with the weed is that it is just
as likely to make a murderer out of the smoker as it is to make them a dancer.” The Deputy
District Attorney planned an ordinance “making it a misdemeanor to have the seed, to grow the
stuff or have it in possession either dried or undried, root, branch, leaves, flowers, pods or seed.”
New York’s The Sun claimed “cocaine, opium, and morphine are nursery tonics compared with
marihuana,” arguing “one who takes it becomes instantly mad and proceeds to do whatever is in
the mind with an insane courage.” The publication enumerated the sensational claims beneath the
headline “Worst Vice in the World.”46
By the 1920s, stories of marijuana induced madness dominated sensationalist press
coverage. The Baltimore Sun argued in 1924 that “all the vicious tendencies in the makeup of
humans” was brought “to the fore by indulgence in the dreaded marihuana weed.” In this telling,
“victims of the habit” had the tendency “to lock themselves up in a small, tightly closed room”
where they placed “a quantity of the weed in a pot over a bed of coals.” The subsequent “fumes”
then drove “the occupants into a frenzy.” The article included a sketch of Mexican men packed
into a small room overlooking a pot of marijuana, whose fumes drifted upwards. Inside the
fumes was a portrait of the devil looking down on them. It added weight to the idea that “its
hold, once its talons have been fastened on a victim” was “most tenuous” (like the Devil himself)
and after using it once or twice, a deep addiction developed and it could only be treated by
physicians. It was worse than liquor, which had “less tendency to arouse a man to fight”
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Cannabis, on the other hand, brought “all the vicious tendencies to the fore” and furnished
“untiring energy and fearlessness to make them more troublesome.”47
“The use of the drug is not limited to Mexicans,” the story continued, “although by far
the greater number of smokers of that race.” It further noted that “a few negroes and quite a
number of white youths are marihuana fiends.” There is little doubt that an influx of Mexican
immigration after the revolution in 1910 spurred the sense that cannabis had become uniquely
menacing, but that anxiety fit relatively neatly within a western tradition of shackling feared
“others” with the entirety of America’s problem with drugs. The American and British press had
similarly demeaned Chinese men and opium dens during spikes in immigration after the Civil
War. Then, they pivoted to a repudiation of Indian and Egyptian men and their alleged cannabis
use in the 1890s. From there, the narrative attached Italian, Polish, and Russian men and
morphine and cocaine use at the turn-of-the-century. Finally, it pivoted to focus on Mexican men
and marijuana in the early 1900s. The tendency, in fact, would characterize America’s response
to drug use for the rest of the twentieth-century. It was a shameful response, but it had precedent
and made Reefer Madness a later iteration of it; one propelled to levels earlier panics did not
reach due to a more rapidly produced and sensationalist media.
By the 1930s, cannabis-related social anxiety peaked, began to inspire national and
international political action, and greatly accelerated the rise of the Prohibition State. In the
process, it validated, normalized, and nationalized a folkloric perception of the drug crisis that
continually undermined the rationalist spirit that guided laws like the Pure Food and Drug Act
and the Harrison Narcotic Act. The response to marijuana in the early-twentieth century was not
without precedent, however. The drive against opium dens in the late-1800s exhibited that same
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spirit—and similarly focused on a form of drug use that posed little harm to social stability:
indulgence in smokable opium. While the outbreak of Reefer Madness served as a sequel to the
backlash against opium dens, the smoking opium narrative failed to achieve the complex social
shaping power marijuana inspired in the 1930s. Indeed, the relentlessly sensationalistic cannabis
coverage of that period created an era of marijuana hysteria that effectively guided the
Prohibition State through the remainder of the twentieth-century and helped maintain support for
a largescale war on drugs.
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Chapter Six
A More Sober Union: The Triumph of the Prohibition State, 1919-1939
Wilbur E. Sutton, writing for the Muncie Evening Press in 1934 argued that “the liquor
problem” had occupied so much of the public’s attention that Americans had missed a situation
that “was far worse than even alcohol excess—the smoking of marihuana cigarettes by boys and
girls.” An Elkhart, Indiana judge then called on the federal government “to root out marijuana
smoking among the young men and women of Northern Indiana.” City officials believed
marijuana had been brought to Elkhart by Mexican laborers eighteenth months earlier and that
those workers were “making considerable profit on [selling the] dope.” In a statement that surely
elevated Judge Sutton’s concern, one Indiana youth arrested for smoking cannabis informed
local police that “the use of marijuana leaves one without will. It gives to time an incredible
expansion which dwarfs the commonplace and reaches through the mind toward infinity for a
temporary glimpse of heaven.”1
That same year, a sweeping expose published by the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, entitled
“Drug Menace at the University of Kansas,” reported that the college had been overrun with
marijuana. University officials attributed the spread of cannabis on campus to travelling jazz
bands visiting Lawrence, Kansas. Will Johns, Special Investigator for the Kansas Attorney
General’s office, noted that jazz band members often resorted to “marijuana or some other drug”
in order to “obscure the monotony of their lives” and to quiet that “ceaseless thumping of jazz
night after night.” The problem then spread to University of Kansas orchestras, one of which
maintained its own campus cannabis patch. From the orchestras, marijuana spread throughout the
campus. According to the article, marijuana became popular at the university because of alcohol
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prohibition and a university rule that forbade liquor at dances. Now, “marijuana smoke” could
regularly be smelled around campus.”2
Whether it was morphine, codeine, chloroform, cocaine, heroin, opium, hashish, alcohol,
or marijuana, Americans felt besieged on all sides by drug and alcohol abuse. By the 1920s, state
and local governments, along with the federal state, had opened a two-front war on the
problem—one aimed at alcohol and the other at drugs. Drug reform had, since the turn-of-thetwentieth-century, complemented a similar drive for the prohibition of alcohol. As one gained
legal and constitutional backing, those precedents propelled the push to restrict the other. There
was consistent overlap not just in policy solutions, but the use and abuse of drugs and alcohol
were apparently also often mutually reinforcing. Journalists, politicians, and the medical
community often found bootleggers to be drug dealers, morphine addicts who suffered from
alcoholism, and former binge drinkers who, as told in the story regarding University of Kansas
orchestras, sought a cannabis high in a world without liquor. The public often viewed drugs and
alcohol as twin evils and sought to prohibit them both in equal measure.3
The various measures aimed at remedying the nation’s drug and alcohol use led to a
confluence of legal, political, and social movements directed towards prohibiting both drugs and
alcohol. The prohibition-minded state that anti-drug reformists and prohibitionists sought to
establish reached its peak in 1919. That year, the Supreme Court not only validated the power of
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Congress to regulate and prohibit opioids through a series of rulings confirming the
constitutionality of the Harrison Narcotic Act, but it also passed a historic ban on the
manufacture and sale of alcohol. It seemed to the drug and alcohol prohibitionists that a more
sober union, underwritten by tight restrictions on non-medicinal opioids and liquor, had finally
been perfected. The task of policing these twin bans on drugs and alcohol fell to one
governmental body—the Internal Revenue.4
As public support for maintaining a prohibition on alcohol eroded during the 1920s, those
two intersecting movements diverged for the first time—or so it appeared. The federal
government responded to the public’s declining support for alcohol prohibition by ensuring that
its regulations on drugs did not share the same fate as the liquor law. In 1933, when Congress
repealed the Volstead Act and the Eighteenth Amendment, the move marked a stunning
repudiation of the Prohibition State’s crowning achievement. The federal government, then,
quickly shifted its focus to that other pillar of the restrictive state—the fight against narcotics—
and utilized it as a site to rebuild the damaged foundation of the Prohibition State. The state,
once fixated on the enforcement of alcohol prohibition, rapidly shifted towards drug control and
alcohol tax violations.
While the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Harrison Narcotic Act laid the legislative and
legal foundations of the Prohibition State, the Volstead Act and the Marihuana Tax Act featured
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the state’s ability to reflect, respond, and adjust to uncertainty and crisis. Once fixated on the
rigorous enforcement of alcohol prohibition, the federal government seamlessly pivoted after the
repeal of the Volstead Act to the policing of alcohol tax violations and containing the spread of
marijuana. This elasticity maintained the core values of the Prohibition State—the gradual
evolution of a set of restrictive policies aimed at curtailing public access to drugs and alcohol.5
It was a seamless pivot illustrating a bureaucratic elasticity that protected the core values
of the state, especially the government’s capacity to develop an evolving set of policies aimed at
restricting public access to substances that seemed to threaten the public welfare. The
reprioritizing of drug prohibition also preserved the budgets and personnel invested to execute
the Prohibition State’s agenda, which changed surprising little even after the repeal of the
national alcohol prohibition law. As support for alcohol prohibition waned in the 1920s,
Congress created an independent Bureau of Prohibition also charged with enforcing drug laws.
When that seemed to fail as well, it transferred alcohol enforcement to the Department of Justice
and created the Bureau of Narcotics. After the repeal of alcohol prohibition, Congress then
created the Alcohol Tax Unit which worked alongside the Bureau of Narcotics to continue the
Prohibition State’s agenda. In that sense, it was a story of resilience and institutional elasticity
that preserved investments in federal law enforcement.
Indeed, the prohibitionist platform emerged from the repeal of prohibition relatively
unphased and found as much work policing the evasion of taxes on legal alcohol as it did
policing violations of the Volstead Act. The Bureau of Narcotics continued to thrive as well and
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focused increasingly on the criminalization of marijuana, which was perceived as a growing
menace in the 1930s. Instead of reeling from reputational and budgetary losses when alcohol
prohibition came to an end in 1933, enforcement seemed to thrive. After the prohibition of
marijuana in 1937, Congress gradually folded the Alcohol Tax Unit, along with the extensive
resources once used in the enforcement of alcohol prohibition, and partially reinvested them in
the intensifying drug war. While the media consistently portrayed the country’s experiment with
alcohol prohibition as a titanic failure, its portrayal of the war on drugs was far more favorable
and contributed to a national consensus that drug prohibition was a legitimate and vital state
function warranting a well-funded enforcement administration. The Prohibition State had
triumphed indeed.6
Prelude to the War on Marijuana: The Rapid Decline of Support for the Prohibition of
Alcohol, 1919-1933
In 1920, John F. Kramer, the first head of the prohibition unit within Internal Revenue,
claimed he loved his job so much he felt guilty receiving pay. He had no doubt that the law
would be easily enforced, that the nation largely supported it, and that all the resources needed to
win the battle would be readily granted. Congress allotted $2 million for national enforcement—
or roughly $30 million in 2020 dollars when adjusted for inflation—and hired a staff of just
1,500 officers to police the new law across the entirety of the United States. It was difficult to

6

For a review of the historical and sociological works that deal explicitly and extensively with the intersection of
alcohol prohibition and the drug war, see: David Musto, The American Disease: Origins of Narcotic Control (New
York; London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Richard J. Bonnie and Charles Whitebread, The Marihuana
Conviction: A History of Marihuana Prohibition in the United States (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press,
1974); Harry G. Levine and Craig Reinarman, “From Prohibition to Regulation: Lessons From Alcohol Policy for
Drug Policy,” The Milbank Quarterly, Vol. 69, No. 3, Confronting Drug Policy: Part 1, 1991, 461-494; Gabriel
Recio, “Drugs and Alcohol: US Prohibition and the Origins of the Drug Trade in Mexico, 1910-1930,” Journal of
Latin American Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (February 2002): 21-42; Lisa McGirr, The War on Alcohol: Prohibition and
the Rise of the American State (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2015).

206

determine in that early period just how difficult policing violations of the nation’s new alcohol
prohibition would be. Kramer, along with millions of other Americans, remained optimistic.7
To skeptics, the budget and staff allotted to the cause seemed to indicate the government
was not serious about enforcement. Frederic J. Haskin theorized that it would take “a fair-sized
standing army to enforce it” and opined that the men of the Bureau of Internal Revenue felt like
“the prince in the fairy tale who was handed a spoon with a hole in the bottom of it by an old
witch as the price of his liberty.” Moreover, the obstacles confronting the Internal Revenue, an
agency still evolving after the Sixteenth Amendment created a new income tax in 1913, were
only exacerbated by its new task enforcing prohibitions on all alcohol and opioid violations
while also overseeing the collection of the nation’s income taxes. Indeed, the tasks given Internal
Revenue between 1913-1919 had become varied and complex.8
The agency had been enforcing the Harrison Narcotic Act since 1914 and had
encountered a variety of struggles in doing so. Haskin compared the “prohibition law to the antinarcotic law” in order to highlight how difficult enforcement would likely become with the
additional responsibility of policing the Volstead Act. The problem with drugs, to him, had been
“infinitely smaller” and characterized by a number of offenders that were a “mere fraction of
those involved in bootlegging.” Even still, “it was found impossible to enforce the anti-narcotic
law until public sentiment for it had been aroused by publicity.” Nonetheless, the Bureau of
Internal Revenue was, by the 1920s, “charged with the enforcement of the Harrison Act and the
Volstead Law enforcement” in a world in which alcohol prohibition was being “patterned after
the experience secured with drug laws for many years past.” Coupling the budgets for both drug
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and alcohol enforcement served as a firewall that protected the stability of the new Prohibition
State. Prohibition agents and narcotics officers shared purpose, space, training, expertise, and
money.9
Whether it was prepared for the task or not, the federal government pursued the dual
enforcement of prohibitions on the nation’s robust and thriving drug and alcohol economies.
Frank M. Silva, director of prohibition enforcement in California, declared in 1920 that he would
also take over the work of enforcing the Harrison Narcotic Act in the state.10 Then, in February
1920, the government announced that “all agents and supervisors for the enforcement of the
Harrison narcotic act” would be transferred from Internal Revenue to the federal alcohol
prohibition director.11 Also in 1920, Congress increased the budget for the Bureau of Prohibition
to $10 million from the initial $2 million and mandated that $1.25 million of it go to the
enforcement of drug laws. From there, the teams worked together enforcing both alcohol and
drug prohibitions and, by the end of 1921, had been involved in over 42,000 violations of the
liquor laws and 9,000 narcotic offenses. The fines associated with the arrests resulted in
$3,032,174 in revenue.12
Sustaining the enforcement of a near total ban on both alcohol and opioids was, as
Haskins pointed out so eloquently, a Herculean task. Worse, it seemed as though predictions that
prohibition would lead to more economic productivity were perhaps unfounded. In an analysis of
the results of two years of alcohol prohibition, the New York Herald reported in 1922 that the
federal government had lost $361,216,118 in revenue—approximately 8% of the federal budget.
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That loss in crucial tax dollars also accompanied an $11 million budget for policing the
prohibitions on drugs and alcohol. Moreover, the report concluded that there had been no
discernable increase in bank deposits to offset those figures. One of the few bright spots in the
report came in the fact that theater receipts had increased by nearly eighty percent. While
Americans may have been taking in more theater, there were not nearly enough theatrical
productions to offset the enormous loss in tax revenue.13
From its inception, arguments against prohibition began to accumulate and reshape public
perceptions about its plausibility. One of the more powerful arguments was that the nation’s
alcohol laws had led to a correlative increase in drug dependency. A movement started as early
as 1925 connecting the two. The Washington Post noted “it has been asserted by those opposed
to prohibition that its enforcement has resulted in a large increase in the use of narcotics and
habit-forming drugs.”14 In the federal prison in Atlanta, advocates of this argument pointed out,
there were 173 persons incarcerated for violating revenue and prohibition laws. There were
322—or 21.3 percent of the population—locked up for violating narcotic laws. Not only had
prohibition led to a devastating loss in national tax revenue, according to this line of thinking, but
it also promoted a rising tide of crime and drug addiction that required expanding budgets to
combat. In turn, it was then impossible to allot those budgets because of the financial
hemorrhaging caused by the very law requiring those expanded budgets.15
The narrative of failure began to implant itself in the national political story. Advocates
of total alcohol prohibition had reckoned it would increase productivity and that working-class
Americans would save more money, which banks would then earn interest on; that crime and the
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administrative costs associated with punishing it would markedly decline and a kind of modern
utopian society would gradually emerge in response to this organically restructured economy.
The opposite seemed to be occurring. The billions lost in tax revenue were not in any way offset
by increased savings and crime.
Social commentator John Erskine wrote in 1924 that “if we had a prohibition law which
represented the will of the people, which frankly forbade the thing it was intended to stop, then
Prohibition would be here, and perhaps here to stay.” If that had happened, he surmised “we who
still prefer the Christian virtue of Temperance to the Mohammedan discipline of Prohibition,
should be voted down, relegated to the past with a good many other vestiges of Christian
civilization.”16 Had alcohol prohibition arrived with that kind of clarity, he hoped “we should be
good sports” and “accept with some show of grace the passing of a civilization we loved.” At
that point, at least, they would know, “for our comfort, that another civilization had arrived as a
substitute for it, and that those who voted us down had now the satisfaction of trying out their
new ideals.”17 Erskine believed, however, that his side was being asked to “give up a freedom we
believed in for something the other side does not believe in either.”18
It appeared to writers like Erskine that not only had alcohol prohibition been an
immediate financial failure, but that those who demanded its implementation did not even
possess the turpitude to properly enforce it. Charges of corruption and nepotism set enforcement
back early. As of June of 1922, even though the unit boasted 2,312 employees, 6 percent of the
force—120 agents—had been dismissed between June 30, 1921 and June 30, 1922. The grounds
for dismissal included “conduct unbecoming an officer, extortion, acceptance of bribes,
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falsifying accounts, and general inefficiency.” A New York Grand Jury even concluded that
“almost without exception” the agents who appeared before them were “not men of the type,
intelligence, and character qualified to be charged with the enforcement of this difficult and
important federal law.”19
Those issues infected the narcotics division of Internal Revenue too. In 1920, Dr. W.H.
Sage, one of the first heads of the division, appeared before a grand jury accused of accepting
$6,400 in bribes. A month later, he was indicted on charges of violating the Harrison Act, the
anti-opioid legislation he was charged with enforcing. Like alcohol prohibition, the oversight of
all opioid prescriptions presented a monumental—if not wholly impossible—task. In a
syndicated newspaper piece entitled “Narcotic Peddlers at Root of Grave Menace that Grips
United States,” it was reported that the extensive guidelines of the Harrison Act, which required
monthly reports from wholesalers and retailers, needed more effective enforcement. While these
mandates placed a “check on all legitimate traffic,” the Narcotics Division of the Prohibition
Unit had “never more than 170 men to enforce the statute, one hundred and seventy men to cover
the entire United States!” Not only that, but one of their figureheads faced an indictment on
bribery charges.20
Despite these setbacks in enforcement, Congress continued to expand the legislative
purview of the Prohibition State. On March 26, 1922, it passed the Narcotic Import and Export
Act—or the Miller-Jones Act. The law served as an amendment to the Smoking Opium
Exclusion Act of 1909 and placed much stronger limitations, as the title of the act suggested, on

19

Imogen B. Oakley, “The Prohibition Law and the Political Machine,” The Annals of the American Academy and
Social Science, Vol. 109, Prohibition and Its Enforcement (September 1923) pp. 165-177; Ibid, 167.
20
“Bribery Charges in US Narcotics Division,” Belvidere Daily Republican, January 27, 1920.
20
“Drug Peddlers Are at Root of Grave Menace that Grips United States,” Rutland Daily Herald (Rutland,
Vermont), April 3, 1922.

211

both the import and export of opium and cocoa leaves. The act “expressly” prohibited the
importation of any narcotic drug into the United States except the crude opium and cocoa leaves
necessary “to provide for medical and legitimate uses only.” The latter amounts would be
decided by a board assembled by the Secretary of State, the Treasury, and Commerce.21
The Anti-Heroin Act followed on June 7, 1924, which prohibited the importation of
opium for the purpose of synthesizing it into heroin, a bill that received almost no coverage in
the United States press. Pharmaceutical firms were simply instructed to sell existing supplies and
that medicinal heroin would no longer be available for consumption. While the Prohibition State
continued to expand its anti-drug platform through legislation, struggles with implementation
and the collection of objective data continued to impede real progress. The Federal Narcotic
Control Board, created by the Narcotic Import and Export Act, assigned with determining the
quantity of opium the United States needed for medical purposes, seems to have failed, over
time, to develop an accurate number.
Pointing to the evidence of a growing drug crisis, Ellen N. La Motte, writing for The
American Journal of Nursing, cited a statistic showing that the importation of opium had actually
increased throughout the 1920s. From 47,024 pounds in 1921, 135,093 in 1922, 99,353 in 1923
to 142,139 in 1928 and 140,172 in 1929. Despite the revolutionary legal developments that
empowered the Prohibition State after the First World War, rates of addiction seemed not to have
fallen according to her statistics, which were as reliable as any others of the time period. La
Motte argued “the number of addicts in America is variously estimated to range from 250,000 to
a million, similar to estimates from the 1910s. She added: “being a secret habit, and not
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recognizable until the patient is down and out, these estimates can only be the merest guesses.
There are no accurate statistics.”22
Paul Kach, of the Baltimore Bar, argued in 1926 that “friend and foe of the Volstead alike
admit its ineffectiveness” and suggested that “the present situation is well nigh appalling.” The
reasons were familiar: corruption, a concomitant disrespect for those charged with enforcing the
law, and a perceived increase in crime due to its passage—a devastating development for the
architects of the Prohibition State. Kach painted a dire portrait where “new classes of offenders
arise” and steadily added to the population of American criminals. They were “lured by the easy
profits of bootlegging.” He added that as “the expense of administration mount ever higher…not
even drunkenness decreases.” Alongside these alarming trends, he also noted that the “drug
menace grows, and terrible though that be, it is often preferable to the vile and health-shattering
substitutes used in place of liquor.”23
In the face of accusations of nepotism and corruption, the Senate responded in 1925 to a
questionnaire about whether it supported patronage in selecting prohibition agents. Eight stated
yes while thirty-five responded no. Colliers had approached the Senate after conducting a poll of
more than 260,000 Americans, in which a majority expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the
agency and its approach to enforcement. Senator Norbeck of North Dakota claimed that “the
failure of enforcement” could be attributed to those members of Congress who disagreed with
the bill and responded by appointing their friends to state enforcement agencies.
A majority of those surveyed believed that prohibition agents should be selected
according to extant civil service protocols and that the decision should be entirely removed from
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politics.24 Without effective enforcement strategies or a central bureau intent on coordinating a
professional agenda against the bootlegging industry, the predictable consequences of any
prohibition—a black market economy in the banned substance—thrived without serious
interference from a prohibition force. Even President Harding, in a message to Congress, decried
“prohibition enforcement as a national scandal.”25
In response to Hardings’ sentiment that the enforcement of prohibition represented a
national crisis, Congress, with the support of Hardings’ successor Calvin Coolidge, created the
Bureau of Prohibition in 1927. Its creation illustrated a strategy similar to the one they would
deploy three years later with the formation of the Bureau of Narcotics. These transformations
pointed to a strategy central to the Prohibition State’s survival. When faced with scandal or a
potential loss of public support, it either transferred agencies or created new ones and installed
fresh leadership that had the effect of diverting attention from the failings of the previous offices.
The creation of the Bureau of Prohibition, however, could not stem the growing tide of antiprohibition sentiment and so it was remade again in 1930 and transferred to the Department of
Justice as part of Porter’s Bill creating the Bureau of Narcotics.
By putting the enforcement of prohibition within the prosecutorial arena of the federal
government, Congress hoped to improve the agency’s reputation. It was theorized that the
Bureau of Prohibition, which was very capable of making alcohol related arrests, still had trouble
prosecuting cases because of its lack of experience gathering convincing evidence. Andrew W.
Mellon, former Secretary of the Treasury, argued that the Bureau of Prohibition should have
never been part of Internal Revenue and agreed with several congressman that it made sense to
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move it to the Department of Justice, where it would work in close contact with those
responsible for prosecuting the cases the bureau initiated in the field.
In 1932, the Bureau of Prohibition employed just 130 agents yet still managed a budget
of $9,436,646. Much of the original prohibition unit had been transferred to the enforcement of
provisions of the Volstead Act related to industrial alcohol, which was a far less controversial
area of policing. That unit employed the bulk of the prohibition agents—1,754—and maintained
budgets averaging $4.5 million. The Bureau of Narcotics, in comparison, boasted 442 agents and
a budget of $1.7 million. In that sense, the shifts were largely optical and the Prohibition State
continued to secure significant moneys and personnel. While the reduced Bureau of Prohibition
only had 130 agents, its budget was still nine times that of the Bureau of Narcotics, which had
300 more agents to support. That procurement, combined with the $4.5 million given to the
enforcement of industrial alcohol laws, meant that the budget for alcohol prohibition remained
around $15 million—or $280 million adjusted for inflation—at the onset of an economic
depression and just one year prior to repeal.26
In the early-1930s, prohibition arrests also began to decline. The Bureau of Prohibition
reported 7,033 arrests for the month of August 1932. That number was down from the 7,459
arrests in August of 1931. A majority of the agency’s work came in the form of seizures. In that
same month, it seized 1,224 automobiles and boats, 1,578 stills, 163 breweries, 264,877 gallons
of beer, 150,792 gallons of spirits, and 12,080 gallons of wine. The bureau did not maintain a
strong record in the courts, however. Of the 7, 033 arrested, 2,193 (33%) resulted in criminal
convictions; 68 led to convictions by verdict and 1,323 simply plead guilty and faced, on
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average, 170 days in jail and a fine of $164. Compared to the sentences levied against those in
possession of drugs, a Volstead violation represented a slap on the wrist.
A frenetic raid, arrest, and seizure style that led to few significant convictions
characterized the enforcement of alcohol prohibition. It was also a costly exercise. Not only had
the federal government lost the modern equivalent of $5 billion in annual tax revenue, but it
spent roughly half a billion dollars (in today’s dollars) in the enforcement of alcohol and drug
laws. In the early phase of a severe economic depression, it was increasingly difficult to justify
these administrative experiments. Worse, accusations of corruption, uneven enforcement, and the
inability to convict a vast majority of those the bureau arrested only added to the arguments of
those calling for repeal. After repeal occurred in 1933, however, the prohibition unit within the
Department of Justice simply transitioned into the Alcohol Tax Unit of Internal Revenue and
moved from the Department of Justice back to the Treasury.
The Alcohol Tax Unit that emerged after the repeal of alcohol actually represented a
restoration of the original prohibition unit. The new agency inherited the staff of the Bureau of
Industrial Alcohol and the 660 agents left in the old prohibition bureau of the Department of
Justice to bring the force of the Alcohol Tax Unit to 1,850. It was the same number of employees
the Bureau of Prohibition and the Bureau of Industrial Alcohol had two years earlier and one
year before prohibition’s end.
The Alcohol Tax Unit also maintained a nearly identical budget of $15 million—or $360
million adjusted for inflation. Those invested in the prohibition of alcohol simply pivoted, once
again, rebranded the cause, and triumphed quickly over what seemed to be an existential crisis:
the repeal of the prohibition law. Additionally, Congress had also created the highly effective
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Bureau of Narcotics, which focused on promoting a more active war on drugs, one that pivoted
quickly to a war on marijuana in the mid-1930s.
The Stepson of Prohibition No More: The Formation of the Bureau of Narcotics in the
Waning Years of Alcohol Prohibition
It would be impossible to police America’s drug problem, Pennsylvania Congressman
Stephen G. Porter argued in 1930, if it was continually viewed “as a stepson of prohibition.”
That year he introduced what became known as the Porter Bill, a plan to divorce the enforcement
of drug laws from the fledgling prohibition bureau. His efforts reorganized crucial federal
bureaucracies and marked an attempt to diversify the government’s investments in the
Prohibition State and refocus it on a new war it had a better chance of winning—the one on
drugs. Although Congress intended to continue funding the enforcement of the Volstead Act,
representatives like Porter believed it was a mistake to fixate on that issue.27
The Bureau of Prohibition, once seen as a vital administrative experiment in the
enforcement of anti-liquor law, had failed to gain footing in its battle against a deeply entrenched
substance—or so went the narrative. From 1919-1930, in fact, politicians, the media, and the
public continually charged the bureau with corruption, nepotism, abuse of power, and the
mismanagement of resources. Whether the criticism was fair mattered less than the ways those
accusations reshaped its public image, one that had been irreparably damaged by 1930. At the
same time, the narcotics division, a subsidiary agency working in the shadow of the prohibition
bureau, continued its fight with drug use, a situation many considered far more threatening to the
public sphere than the average violation of liquor laws. The agency was, as Porter said, the
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overlooked stepchild of a troubled parent and the congressman hoped to offer it the attention and
resources he believed it deserved.
The United States Congress, at the behest of Porter, who was considered an expert on the
nation’s problem with narcotics, initiated a bureaucratic reshuffling that would change the course
of the Prohibition State’s history. The Porter Bill created a Bureau of Narcotics within the
Treasury Department, under the direction of a commissioner appointed by the Secretary of State,
who would earn a $9,000 yearly salary. The new agency would also “include all present
employees of the Prohibition Bureau engaged exclusively in the enforcement of any law related
to narcotic drugs.”28 Simultaneously, Congress transferred the Bureau of Prohibition to the
Department of Justice, where it would play a supporting role in the nation’s broader fight against
federal crime. While it would continue to gain outsized budgets and a deep staff, it was
ultimately removed—as much as it could be—from the public eye, renamed, and relegated to the
shadows of federal law enforcement.29
In one fell swoop, then, the federal government downgraded the public importance of
alcohol prohibition enforcement by disbanding the Bureau of Prohibition and moved it to a new
department where it was rebranded as a subsidiary agency. Still not done, Congress then
reinvested a portion of the prohibition bureau’s budget in a campaign against drugs. In the
process, the Bureau of Narcotics gained esteem and became a prominent new face in the national
drive against crime. Porter argued that “the principal object of the bill is to take narcotics control
away from the Prohibition Bureau and added, “In my opinion the subject of narcotic control is of
greater importance today than prohibition.”30
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Porter’s bill passed just as the narcotics division fell into a crisis of corruption, ineptitude,
nepotism, and abuse of power that had similarly plagued the public reputation of the prohibition
bureau. As Congress considered Porter’s Bill, the Deputy Commissioner of Prohibition in
Charge of Narcotics, Colonel L.G. Nutt, found himself in the middle of a scandal. An
investigation revealed that his son, Roland H. Nutt, and son-in-law, L.P. Mattingly, had
borrowed money from Arnold Rothstein, notorious head of the Jewish mafia in New York, who
had made a fortune from both bootlegging and the illegal sale of narcotics. The state of New
York found money transfers from Rothstein to Col. Nutt’s family along with evidence that his
son represented the gangster in an income tax case. A grand jury ultimately determined that those
connections, while alarming, did not prevent Nutt from enforcing federal drug laws. However,
while investigating his possible connections to Arnold Rothstein, the state of New York
discovered that Nutt padded his arrest reports by including narcotic busts made by local police,
not federal agents. A new investigation into that matter then commenced.31
As a result of these allegations, Harry J. Anslinger, Assistant Commissioner of
Prohibition, replaced Colonel Nutt as Chief of the Bureau of Narcotics, which was still an
agency under the umbrella of the Bureau of Prohibition. That was about to change, however.
Two weeks later, on March 22, 1930, the House Ways and Means Committee approved Porter’s
proposal separating the control of narcotics from the Bureau of Prohibition. Then, on June 14th,
President Herbert Hoover signed the bill and mandated the new bureau be established in thirty
days.32
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The creation of the Bureau of Narcotics signaled a revolutionary change in the history of
the Prohibition State. In terms of political optics, it pointed to a willingness on the part of the
government to acknowledge that its strategies guiding the war on alcohol were not effective nor
sustainable and that it was open to change and administrative experimentation. That agility,
perhaps more than any other factor, preserved the Prohibition State. While Congress could not
abandon the enforcement of the Volstead law, it did shift its focus from pursuing liquor
violations to fighting the nation’s alleged narcotic problem. It also continued to bestow historic
budgets on the enforcement of alcohol prohibition, which became more of a hidden battle. The
rebranding of agencies that year also saved both bureaus from descending into deeper levels of
scandal, which threatened to discredit the enforcement of both alcohol and drug laws. For those
looking to investigate corruption in those agencies, the fact they no longer existed made them
exceedingly difficult to further probe.
With new leadership under Harry J. Anslinger, a mandate from the United States
Congress to pursue any and all violations of drug laws, and strong public support, the Bureau of
Narcotics wasted little time asserting itself. In one of the bureau’s first drug raids, it was clear
that Anslinger intended to escalate the government’s response to the nation’s perceived narcotic
problem. In Oakland, California on August 15, 1930, agents seized opium, morphine, cocaine,
and heroin with a street value that exceeded $100,000. It was a major bust carried out by Harry
D. Smith, supervising agent in charge of the Pacific Coast, who proposed the raid after he
intercepted intelligence suggesting drug dealers were using an abandoned building at 320
Seventh Street as a dispensary. Harry J. Anslinger then ordered the seizure from Washington,
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D.C., which led to the discovery of 127 cans of opium, one ounce of morphine, and fifty bundles
of heroin.33
The media viewed the raids favorably. Indeed, it celebrated the new bureau and those in
charge of directing its movements. In a nationally syndicated article entitled “Fight on Narcotics
Advanced,” the unnamed author argued that “the [drug] problem is akin to the prohibition
problem.” The writer of the piece then corrected himself and argued that, in the end, the two
issues could not even “be considered on the same plain” in terms of addictive potential. Even
“the most ardent wet [was] apt to fully consent to restriction of the sale and use of narcotics,” it
averred. That was because alcohol, after initial use, paled in comparison to the addictive power
opium or cocaine wielded over first-time users. In popular discourse, in fact, it was almost taboo
to question the importance of policing the nation’s drug laws, which made Anslinger’s vigorous
enforcement seem justified and appropriate.
To those who had advocated for a stronger national response to the spread of narcotics,
the notion that alcohol prohibition had accelerated the traffic in drugs held considerable sway. It
was a reiteration of the point made about marijuana use in the University of Kansas orchestra—
that the prohibition of alcohol, while perhaps admirable in its promotion of restraint, had
ultimately created a far worse problem by instigating increased drug use. In an article entitled
“Fight on Narcotics Advanced,” the author of the piece argued, “it has been said that under
prohibition of alcohol, a great many” Americans had “turned to narcotic drugs.” The writer did
not, however, want to get into a broader discussion about the similarities or dissimilarities of
alcohol to narcotics. Rather, they were simply satisfied that “something [was] being done.”34
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In a sweeping editorial titled “The Economic Losses through Drug Addiction,” writer
Frances N. Ahl contended that the narcotic menace is the most serious problem confronting our
police and other law enforcement officers.” Ahl claimed that the economic burden of the 250,000
drug addicts (which they considered a conservative estimate) in the United States amounted to a
loss of $1.57 million daily ($573,875,000 per annum). The author arrived at those numbers by
analyzing the ways “these addicts prey upon our nation to the extent of millions,” and strained
“our law enforcement system, our police, our judiciary, our jails, prisons, penitentiaries.” This
many tentacled malady made the narcotic problem “an industrial menace as well as a social
one.”35
With many of the same concerns in mind, Congress appropriated $1,708,000 for the fight
against drugs in the 1931 budget. This represented a $47,000 increase from 1930 and illustrated
the extent to which Congress, even as public revenue plummeted due to the onset of the Great
Depression, nonetheless devoted itself to greater investments in the policing of drug laws. On the
eve of the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt, amid a social milieu characterized by a sense that
the prohibition of alcohol would not survive the 1930s, Congress dutifully reoriented the
Prohibition State and prepared it for long-term survival. In the face of unexpected and
unprecedented threats posed by a decline in popular support of alcohol prohibition and economic
depression, it would be no small task.36
The appointment of Harry J. Anslinger appeared to provide the correction Porter and
Congress had hoped. The Bureau of Narcotics emerged as a far more organized, professional,
and active agency than it had been under the prohibition bureau. It communicated regularly with
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Congress, promoted awareness campaigns against narcotics, advocated for tighter municipal,
state, and national laws, and collaborated with other federal agencies to fight national crime. In
1931, for example, it participated in an effort to rid Chicago of organized crime and joined a
network of federal bureaucracy intent on using any national law necessary to cripple the city’s
notorious underworld. While the income tax law was most favored in attacking gangsters, “other
laws in use [were] the Volstead act, Harrison act, the Mann white slave act and the Dyer
automobile theft act.” The governmental branches “concerned in the war” included the Bureau of
Narcotics, the Justice Department, Immigration Service, the Coast Guard, and Customs
officials.37
Although the Department of Justice continued to actively police alcohol prohibition,
those operations faded from the headlines and were replaced, to some degree, by the more
dramatic raids of the new Bureau of Narcotics. In February of 1931, a mile north of the San
Francisco Airport, for example, H.S. Seager director of the California state Bureau of Narcotics
ceremoniously burned over a half million dollars in drugs. The San Francisco Examiner
gleefully reported that “a $600,000 opium pipe was smoked yesterday by the state of California.”
The bonfire began early in the morning as “two big garbage trucks trundled slowly down the
highway towards the rendezvous on the edge of the bay waters.” A car filled with police officers
armed with shotguns and a bevy of motorcycle police carrying sub-machine guns flanked the
trucks. Once they arrived at the bay’s edge, a large fire was built. The officers threw 8,000
opium pipes into the flames along with “cooking stoves, needles, elaborate hypodermic outfits,
crude layouts consisting of safety pins and eyedropper glasses, tins of cocaine, heroin, morphine,
marijuana, and other deadly habit-forming drugs.” Director Seager referred to the bonfires as
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“opium parties” and he expected that one more would result in the destruction of all drugs
collected by the state over the past ten years.38
The bonfire demonstrated a new and more aggressive style of national policing, but also
pointed to a kind of public performance that put on display the new resources involved in
attacking the country’s problem with substance abuse. Even though the massive pile of narcotics
burned that day had been collected over the past decade, their incineration created something of
an optical illusion suggesting that the state’s drug problem was far worse than it had previously
appeared and thus required a force much bigger than had been assembled in the past. The scene
also emphasized that, in the area of drug control, the government intended to master the
enforcement style the prohibition unit was thought to have bungled; that its failure to
successfully prohibit alcohol represented the loss of just a small battle in a larger war against
illicit substances that the federal government was committed to win.
The fight against drugs rapidly transformed into a nationwide war in the 1930s. That war
included simultaneous campaigns against smoking opium, morphine, codeine, heroin, cocaine,
and marijuana. Politicians, bureaucrats, and the media began to increasingly frame it as a war in
public discourse as well, which helped cement the idea. “The war against narcotics is now
advancing on many fronts,” a widely circulated article proclaimed in March of 1931. It explained
that “the Bureau of Narcotics seeks to control the use of habit-forming drugs through the present
laws governing their importation, sale, and manufacture.”
Demonstrating a spirit of cooperation, the United States Public Health Service also
deployed its Division of Mental Hygiene to determine the exact quantity of drugs required for
medicinal and scientific purposes in the United States. The bureau also worked with the
38
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American Medical Association, which sought the same information. The National Research
Council added to this coalition of experts by experimenting with the therapeutic value of
narcotics that possessed no addictive qualities. The paper argued “if all these methods of attack”
were coordinated then it would result in “tremendous human good.”39
The dramatic raids and the warlike phraseology did not define the entirety of the Bureau
of Narcotics mission. Indeed, Anslinger focused much of his attention on the issues that plagued
the reign of his predecessors: lack of professionalism, inconsistencies in enforcement, and
corruption. The lack of uniformity in state drug laws encouraged these issues by creating
conditions where agents’ approaches to drug crime varied from state to state—an environment
that made it difficult to train new staff and nurtured a lack of cohesion that bred corruption.
These were the same problems that hampered the success of the Bureau of Prohibition and so
Anslinger’s attempt to correct it demonstrated an overall devotion to improving the reputation of
the Prohibition State generally.
In one of his first speeches, given at an annual meeting of the nation’s druggists,
Anslinger pushed for better adherence to the Harrison Narcotic Act at the state level. He told
delegates at the annual meeting in 1931 that “a thorough enforcement of narcotic laws was
impossible as long as various state laws conflict and the Harrison drug act is limited in
application.” That kind of discord created confusion and inefficiency and he reiterated and
marketed the message of uniformity throughout the 1930s. Anslinger argued that “between the
point in which the operation of the federal narcotic laws” extended and “the point where the
operation of state narcotic laws, most of which are archaic, begins” there was an enormous
gap—or what he called “a twilight zone”—that afforded “a safe refuge for the dope trafficker
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and racketeer.”40 Anslinger believed that a national uniform drug law, simply worded, would do
more to eradicate the drug problem than any perhaps any other measure.41
As confidence in the nation’s fight against narcotics reached new peaks in the early1930s, the support for alcohol prohibition dramatically collapsed. In August of 1933, James A.
Farley, Chairman of the Democratic National Committee, declared that the enforcement of
prohibition was a joke and that the Roosevelt Administration would not “attempt to enforce
Federal prohibition laws” and would not “authorize further appointments to the prohibition
service.” While incredibly ominous news for the Prohibition State, those developments were
somewhat overshadowed by the appointment of the first woman to serve as the Chief of the
Bureau of Narcotics overseeing the regions of Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin.42
Elizabeth Bass, who had been the Democratic national committeewoman, received word
in August that she would become the latest narcotics chief in charge of the crucial district that
included Chicago. Less than a year into her tenure, Chicago papers reported “a woman has
succeeded in putting fear into narcotic law violators in three states.” Bass claimed that in just
five months she had gained 432 drug convictions out of 450 arrests and had developed this
successful record by accompanying her agents on raids and then showing up in court to testify.
She also took a hardline approach and had “come around” to the belief that imposing maximum
sentences constituted the surest cure for those addicted to drugs. “Some of my associates feared
at first that, being a woman, I would get sentimental over addicts, especially the women,” she
explained to the press, “but, of course, I don’t.”43
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Instead of reigning in the policing of drugs—like it had alcohol—the government gave
the Bureau of Narcotics wide latitude. Anslinger, in fact, spent a significant amount of time
investigating performance enhancing drugs in the sport of horseracing. The issue reached his
office due to the mafia’s involvement in racetrack gambling and Anslinger claimed that the
drugging of the animals had become a general practice when he testified before the House
Appropriations Committee in early-1934. Out of 1,200 horses, he claimed, 300 had been
“doctored just before each race.” He called it a “terrible practice” that was “ruining the
thoroughbred in the country.” Anslinger informed the committee he had already submitted to the
Department of Treasury “a memorandum proposing a federal law which might curb the
practice.” Syndicated news articles proclaimed, “Government Joins Horse Doping War” and the
Bureau of Narcotics worked directly with the state of New York to innovate a laboratory that
tested horse saliva for drugs.44
By the mid-1930s, the federal government’s approach to the regulation of drugs had been
drastically altered by Congress and the Roosevelt Administration. Support for the nation’s socalled dry laws had plummeted and the White House declared that it would no longer attempt to
enforce the Volstead Act, which had been—just a few years earlier—the celebrated pinnacle of
the prohibitionist agenda. In the process, Harry J. Anslinger’s Bureau of Narcotics emerged as a
model agency leading the Prohibition State into the modern era.
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The bureau promoted new and more uniform national drug laws to much acclaim,
advocated for efficiency and professionalism, successfully collaborated with state and federal
law enforcement agencies, and remained versatile enough to pursue developments like the Horse
Doping War. Then, from 1933-1935, there was a kind of interregnum in the war on alcohol and
drugs. Roosevelt abandoned the enforcement of alcohol prohibition and the Bureau of Narcotics
maintained a status-quo approach to enforcing narcotics violations while wading into the issue of
performance enhancing drugs. Action renewed as anti-marijuana sentiment began to spread
throughout the United States in the wake of alcohol prohibition’s repeal, infusing the Prohibition
State’s agenda with fresh energy. Simultaneously, the bureau formerly charged with policing
violations of liquor laws turned, instead, to focus on the evasion of alcohol taxes, which did
much to improve its reputation. The Prohibition State, which seemed badly wounded in 1933,
was—just a couple of year later—poised for a significant comeback.
Rogue of the Roadside: Marijuana and a New Front in the American Drug War
In 1933, the state of California officially declared war on marijuana. The Californian
called it “the nation’s depression narcotic” and claimed that William G. Walker, chief of the state
narcotic division, was cooperating with federal officials to launch “an extensive drive on all
marihuana growers, peddlers, and users.” The smoking of marijuana cigarettes, the department
alleged, had grown so rapidly in California that it represented a national menace. This increased
focus on marijuana resulted, in part, from a general transition by the Bureau of Narcotics from
the East Coast to the Pacific, where use of the substance had always been far more widespread.45
The newspaper media widely publicized this geographic shift in drug war fronts. The
Spokesman-Review of Spokane, Washington declared “Enemy Pretty Well Beaten on the Eastern
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Front” and suggested that the Pacific Coast would get renewed attention. The “incessant warfare
to control the smuggling of narcotics into the United States,” it reported, had “turned to a new
battlefront—the Pacific coast.” In many ways, the shift brought the war on drugs back home, to
San Francisco, a leader in anti-drug sentiment. The city had banned opium dens in 1875 and
developed a raid-and-arrest style of policing Chinatown that gained national attention and led to
the passage of the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act in 1909. By 1933—the year Congress repealed
alcohol prohibition—national focus turned again to California where the light this time shone on
cannabis.46
That was not the sole focus of the campaign, however, and it remained a broad war on all
forms of drugs deemed habit-forming. “Dope, morphine, marihuana, cocaine, and its sisters of
the green dragon,” The News Messenger of Lincoln, California reported, “is striking at the heart
of California homes and taking a toll that cannot be exaggerated.” Just as it had in the fight
against opium dens and smoking opium in the late-nineteenth-century, California also
spearheaded the drive against marijuana and became one of the first states to prohibit its use in
1914. The bordering states of Nevada, Oregon, and Washington did not prohibit it until 1923 and
Arizona waited until 1931. California remained a trend-setter in the drug war—especially in the
explicit connection of drug use to immigrant populations and their cultures.47
The sensationalistic stories progressed. William G. Walker, chief of the California’s
narcotic division, claimed a local school teacher stood accused of instructing children “how to
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use and become addicted to morphine” and that “marihuana cigarets [sic]” were being “peddled
to school children and ‘thrill-struck’ adolescents” for twenty-five cents. In Humboltd County, he
continued, a man smoked one cannabis-laden cigarette and “cut off the head off his best friend.”
Walker concluded that marijuana was “second only to heroin for creation of cruelty streaks in its
victims.”48 Even though alcohol traditionally served as the cause of public disturbances across
the United States, marijuana and heroin, by the 1930s, were billed as unique agents capable of
inciting frightening mayhem.
These kinds of sensationalized stories then spread eastward—just as those involving
opium dens had at the turn-of-the-century—and began to influence the national narcotics
narrative. In New York, it was reported that “narcotic authorities throughout the country” had
started “a grim, intensive drive against the use of marihuana, one of the most insidious and
pernicious dope evils of the twentieth-century.” The anti-cannabis narrative, which had been
circulating since the late-nineteenth century, reached its pinnacle during the 1930s. The
substance, considered relatively benign throughout the nineteenth-century, had now become a
centerpiece of a new war on drugs.
According to the “campaign” in response to the threat marijuana posed would be
“prosecuted” with an intensity that no “similar past crusade” had known. Still, it would
“probably fail.” The problem, those involved in it suggested, was far more entrenched than
American citizens realized. Because it could not be eradicated wholly in the short term did not
mean a monumental effort should not be waged. Indeed, authorities in New York urged the
nation to conduct a “savage thrust against marihuana.” It was particularly menacing because
addicts could grow it locally. If a person sought cocaine or heroin, the only way to obtain it was
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from a dealer, but marijuana could be grown in window boxes, in backyards, or on any “patch of
earth.”49 That made the substance particularly alarming to those inclined to fear its spread. Like
tomatoes or kitchen herbs, any American could grow marijuana and then consume or sell it. For
individuals convinced it destabilized society, the backyard-garden nature of the plant’s
composition created panic. This panic was then exacerbated by the popular association of
marijuana use with violent crime. Harold V. Smith, Chief of the Pennsylvania Narcotics Bureau
began a war against cannabis in that state as well and argued that “a great deal” of “industrial
unrest and sex crimes” could be attributed to those “under the influence of marihuana.” These
sorts of comments illustrated the ways in which media alarmism began to significantly infiltrate
the thinking of policymakers, who then used incredibly sensationalized, alarmist, and martial
language to inspire government action.50
As this crusade against cannabis gained momentum in 1934, it was still unclear which
agency would ultimately house the old prohibition unit. That presented a moment of uncertainty
in which the forces behind the Prohibition State’s continuation pondered the future of the
personnel and resources that had already been invested in the war on illicit substances. It became
immensely clear, however, that those focused on arresting substance abuse in the United States
had no intention of retreating. Instead, they merely pivoted—seamlessly—to new fronts. Having
gained experience in the fight on drugs in the opening decades of the twentieth century, the
media, along with local and federal agencies, seemed poised to attack cannabis in unprecedented
ways. At the same time, those agencies and journalists involved in combatting the substance
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increasingly marginalized discussions about whether cannabis actually posed the risks they
alleged it did.
In that environment, the fight against marijuana expanded and took on the appearance of
a socially necessary war. In a “special laboratory” maintained by the National Research Council
at the University of Virginia, for example, researchers experimented with what they called
“dopeless dope.” To those involved in the program, it represented the only viable option in
reducing a problem the agency considered to have accelerated beyond logical control. The best
statistics available suggested there were in excess of two million Americans addicted to drugs.
Those numbers were never fully trusted because it was assumed most Americans refused to talk
about their addictions. It was a silent scourge. That rationale made it impossible to accurately
assess the exact number of dependents and provided space for a wide range of theories regarding
the true extent of the problem. Many of the experts consulted still nonetheless believed that
“since the advent of prohibition, the use of drugs [had] increased steadily.” They alleged that
throughout the 1920s the number of addicts had quadrupled. National Research Council
scientists nonetheless believed it might be possible “to keep the bee and remove the sting.” In
other words, it hoped to provide the desired qualities that led to continual use while eliminating
the concomitant physiological dependency.51
This broad collaborative effort to eradicate the use of drugs in American society, which
was thought to have greatly increased in the wake of the repeal of alcohol prohibition, had much
to do with Anslinger’s leadership at the Bureau of Narcotics. Unlike his predecessors, he avoided
scandal, promoted cohesive action, and perhaps more importantly, was adept at marketing war
on illicit substances in ways no other bureau chief had been. His office conducted that public
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campaign through editorial pieces, speeches delivered at professional conferences, educational
programs, interviews, and on the radio. Shows like “Crisis in Drug War” played with regularity
on the Columbia Network. Cumulatively, the newspaper industry, along with state and federal
agencies, developed what is best described as a public relations campaign against marijuana.
In 1932, East Coast radio stations ran Anslinger’s speech to the World Narcotic Defense
Association’s annual conference that year, where he spoke about “The Part of the Federal
Government in the Narcotic Drug War.” The airing also included a similar speech by Edward P.
Mulrooney, entitled “Part of Municipalities in the Narcotic Drug War.” It concluded with the
Honorable Charles H. Tuttles’ talk “Coordinating the Power of the Federal Government, the
States, and the Municipalities in the Narcotic Drug War.” These educational programs informed
the public about the menace marijuana allegedly posed while also introducing the administrative
solutions the speakers deemed necessary in curtailing its spread.52
As the nation transitioned from its failure to enforce alcohol prohibition, the Bureau of
Narcotics and its advocates in the media made it clear that the nation faced a different and more
important war against drugs. This pivot was not unique to the United States and could not be
attributed solely to the efforts of the Bureau of Narcotics. Support for alcohol prohibition did not
collapse in the United States alone, but also in Canada, England, Russia, Finland, and throughout
Europe. Similarly, the shift from a failed experiment with alcohol prohibition to a new war on
drugs occurred elsewhere too. Indeed, the United States efforts were part of a transnational war
on drugs. In May 1931, 51 nations met in Geneva to discuss the “civilized world’s fight on the
drug traffic.” It was the most “extensive effort yet” to gain national cooperation in controlling the
global manufacturing of narcotics. In response to an alarming increase in drug addicts on the
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streets of London and in British asylums, Scotland Yard waged “an intensive war” against
“heartless traffickers.” England estimated that roughly 90% of all those confined to mental
institutions had arrived there due to the abuse of narcotics.53
The drug war also spread to Canada and The Gazette of Montreal, Quebec announced
that “Mounties’ War on Drugs Continue,” arguing that officers there worked dutifully to break
up an international drug smuggling ring in Canada. The members of this alleged ring, “including
Chinese,” were falling “into the net laid by the Mounties.”54 In March of 1931, a report from
Paris noted that the country’s “secret police” had begun a “drive to trap international drug
traffickers operating on a big scale between France and the United States.” Then, in September,
1933, the Egyptian government ordered 10 British planes to “deal with the growing practice of
smuggling drugs—particularly hashish—throughout the Sinai desert.” The aircraft included
bomb racks, machine guns, cameras, and radios.55
That level of international coordination in fighting the 1930s wave of drug crime was
evident in Washington, D.C. In December of 1934, a conference held by the Department of
Justice illustrated the extent to which the national government sought to orchestrate a more
aggressive, scientific, and coordinated assault on the nation’s alleged crime epidemic. J. Edgar
Hoover, director of the division of investigation of the United State Department of Justice,
presented a paper entitled “Detection and Apprehension,” Judge Charles W. Hoffman, of
Cincinnati, focused on “Modern Youth and Crime,” and New York Attorney General John J.
Bennett, Jr. spoke about “Commercial Racketeering.”56
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Harvard Criminologist Dr. Sheldon Gleuck read “The Place of Proper Police and
Prosecution in a Crime Reduction Program” and newspaper editor Stanley Walker delivered
ideas on “The Opportunities of the Press in the War against Crime.” H.V Kaltenborn elaborated
on the place media held in the effort by discussing “The Role of Radio in an Anti-Crime
Movement” and a Hollywood executive complemented it with “The Screen’s Contribution to the
Prevention of Crime.” Harry J. Anslinger appeared at the conclusion of the conference to discuss
“The Narcotic Problem” he claimed plagued the nation. Connecting various crime waves to the
use of cannabis was an established trend by the 1930s. England attempted to connect it to crimes
involving temporary insanity in the late-nineteenth century. In Mexico, the assertion that
marijuana inspired criminal activity led the country to declare war on it. By the time the United
States adopted that narrative in the 1930s, it had developed deep historical roots.
Despite this level of organization and coordination at the national and international level,
state legislatures were still reticent to pass uniform drug laws. In Springfield, Missouri, Jack
Arthur Fisk, twenty-two years old, was suspected as being the source of the marijuana smoked
by local high school students. He was arrested and jailed for sixty days, but only served two
weeks of the sentence because it was discovered that Missouri had no anti-marijuana law. Judge
R. Jasper Smith ruled that the state had violated his rights by charging him with “contributing to
the delinquency of a minor” as cannabis was not mentioned in the statute. The judge concluded,
“The only way the state can get convictions legally of persons dealing in marihuana is for the
state legislature to pass an act against it.”57
The situation in Missouri represented a local political problem that hampered the success
of the Bureau of Narcotics’ call for rigorous enforcement and blunted the momentum of the
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American war on drugs. Many states still struggled to sternly enforce the Harrison Narcotic Act,
which was, in 1934, twenty-years old. The San Francisco Examiner reported, “Campaigning to
enlist the States in its drive to suppress drug peddling physicians, the Federal Narcotics Bureau is
urging all forty-eight legislatures to adopt a uniform anti-narcotics law.” The expansion of the
Prohibition State required a broad state level buy-in and the media, along with local and federal
officials, pushed for uniform laws. As of December, 1934, the uniform bill had been adopted by
nine states and 17 had applied for drafts of the act. Forty-four state legislatures met in 1934 to
consider a uniform narcotic law that not only strengthened the mandates of the Harrison Narcotic
Act, but also included new measures to criminalize marijuana.58
George F. Zimmer, a former Special Agent for United States Naval Intelligence, wrote
that “legislatures of forty American states” would convene in January of 1935 and would be
asked to “do what forty-five foreign nations” had already done—enact uniform narcotic laws. In
a radio address delivered in March of 1935, President Roosevelt called upon state legislatures to
pass more stringent drug laws that would align them with the national government and the
international community, which had outlined its agenda in Geneva the year before. The President
suggested that passing uniform legislation, which also banned marijuana, would allow the state
legislatures to “give their own people far better protection than they now have against the
ravages of the narcotic drug evil.”59
As the public formed its understanding of marijuana, its effects, and the extent of its use,
sensationalist and militaristic commentary thrived. Kenneth Clark, Chief Correspondent of
Universal Service, wrote that “shocking crimes of violence” were increasing due to the
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consumption of cannabis. He continued, quite vividly, by suggesting that marijuana had led to
“murders, cruel mutilations, maimings [sic], done in cold blood, as if some hideous monster was
amuck in the land.” He also claimed that the “underworld” had tuned to the drug as a way to
“subjugate the will of derelicts.” Commenting on a series of anecdotal cases, including a young
Florida boy who executed his entire family with an ax after smoking the substance, Clark asked,
“mothers and fathers of America, WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO ABOUT IT? Do you want
this fate for your sons, your daughters?” He believed two things needed to be done immediately.
First, “federal law must be broadened and strengthened to bring this dope under control, to
smash this hideous menace.” Secondly, individual states had to pass “narcotic drug acts” that
would “outlaw marijuana, as well as all other dope, and provide drastic punishment for
offenders.”60
To illustrate the power of a new and improved federal policing force, the bureau took part
in an attempt at cleansing the nation of its illegal drug problem in the spring of 1935. It was a
drive to “mop up” crime and it immediately led to the arrest of 1,909 Americans across the
nation. Media commentary referred to this demonstration of Prohibition State activism as the
“most sensational coup against the underworld ever attempted by the federal treasury.” The
campaign included the Bureau of Narcotics along with 12,000 officers of the Treasury
Department, who “swept through the country from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the
Canadian to the Mexican borders.” It linked all officers of the Treasury Department together in a
raid “cut deeply into the ranks of counterfeiters, bootleggers, narcotics dealers, and other law
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violators.” By the end of the campaign to “stamp out all forms of lawlessness,” over 2,000
Americans were arrested, 580 of them for narcotics alone.61
Emphasizing the symbolic importance of this campaign, Eleanor Roosevelt wrote “the
greatest weapon against this [narcotic] evil is public opinion” and she hoped that the “recent
narcotic drives” had focused the attention of the courts and the public on the problem. The goal,
to her, was the imposition of “severe sentences” on drug addicts so that they would not “be
allowed to return to society” until they had been rehabilitated. The First Lady reiterated an ethos
that had been embraced by her husband—that drug addicts had to be sufficiently punished,
broken of their habits by any means necessary, and slowly reintroduced to law-abiding society.
This line of thinking had characterized the Herbert Hoover administration, which created the
Bureau of Narcotics, Harry J. Anslinger, mainstream journalists, and a wide network of local,
state, and federal politicians, judges, and law enforcement officials.62
These overt attempts to reshape public opinion marked a crucial evolution of the
Prohibition State’s agenda. As it passed drug reform laws in the early-1900s, including the Pure
Food and Drug Act and the Harrison Narcotic Act, public opinion had not significantly factored
into decision making. With the collapse of the Volstead Act, however, it became clear that future
reform efforts would require a more sustained focus on winning over the general public and
convincing them of the necessity of action. In the meantime, the Roosevelt administration made
efforts at expanding the government’s interests in containing the nation’s drug problem through
executive action.
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Roosevelt’s administration spearheaded the creation of a $5 million federal narcotics
“farm” outside of Lexington, Kentucky, which opened in the summer of 1935. It spread over
1,000 acres and had been built to rehabilitate upwards of 1,500 American addicts. A formal
dedication for the new “farm” took place at 2pm on May 24, 1935 as a crowd of politicians and
bureaucrats filed into the auditorium in the main building of the compound. The ceremony began
with the song “America” and an invocation by Reverend George O’ Bryan. Josephine Roche, the
first woman appointed as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury by President Roosevelt, followed
with “a greeting from the Treasury Department.” United States Surgeon General Hugh S.
Cummings delivered the dedicatory address, Dr. A.W. Fortune, pastor at Central Christian
Church delivered the benediction, and the ceremony closed with the playing of the Star-Spangled
Banner. With the farm in Lexington, the federal government now entered into the business of
rehabilitation and exerted its power over all phases of drug dependency in the United States.63
William F. Conhurst wrote that the farm, a revolutionary new concept in the nation’s
effort to reform the more than 100,000 drug addicts in the United States, would offer
“wholesome, beneficial surroundings under the care and custody of the United States Public
Health Service.”64 Conhurst asked, “What makes a man take dope?” According to the experts he
consulted, more than three-fourths of the nation’s addicts arrived at the predicament because
“previous use of opiates in medical treatment or self-treatment for the relief of pain.” Others
became addicts because of their affiliation with drug using individuals or to “allay emotional
distress or overcome drunkenness.” Those sentenced to the new federal farm included
individuals who had violated federal drug laws, those whose parole required rehabilitation before
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being integrated back into society, and natural-born Americans who voluntarily admitted
themselves. In the summer of 1935, the first few inmates were transferred from the federal
penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas to the Lexington narcotics farm to begin treatment.65
Despite these new and revolutionary methods, the drug problem continued to evolve in
new forms. In the summer of 1935, reports of a “suicide epidemic” amongst the United States
military in Panama began to circulate. It started with an editorial in Nelson Rounsevell’s Panama
American, in which he alleged soldiers were driven to the smoking of marijuana as a way of
“seeking solace from harsh and cruel treatment” by their superiors. He demanded that the
Secretary of War investigate the deaths of four soldiers during the six-week period from May
20th-July 5th. Indeed, the destructive potential of marijuana smoking seemed limitless. The Los
Angeles Times reported that “when a Mexican of the lower class runs amuck, tries to snip off the
ears of his wife with a carving knife, cut the throat of his compadre, and it takes six to eight burly
American policeman to get him to jail—when those things happen, I say, it is as clear as day that
the little chap, who otherwise would be no stronger than a cat, has been smoking marihuana.”66
The persistence of alarmist marijuana narratives increasingly lured the Bureau of
Narcotics into the fight against cannabis. Anslinger announced another federal drive in 1935 and
told the press that “marijuana smoking is increasing, while the use of other drugs is decreasing.”
He suggested it was primarily used by those Americans who were between the ages of 18-22
and, “in order to satisfy their cravings,” the addicts committed petty thefts or turned into
shoplifters in order “to get money to pay for their cigarettes.” He also claimed that “the surest
way to insanity,” as far as drugs were concerned, came through the smoking of marijuana as it
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destroyed “all reasoning power” and broke down “a person’s ability to judge space, time, and
distance.” At this point in the drive against marijuana, government officials spread
sensationalistic tales of marijuana as prolifically as the sensationalist press. In many ways,
Anslinger—more than any figure before him—nationalized the alarmist anti-marijuana media
narrative. By corroborating stories of marijuana inspired crime sprees, Anslinger not only
bolstered the media’s narrative, but also used it to shape public opinion and justify historic
government action.67
Anslinger’s theories, which he used to enhance the bureau’s importance, mirrored the
cannabis-related sensationalism that flowed regularly through the American press. In “The Fight
Against the Hashish of America,” a widespread newspaper feature, the author began,
“marihuana—a dread name, with terrifying implications—has appeared on the American scene
to give officials of the United States Bureau of Narcotics a more difficult problem than the
treacherous opium of the Orient, morphine, cocaine, or heroin.”68 It continued, “For to this
unusual plant, so these officials say, may be traced many of the most horrible crimes in recent
history.”69 The bureau’s efforts to protect American citizens against its presence, however, had
been handicapped by the fact there was “no federal law controlling it, although 34 states and the
Territory of Hawaii” had moved to regulate its sale and consumption.70
This intensified war on cannabis became the face of the Prohibition State in the wake of
the repeal of alcohol prohibition. Yet, the enforcement of alcohol laws had not significantly
lessened. Even though it received far less press than the headline grabbing drug war, the Alcohol
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Tax Unit nonetheless seized 904,295 gallons of illicit liquor, 19,024,255 gallons of mash, and
made 34,480 arrests. The Bureau of Narcotics, during the same period, claimed 7,108 ounces of
narcotics that led to 2,560 convictions. As the headlines increasingly focused on the war with
marijuana, the Alcohol Tax Unit quietly continued its crusade on illicit booze. Indeed, in 1936, it
even began to grow and received an allotment of $773,240—in addition to its $15 million
budget—to be spent on new employees. In the process, the Bureau of Narcotics received an
additional $25,850 for “expenses and purchase of field equipment.”71
The war on alcohol tax violations, however, did not have the public appeal that the war
on drugs did. The government’s perceived failure to properly police the prohibition of alcohol
was still relatively fresh in the American mind. At this point in the story, in fact, the repeal of the
Volstead Act had occurred just three years earlier. The battle against marijuana, however less
relevant than the pursuit to ensure that the national government received its fair share of liquor
tax revenue, ultimately dominated the public image. In a pamphlet distributed in honor of the
Tenth Annual Observance of Narcotic Education Week—sponsored by the International Narcotic
Education Association, Inc. and the World Narcotic Defense Association—the Bureau of
Narcotics was extensively quoted. This week of awareness, held from February 22-29, focused
on marijuana. The plan for 1936 was clearly outlined. First, it called for governors of states and
territories to issue proclamations requesting citizens and organization to join in the observance of
the week. Secondly, it requested that press and radio give publicity to the narcotic problem
through news items, editorials, educational materials, and broadcasts. Thirdly, ministers, Sunday
school teachers, Y.M.C.A., Y.W.C.A., W.C.T.U., and other religions organizations were to
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devote one meeting or part of a meeting during that week to discuss the dimensions of the
nation’s drug problem.72
The program ultimately pointed to a broad socio-political collaboration that included both
the private and the public sector. Universities, colleges, public, parochial, and private schools
would offer “narcotic menace study” and “clubs, fraternal orders, civic, and philanthropic
groups” were to give the “narcotic problem serious attention by addresses, discussions, and
study.” Then, the organizers offered a few points under the byline “for special emphasis.” They
included, first, “efficient narcotic law and prompt and effective action against violators by the
courts.” The program then promoted the enactment of the Uniform State Narcotic Drug Act and,
finally, an “active campaign against the Marihuana menace, including uniform legislation.”
These efforts indicated the arrival of a new era in the drug war, in which unprecedented national
coordination thrust the topic to the forefront of American politics. This effort benefitted, of
course, from the unity inspired by Franklin Roosevelt’s approach to the Great Depression. The
drug war, then, served as a rare moment of cohesion—offering the country a moment to rally
around a topic over which few Americans disagreed. With anti-marijuana policy, then, the
Prohibition State found a way to expand in the face of its perceived failure to successfully
manage the prohibition of alcohol.
Similar to efforts at controlling the spread of opium, morphine, cocaine, heroin, and
alcohol, the battle against marijuana had international reach. In November of 1934, in Geneva,
Switzerland, the international community had gathered again to refine its policies on drugs. The
Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium and Other Dangerous Drugs focused on “the abuse of
cannabis in the United States.” Importantly, it cited the records of the Bureau of Narcotics, which
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had a clear role in shaping the foreign agenda. A League of Nations Memorandum noted that
“The records of the Bureau of Narcotics indicate that geographical distribution of wild cannabis
in the United State may be said to be mainly in those States bordering the Gulf and the Republic
of Mexico.”73
The Prohibition State also continued and expanded its role in preventing the importation
of drugs from foreign countries—an activity it began in that first International Opium
Conference in Shanghai in 1909. Regarding importation, the committee cited the “Food and
Drugs Act” of 1906, which mandated that “collectors of customs are directed to refuse delivery
of all consignments of dried flowering tops of the pistillate plants of cannabis sativa” unless
receiving a “penal bond” ensuring it would not be sold for purposes other than medicinal. The
committee declared cannabis was highly addictive and had the potential to create “psychomotor
activity with a tendency to wilful [sic] violence accompanied by a complete loss of judgment and
restraint.” The evidence presented on that international stage was often culled from the American
press. Oftentimes the examples used, in comparison to the variety of sensationalistic options, did
not seem to confirm any other point than marijuana could be easily purchased on the streets. In
one instance, those gathered discussed the story of a boy from Atlanta who purchased the
substance from a food vendor:
While walking up around the curb market in Atlanta, Georgia, I passed the stand of the
hot tamale man who asked me: ‘Do you want any hot tamales?’ I said ‘Don’t you have
anything stronger?’ He said: ‘Yes’ and sold me two marihuana cigarettes for twenty-five
cents. I had never seen this kind of cigarette before. I smoked one of them and it game me
a headache. Then I smoked the other one and began to feel it. My mind changed in a
queer sort of way. I craved some more of the cigarettes; and, not having any money, I
pawned my shoes for one dollar and bought a bag of dried leaves to roll my own. After a
couple of more cigarettes, I began to feel like I was on top of the world. I would walk up
to anyone and ask them for anything without hesitancy. Then I felt like I would do
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something desperate. However, I was very tired and fell asleep for two whole days and
nights.74
This anecdotal tale from Atlanta, provided by the Bureau of Naroctics, had been
submitted as evidence buttressing the idea that the country suffered from a marijuana epidemic.
Although not nearly as alarmist as other stories, the article continued to illustrate the power the
media played in shaping national and global marijuana policy. The Bureau of Narcotics, in fact,
collected alarmist anti-marijuana news stories and disseminated them as evidence of a drug
epidemic. The League of Nations, for example, also quoted “an investigation carried out in a
district in New Orleans,” which uncovered that “out of 450 prisoners, 123 whose aged ranged
from 18 to 31 years, were marihuana addicts and there were 68 arrests during 1930 for the sale
and possession of this product.” The Narcotic Education Association, which worked closely with
the Bureau of Narcotics, quoted the same statistics.75
In one of its pamphlets from the 1930s, the Narcotic Education Association reported that
“out of 450 prisoners, there were 125 marihuana addicts, all of whom were young people ranging
in age from 18 to 31 years; our of 37 murderers, 12 were addicted to the use of Marihuana and
out of 193 persons convicted of important thefts, 36 were similarly addicted. About one out of
four of all persons arrested in the city were Marihuana addicts.” The nature of this investigation,
or even the organization that carried it out, was never revealed. Yet, it was cited in both domestic
educational pamphlets, internal Bureau of Narcotics documents, and even in Geneva at a meeting
of the League of Nations. These stories, which circulated internationally, continued the trend of
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institutionalizing highly questionable statistics, facts, and incidences related to the global
marijuana problem.76
The anti-cannabis campaign of the 1930s illustrated the ways in which prohibitionist
forces gained ground in post-repeal America. Indeed, those responsible for the failure of alcohol
prohibition enforcement, like Harry J. Anslinger, became the leaders of the anti-drug movement.
Anslinger’s bureau emerged as the most ascendant force in post-repeal America. His attacks on
the nation’s opioid epidemic, skill at avoiding scandal, and adept promotion of the bureau’s core
values led to a situation in which the federal government was finally able to put marijuana on a
path towards criminalization.
While the threat of marijuana seemed to appear out of nowhere in the 1930s, that was
mostly due to the new national exposure it received. “A Chemist,” writing to the St. Louis Star
and Times, argued that “marijuana is no new drug or dope. I have known it for twenty-five years.
You are right when you state that marijuana is used as a substitute for liquor.” The writer also
believed that “marijuana, cocaine, morphine, heroin, opium, all alcoholic beverages and five
other drugs are habit forming and known by all expert chemists.”77
In Louisville, Kentucky, officials declared that bootleggers—who had “for the most part
folded up their joints and silently turned to honest toil or other rackets”—had transitioned to
bootlegging “the loco weed of the southwest.” In an environment heavily dependent on anecdotal
evidence, the suggestion that alcohol prohibition had led to a dramatic increase in drug addicts
continued to assert itself and while Harry J. Anslinger did not create this narrative, he
masterfully utilized it to gain support for his bureau and the fight for uniform state laws.78
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From his office in Washington, D.C., Anslinger remained in contact with field agents and
petitioned the newspaper media for printed copies of sensationalist cannabis-related tales. In
1937, he wrote his District Supervisor in Denver and requested that he “please endeavor to
ascertain and advise this Bureau the name and date of the newspapers carrying the story relating
to the following incident:”
In Denver, Colorado, agents of the Federal Narcotic Bureau had made arrangements with
one Halloway for a purchase from a ‘plant’ of stolen cocaine. It was generally known that
Halloway was addicted to marijuana and that a short time before, in a restaurant, he had
made an unprovoked assault upon a policeman in full uniform who had entered to get a
cup of coffee and who had to club Halloway into unconsciousness. Nevertheless, the
night before a purchase of cocaine was to be completed, Halloway AGAIN RESORTED
TO THE USE OF MARIHUANA, ran amuck, attempt to shoot his wife, mortally
wounded her grandmother and, after shooting it out with police officers, finally killed
himself.
Anslinger signed the request “Very truly yours,” and sent it from Bureau headquarters in
Washington, D.C.79
Anslinger collected these stories and then utilized them as a body of evidence pointing to
the potential dangers of unchecked marijuana use. He presented Ralph H. Oyler, the District
Supervisor in Detroit, Michigan, with a similar entreaty. “Please endeavor to ascertain and
advice this Bureau the name and date of the newspaper carrying the story relating to the
following incident:
Sometime ago the silence of the state prison at Marquette, Michigan, was shattered by the
sound of fusillade of pistol shots and an hour later a kindly prison doctor lay dead and
beside him lay the trusty who had given his life trying to save his friend, the doctor. An
investigation developed that arms and ammunition had been smuggled into the prison in
the false bottoms of herring containers and that the MARIHUANA from which Tylczak,
the murderer of the doctor and trusty, had derived his demoniac courage, had also been
smuggled into the prison.
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Reflecting popular assumptions about marijuana use, Anslinger urged the nation’s law
enforcement to “search for marijuana behind cases of criminal and sex assault” claiming that “in
more than a dozen recent cases of murder or degenerate sex attacks, many of them committed by
youths, marijuana proved to be a contributing case.” The collection of this information—much of
it resulting from questionable journalistic practices—showed the internal workings of the
Prohibition State and the methods it used to advance its agenda. It also marked a significant
turning point. Prior to Anslinger’s reign at the Bureau of Narcotics, government officials rarely
used sensationalist media accounts of the problem to push agendas. While a great deal of
alarmism surrounded the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act and the Harrison Narcotic Act,
Congress ultimately analyzed the problem, as best it could, through a rational lens. Anslinger
changed course and, in a landscape where little accurate information on the dangers and extent of
marijuana use existed, he utilized salacious narratives connecting the substance to a variety of
evils.80
Anslinger also claimed the “menace” had been relatively new to the United States and
that, in 1931, his “marijuana file” had not even been two inches thick. By the mid-1930s,
however, the cases had expanded to the point that they crowded “large cabinets.” The problem
had not been well known, according to him, until an outbreak of unprovoked crime occurred,
much of it reported by a press that had a long history of connecting violent crime with drug use.
One case involved the murder of an entire family by an otherwise sane Florida teenager who had
no recollection of committing the multiple homicide. Anslinger noted that during “the years 1935
and 1936,” marijuana related crime saw its most rapid growth in the traffic.” He strongly
reiterated that all law enforcement agencies and communities had to stand up against it. His
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confession, however, that much of his marijuana knowledge came from the stories he sought and
accumulated from the alarmist press, seemed to confirm the influence the newspaper industry
had on drug policy and enforcement.81
In some cases, Anslinger received and responded to letters from American citizens,
showing his deep dedication to the marketing and promotion of the battle against marijuana.
Functioning more like a media liaison than a bureau chief, Anslinger spent inordinate amounts of
time collecting anecdotal news stories and responding to the general public. On June 30, 1937,
Jack Golien, of the U.S. Navy, wrote about the time, several years earlier, when he was stationed
at Coco Solo, Canal Zone. While there, he “learned that many of [his] fellows were using
marihuana cigarettes” and that they could be purchased anywhere along the zone. His colleagues,
however, preferred “rolling their own” and “getting their weed from the different Army Posts,
principally at France Field, where there was a large garden of it under cultivation.” Golien then
confessed that he had—for the duration of up to a year—used cannabis in the form of gum. He
considered himself “one of the few people” able to “throw it aside.” He was now over sixtyyears-old and wanted to see “this thing placed with the other drugs that are handled by
[Anslinger’s] bureau.” He concluded by explaining to Anslinger that “this note is uncalled for,
but I hope you will see that I would like to help in the work you are doing.”82
Anslinger’s correspondence with the public also indicated the success of his marketing
efforts. His campaign against marijuana had become so widely known in the United States that
individual citizens wrote him letters and—rightly—expected he would read them. His agency
was accessible and open to the public. Anslinger’s experience in the failed war against alcohol
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likely taught him that this kind of connection with the general public was the only way to ensure
the long-term success of Prohibition State goals. In that sense, Anslinger oversaw the
democratization of the Bureau of Narcotics, which had been connected from its inception to the
Prohibition Bureau. That office, unorganized and unresponsive to the public, did not resemble
the 1930s Bureau of Narcotics.
In response to one Americans’ plea to send the Boy Scouts and Girl Scouts out to help
search for and destroy marijuana, Anslinger wrote, “I have received and given careful
consideration to your letter of June 20, 1937” and assured him that the “Bureau appreciates your
interest in the problem of eliminating the abusive use of marihuana.” Anslinger believed,
however, that there were “objectionable features that would make the plan impracticable in its
execution and dangerous in its consequences.” First, there was the danger of “arousing unhealthy
curiosity on the part of some of these young people relative to the physical effect of the use of
marihuana.” He feared that curiosity could lead to a possible “spread of the habit among the
young, which we are, of course, anxious to avoid.” He also mentioned to his correspondent H.R.
6906, which had already been passed by the House of Representatives. The bill, he claimed,
would “curb the production, traffic, and use of marihuana for abusive purposes, through the
instrumentality of a taxing measure.”83
There were those who dissented. Even at the time, these sensationalized marijuana
narratives were—to many—difficult to swallow. A few of Anslinger’s sources indicated as
much. In response to his request for the murder of the doctor in a Michigan prison, L.J. Ulmer
responded “I am sorry that I do not know the name of the newspaper carrying that story. As a
matter of fact, the story is not entirely correct.” He pointed out that “undoubtedly this newspaper
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story refers to the killing of Dr. A.W. Horbogen in our Prison Hospital here five years ago.”
Ulmer was, at the time, a member of the State Prison Commission and he was part of the
investigation into the smuggling of guns into the prison. First, he informed Anslinger that the
“guns did not come in herring cans, but they came in Hormel chicken cans” and that “we were
never able to prove definitively that Marihuana had anything to do with the men who were
concerned in the plot which looked like an effort to escape. We have always surmised that they
did have Marihuana, but we were unable to find any at the time.” A more logical picture
unfolded from the letter, in which inmates—interested in escaping—smuggled in guns and used
them to carry out the plan. The marihuana, maybe tangentially related, had never been found.84
George Vincent Holliday was more forceful and argued that while he “did not approve of
the general consumption of marijuana or any other drugs indiscriminately termed narcotics,” he
balked at the “alleged horrors connected with their use” which he considered “no more revolting
than the monstrously publicized mouthings of the professional reformers who hysterically
condemn them.” Many of the “facts” used by reformers, he informed Anslinger, were “utterly
unfounded on fact, sheer tripe.” He argued that “much worse stuff has been published, of course,
but rarely with full governmental approval.” These reformers—in this case Madame Wright and
the Parents and Teachers “outfit”—would have been, to Holliday’s mind, “much better occupied
with a study of eugenics, rather than narcotics.”85
Men like Holliday were on the wrong side of history—at that moment in time. When
Congress finally passed the Marihuana Tax Act of 1937, the bill inspired little opposition. The
relative silence around new drug reform measures indicated the level of deep public consensus
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on the issue. So, like the Heroin Act of 1924, the Marihuana Tax Act was quietly implemented.
The debate around the dangers of marijuana had already taken place by then; not in the halls of
Congress, but rather in the newsrooms, churches, and schools of America. It was a narrative
driven by the media, coopted by Harry Anslinger and his bureau, and presented to institutions
like the League of Nations and the United States Congress as a new and grave danger.
James F. Finneran, secretary of Massachusetts State Pharmaceutical Association, claimed
that the law was of “such a stringent nature” that it would “in all probability mean that the drug
would no longer be used medicinally as the amount used is small and conditions under which the
drug may be sold are so severe it will not be profitable for manufacturers.” Whereas the
prohibition of alcohol dealt with a widely used and culturally entrenched substance sure to
become a black-market commodity, the use of cannabis had been marginalized in mainstream
circles for years and its ban introduced a far less controversial and manageable prohibition. On
many levels, the passage of marijuana prohibition illustrated the power of the lessons learned
from the undoing of the Volstead Act and marked the reemergence of a leaner and more
organized Prohibition State.86
It helped that marijuana had never been fully trusted. From the 1840s to the outbreak of
Civil War, the medical community hoped it might become an anesthetic with the power of opium
(but without its infamous side effects). When it proved, in response, to be erratic, incapable of
subduing patients according to expectations, and ultimately ineffective, the medical community
quietly pivoted from its use. That made the substance vulnerable to being rebranded by the
newspaper media, adroit agents like Anslinger, and a United States Congress eager to reassert
federal policing power in an era in which it had been dramatically challenged through the repeal
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of alcohol prohibition. Without medical viability—confirmed by a network of physicians who
disavowed its use—cannabis, or the otherized “marijuana” that it became, provided an ideal
substance in the reformation of the post-repeal Prohibition State.
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Conclusion
On March 3, 2020, federal prosecutors announced charges against a physician in
Scranton, Pennsylvania, who was charged with “overprescribing controlled substances for no
legitimate medical purposes.” The physician, who operated a pain management clinic, allegedly
wrote prescriptions for “massive amounts of controlled substances, primarily opioids” and had
started doing so in January of 2014. The indictment claimed that more than eighty percent of the
doctor’s prescriptions were for controlled substances and that many of his patients visited more
than one pharmacy in a single day to fill them. Federal authorities raided his clinic and house,
seized assets, and the doctor now faces trial.1
The federal prosecution of the physician illustrates the enduring power of the drug
regulatory state. Opioid laws, largely modeled after 1914’s Harrison Narcotic Act, passed over a
century ago, which placed physicians under strict oversight and made it illegal to prescribe
controlled substances in the interest of maintaining an addiction. While there are those who
protest the validity of this approach and advocate for maintenance clinics similar to ones found
in Europe, there has been no significant alteration of the law in over a century. In Scranton,
Pennsylvania, in March of 2020, the core mandates of that policy continue as strong as they were
over a century ago.
In other areas, however, many values of the regulatory state have not aged well.
Incarceration statistics clearly show the continued vitality of drug war thinking. As of 2020,
forty-five percent of those in federal prison are serving time for “drug offenses,” a number that
far outpaces any other punishable crime. Indeed, the second most common offense in the federal
prison population is a violation related to weapons, explosives, and arson—crimes that led
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30,720 Americans to prison”.2 In 2012, statistics showed that twenty-eight percent of those
incarcerated in federal prison for drug crimes were there due to infractions related to crack
cocaine and twenty-six percent because of powder cocaine. Twenty-four percent of the federal
prison population could be attributed to methamphetamine-related crimes. Additionally, twelve
percent received sentences that came as the result of marijuana possession, and six percent
because of heroin. More disconcerting, Black Americans, who represent over thirteen percent of
the United States population, make up thirty-seven percent of the federal prison population. That
grim fact is largely due to the so-called war on drugs, which has been managed by agents of
Prohibition State era bureaucracy.3
At the same time, the Prohibition State’s war on marijuana, which emerged as a signature
way it stabilized itself after the repeal of the Volstead Act, has been lost. In 2020, eleven states
and Washington, D.C. have legalized recreational marijuana, and a majority of the states have
eased restrictions on the medicinal use of marijuana.4 In the 1930s, anti-marijuana activists
pushed for the criminalization of marijuana and pursued it by passing state laws aimed at
compelling federal prohibition. In the 2010s and 2020s, public sentiment and public policy are
moving in the opposite direction. Pro-legalization activists are making strides at the state level
and gaining support for a federal undoing of cannabis prohibition. And, harkening back to the
nineteenth century, the notion that marijuana is a valuable medicine has regained popular
acceptance and researchers and physicians are again looking for new cases in which it might
prove effective.
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As public officials grapple with the overpopulated federal prison population, critiques of
the American drug war accelerate, and as states move to legalize marijuana, a very real opioid
epidemic lingers in the backdrop. According to the Department of Health and Human Services,
over ten million Americans “misused prescription opioids” in 2018. That same year, over 67,000
Americans died from drug overdoses making it the leading cause of injury-related death in the
United States. The idea that American physicians who prescribe opioids and the pharmacists who
fill the prescriptions requires federal oversight is as strong as it was in the early-twentieth
century. Indeed, in late-twentieth century America—just as in the late-nineteenth century—
physicians, the media, and public officials turned to address an opioid epidemic. This time
Oxycontin replaced intravenous morphine, but the response remained relatively the same in that
it sought to curtail access through stricter oversight of the medical and pharmaceutical
profession. It did so while also seeking to criminalize prescriptions of opioids when they
flagrantly violated anti-maintenance philosophies.
The foundation of the Prohibition State, then, remains stable. Congressional legislation,
focused primarily on restricting public access to opioids, passed from 1901-1914, has survived
the decades relatively well (with the exception of the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act). A more
complicated story characterizes the legislation passed between 1914-1937. The Volstead Act
prohibiting the manufacture and sale of alcohol did not survive the 1930s. The push for federal
marijuana reform, pursued in the wake of the repeal of alcohol prohibition, passed and was
continually strengthened throughout the twentieth century. Following its perceived failure to
effectively enforce the prohibition of alcohol, the federal government turned towards the waging
of a more vigorous campaign against narcotics.
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It was not until Richard Nixon’s election in 1970 that the Prohibition State made
significant modern gains. Congress passed the Controlled Substances Act, which created a
classification system ranking drugs based on their alleged danger. According to that system,
marijuana became one of the most dangerous drugs in the world. Not only did these moves
create controversy, but they also put the regulatory state on a trajectory that would lead to the
further erosion of the public’s trust in its effectiveness. These policy shifts in the 1970s also led
to the notion that President Nixon began the so-called war on drugs. In reality, Nixon’s new
battle against drugs simply modernized Progressive Era and New Deal policy initiatives—
including the continued and dramatic overstatements regarding the threat posed by cannabis.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, cocaine continued to pose social problems just as it had
at the turn-of-the-twentieth century and the Prohibition State shifted to address them. With strong
regulatory and punitive laws already in place, state and federal government enabled the law
enforcement community to strictly enforce them. Consequently, the Prohibition State’s
weaknesses emerged once again. Since the passage of the Smoking Opium Exclusion Act in
1909, the enforcement of drug laws tended to focus disproportionately on people of color and/or
the impoverished. Nearly from the beginning, the enforcement of drug laws often appeared to
overwhelmingly and irrationally punish Americans based on class, race, and ethnicity. Whether
it was Chinese, Eastern European, or Mexican immigrants, Black Americans, Russian Jews, or
poor White Americans, each suffered from what appeared to be an unfair application of the
punitive tools developed by the Prohibition State.
As Black Americans entered the prison system in record numbers due to the sale and
possession of crack cocaine in the 1980s, it was clear that Prohibition State initiatives had
changed little since 1908. The government viewed the same substance—powder cocaine—as far
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less of a public menace. The primary difference seemed to depend on the individual using the
substance. As powder cocaine was favored more by the white middle class, it garnered less
attention and less severe punishment. That was consistent with Prohibition State values. From its
onset, the punitive measures enforced by the law enforcement community regularly fell hardest
on poor Americans and people of color while middle class citizens were more often cast as
unfortunate addicts in need of mild reformation.
The 1990s served as a moment of transition for the government’s prohibitionist agenda.
In 1996, California legalized medical marijuana offering one of the most significant setbacks for
the Prohibition State since the repeal of alcohol prohibition. At the same time, however,
pharmaceutical companies began pushing the sale of Oxycontin, a powerful opioid, that was then
liberally prescribed in a landscape in which the enforcement of regulations on doctors and
pharmacists had been significantly loosened since the 1910s. Since the early-2000s, Americans
have faced with an anomalous situation, in which Prohibition State values have been
significantly damaged through the continued legalization of cannabis but also more relevant than
ever due to an entrenched opioid epidemic.
American public support for the so-called “drug war” has collapsed in important ways.
The martial terminology casting the nation’s efforts at controlling narcotic policy has always
been misleading, however. Polls indicate that Americans disapprove of the harsh punitive
measures associated with the Prohibition State and there is growing support for reducing
sentences for non-violent drug offenses. A majority of Americans also support the decriminalization and legalization of marijuana. These numbers are then used to suggest the nation
is ready to end “the war on drugs.” The Prohibition State’s power, however, has historically
rested on the regulation and control of opioids. Given the dire situation regarding the modern
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opioid crisis, it is unlikely Americans are prepared to support the elimination of oversight related
to pharmaceutical drugs.
Drug history is repeating itself, but in episodic ways. As the medical community has
restored its optimism regarding the healing power of cannabis, mirroring trends in the profession
most prominent in the 1840s and 1850s, an opioid crisis has unfolded. Following a familiar
trajectory established in the late-nineteenth century, drugs like Oxycontin, widely used by the
middle-class, has trickled into the working class.
There is much hope in the modern public response, however. Instead of turning against
the use of all drugs deemed illicit in response to an opioid crisis, Americans have adopted a more
nuanced perspective. The legalization of marijuana continues as does a keen sense that poor
Americans and people of color should not be disproportionally penalized. Researchers are also
actively exploring the possibility of using psilocybin mushrooms to treat mental issues related to
trauma and chronic depression. Instead of demeaning accelerated opioid use and addiction in
poor white communities, the government has taken a more empathetic approach and focused on
opioid restriction and rehabilitation. That trend may be a sign of continued racialization of the
problem, but it also may indicate a more enlightened approach. More time will tell.
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